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Chapter 1
Games and solution concepts
Let us consider a group of individuals who are all interested in making profit
on some market. These individuals can choose to operate on their own, but
when two or more individuals coordinate their actions, they will usually
make a total profit which is larger than the sum of the individual profits.
Clearly, this gives an incentive for people to join in coalitions, where such
coordination of actions is possible. However, the formation of a coalition
will only take place if its members can come to an agreement on the dis-
tribution of the total profit among them. This so called a/Zocatton pro6/em
can sometimes really obstruct cooperation between people, as is illustrated
in the following simple example.
Three people, let us name them Alfred, Bert and Chris, can achieve no
profit if they operate on their own. However, if two of them work together,
they can obtain 50 dollars together. The situation is even a little bit better if
all three of them join in a coalition, because then they can obtain 60 dollars
together. It is not easy to predict which coalition will form and how the
members of this coalition will distribute the money. Perhaps Alfred and Bert
know each other very well. They could propose to Chris that they are willing
to cooperate with him, under the condition that Chris gets only 10 dollars of
the share. Then Alfred and Bert can equally share the remaining 50 dollars,
the same amount they could get without the cooperation of Chris. Maybe
Chris simply accepts the proposal. That would be the end of the discussion:
Alfred and Bert share the 50 dollars and Chris gets the remaining 10 dollars.
Maybe Chris considers the proposal unfair and refuses cooperation. That
would also be the end of the discussion, except in this case Chris leaves the
negotiations without any money. Another possibility is that Chris tries to
test the apparent friendship between Alfred and Bert by presenting a new
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proposal. In the current proposal Alfred gets 25 dollars and Chris gets 10
dollars. Chris could offer 30 dollars to Alfred if he is willing to join him in a
two-person coalition. That would leave 20 dollars for Chris, and both Alfred
and Chris would profit in this new proposal. When Alfred accepts the new
proposal endless discussions could follow.
Game theory is the branch of mathematics in which situations like the one
above are modeled and studied. Several game models exist, some focus on
situations where the interests of players are purely conflicting, others study
situations where cooperation can benefit the players. In the earlier given
example we clearly have a situation of the latter type. A game model which
is suited for describing situations like these is the so-called trans/era6/e utt/tty
yame. The term transferable refers to the assumption that players attach
the same value to a unit of utility (profit) in the game. Hence, if some utility
is transfered from one player to another, the pain of the first player is equal
to the gain of the second player, so to speak.
Formally, a tranfcrable utility game is a pair (TV, v), where Af is a non-
empty finite set, and v is a real valued function on the power set of TV,
assigning 0 to the empty set. TV is called the p/ayer «et. Its interpretation is
that of a set of individuals or players, who are free to cooperate and cluster
into coalitions. For any 5 Ç TV the u>ortn v(5) is interpreted as the maximal
profit or minimal cost that the players in 5 can achieve if they decide to form
a coalition. The function v is called the cAaracteristic /unction. Throughout
this manuscript we speak of a cooperative game or simply a game when we
refer to a transferable utility game.
Often it is assumed that all the players who are participating in a game
will work together and form the coalition iV. This leaves us with the problem
of finding reasonable rules for distributing the total profit v(iV) among the
players.
A vector x = (x,),gjy £ JR^ is called an a//ocatton. The amount x, can
be interpreted as the share of the profit which is given to player t. In a game
v an allocation x is called efficient if it distributes exactly the profit of the
coalition iV among the players, i.e. if
A widely accepted critérium for an allocation x is that every player should
receive at least the amount he can obtain by operating on his own, i.e.
*• > v({i}) for all i € AT.
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Allocations satisfying these inequalities are called tn<ftvt<fua//y rational. The
imputation «et I(v) consists of all efficient and individually rational alloca-
tions:
I(v) = {i 6 « * | X) *< = « W &nd i, > v({i}) for all i 6 N}.
The critérium mentioned above could be strengthened by demanding
that not only every player, but also every coalition SÇ JV should receive at
least the amount it can obtain by operating on its own, i.e.
i, > v(5) for all S Ç AT.
tes
In the following we denote £ .es *. by x(5). The core consists of all efficient
allocations satisfying the above inequalities:
Core(w) = {i € tt"|x(tf) = v(AT) and i(5) > «(5) for all 5 Ç AT}.
Core allocations have the property that no coalition can improve its situation
by splitting off from the grand coalition AT. Hence, if core allocations exist
for a game v, then it is very likely that the grand coalition N forms, and
that the profit v(iV) will be allocated according to some vector in Core(v).
In the earlier given example, where the players Alfred, Bert and Chris
try to distribute the 60 dollars they can obtain, the core is empty. No matter
how the money is divided among the players, there will always be a coalition
which receives less than it could obtain by working alone. This coalition
has a plausible threat to stop cooperation in the grand coalition iV. Such a
situation can prevent the formation of the coalition TV.
The core can be viewed as a so/utton concept in the sense that it assigns
to every game a set of (reasonable) allocations. Other well-known solution
concepts are the 6aryatntny set (Aumann and Maschler [3]), the Jfcerne/ (Davis
and Maschler [13]) and the preifcerne/ (Maschler, Peleg and Shapley[33]).
The fact that these solution concepts do not assign a single allocation to
a game, but a (possibly empty) set of allocations, can be regarded as a
disadvantage. Therefore, there is also some interest in solution concepts
which assign to every game exactly one allocation. Among these, the SAap/ey
value (Shapley[50]), the prenuc/eo/u« and the nuc/eo/us (Schmeidler[48j), and
the r-va/ue (Tijs[60]) are the best known. An advantage of the prenucleolus
and the nucleolus is that they always lie in the core of the game if the core
is non-empty. Their definition is as follows.
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Let v be a cooperative game with player set JV. For an allocation z € 2R^
and 5 Ç yV the value v(5) - x(S) is called the ezceaa of coalition 5 at i .
Intuitively, the excess of coalition 5 at z can be interpreted as a measure of
discontent of S with z. Let 0(z) be the vector of all excesses at i (5 Ç # )
arranged in order of non-increasing magnitude. The prenuc/eo/us is defined
as the set of vectors in iR^ which lexicographically minimize the function
0(z) over the set of efficient allocations. The nuc/eo/u« is defined as the set
of vectors in 2R^ which lexicographically minimize the function 0(z) over
the set of imputations I(v).
The motivation of these definitions is that the coalition who is least con-
tent should be helped as much as possible, so the maximal excess should be
minimized. Having done this, we turn to the coalition with second maximal
excess, and help this coalition as much as possible, without changing the ex-
cess of the first coalition. Then we proceed with the third maximal excess,
etc. In the definition of the nucleolus we also keep in mind that the outcome
of this process should be individually rational. Notice that the prenucleolus
and the nucleolus are defined as set valued solution concepts. However, in
case of the prenucleolus, this set turns out to consist of one single point.
The same is true for the nucleolus, provided that I(v) is non-empty (see
Schmeidler|48j). We shall denote the prenucleolus of a game v by P .V(v)
and the nucleolus by •V(u).
The definitions of the above mentioned solution concepts are all moti-
vated by some intuitive sense of fairness, perhaps one more convincing than
the other. But in all cases, the plausibility of such a motivation depends on
the assumption that the worth v(S) of a coalition is interpreted as a profit
and not as a cost. Therefore, each solution concept has its counterpart,
which is applicable in case v(S) should be interpreted as a cost. We shall
give the definitions of the counterparts of the imputation set, the core, and
the (pre)nucleolus respectively.
The antt-tmputalton set of a game v is defined as
AI(v) = {z e « " | £ XJ = w(JV) and z, < v({t}) for all ï G JV}.
The anft-corc of v is defined as
ACore(v) = {z € J?*| x(tf) = v(tf) and x(S) < v(5) for all 5 Ç JV}.
Also the prenucleolus and the nucleolus have their counterpart in the so-
called anh'-prenuc/eo/us and anti-nuc/eo/us. In case the values v(S) are in-
terpreted as costs rather than savings, the excesses at z can be interpreted
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as a measure of content with i . Therefore, it is more natural to arrange the
excesses in non-decreasing order, and to maximize this vector lexicographi-
cally. In case of the anti-prenucleolus the maximisation is performed over the
set of efficient allocations, in case of the nucleolus the maximization is per-
formed over the anti-imputation set. Anti-prenucleolus and anti-nucleolus
are denoted respectively by y^Jv^t;) and yUV(v).
With a game v one can associate its so-called rfua/ game v*, which is
defined by v*(5) = v(JV) - v(JV\S) for all S Ç AT. The term dual becomes
clear by observing that (v*)* = v. We have the following relationships
between a game v and its dual.
• Core(v) = ACore(w').
= il? JV(v').
Unfortunately, it is not true in general that JV(v) = ^^(v*). However,
when Core(t>) / 0, the nucleolus and the anti-nucleolus coincide, so in that
situation we have -V(f) = >lA/(v*).
In this monograph we consider various classes of cooperative games, such
as traveling salesman games, minimum cost spanning tree games and assign-
ment games. As the names suggest, each of these games is closely related to
a well-known combinatorial optimization problem. The general idea behind
this is the following. A group of people, denoted by AT, work together in
some project. Each subset 5 Ç N can form a coalition, and if they do so,
they will try to maximize their profit or minimize their cost in this project.
The set of possible actions that coalition S can take corresponds to the set
of feasible solutions of some combinatorial optimization problem associated
with 5. The worth u(5) is taken to be the profit or cost which results from
an optimal action or perhaps from some specified heuristic action of S. In
this monograph we investigate the properties of some cooperative games,
which are related in this way to a combinatorial optimization problem. We
have mainly concentrated on the structure of the core and on the nucleolus
of these games.
Often the combinatorial optimization problem associated with a coalition
5 is defined on a weighted graph. For an overview of literature on games in
which graphs play this role, we refer to Sharkey[53].
The outline of this monograph is as follows. In chapter 2 we consider
games for which the characteristic function is defined on only a subset
S Ç 2^ of coalitions. The interpretation of the collection S is that of the
collection of formable coalitions. The motivation to consider such games is
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that in some situations communication between players may be hindered, in
which case only coalitions need to be considered for which full communica-
tion between players is possible. Models like these are studied in Myerson[38]
and Owen [44]. The reason to consider these games in this monograph is that
the core and the nucleolus of some interesting classes of games only depend
on coalitions in some suitably chosen collection 5, not because cooperation
between players is restricted, but simply because of the inherent structure
of these games.
In chapter 3 we consider games which are associated to the traveling
salesman problem. Chapter 4 deals with games which are in some way
related to the minimum cost spanning tree problem, and chapter 5 is devoted
to games arising from the (multi-dimensional) assignment problem. In all
of these chapters we pay special attention to the core (or anti-core in a cost
situation) of these games. In some cases we also investigate the nucleolus.
The structures we discovered in these chapters led us to the more general
question of how a certain structure in the characteristic function of a game
influences the structure of the core. In chapter 6 we establish relationships
between properties of the characteristic function and the number of extreme
elements of the core.
Chapter 2
Games with restricted
cooperation
2.1 Restricted cores of games
In this chapter we consider cooperative games (N,v) in which there is a
restriction on the formation of coalitions. Situations like these are described
in Myerson[38] and Owen[44], where cooperation between players is only
possible if there exists a communication link between them. Let us denote
the collection of formable coalitions by S Ç 2^. In this situation it is natural
to take only coalitions in B into consideration in the definition of the core.
The B-resirtcte<f core is defined as
Core(B,t>) = {i G 1R* | z(JV) = v(W) and i(B) > t/(J3) for all 5 € B}.
The B-restricted core is also investigated by Faigle[l6]. In that paper, the
concept of balancedness for games with a limited set of formable coalitions
is generalized, and a generalization of the well-known Shapley-Bondareva
theorem is derived. Also, the concept of convexity is generalized. These
general convex games may have an empty core, but obviously necessary
conditions turn out to be sufficient to guarantee the non-emptiness of the
B-restricted core.
In contrast with the unrestricted core, the restricted core is not necessar-
ily bounded. In Derks and Reijnierse[l5{ necessary and sufficient conditions
on B are given, such that the B-restricted core is bounded.
Notice that core restrictions may be redundant. In a game v a coalition
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5 is said to b« e««enh'a/ if
X] ^C) ^ ***'* non-trivial partition T of 5,
TeT
where a partition is called non-trivial if it contains at least two non-empty
sets. Remark that all 1-person coalitions are essential. The set of essential
coalitions is denoted by £ (t>). Essential coalitions are the only coalitions
which are needed in the description of the core. This is seen as follows. Let
5 be a coalition which is not essential. Then there exists a partition T of 5
into essential coalitions such that u(5) < Z)reT f (T). When we sum up the
restrictions corresponding to the coalitions in T, we find
x(5) = £ x(T) > £ v(T) > *(S).
ret T6T
Hence, the restriction corresponding to coalition 5 is implied by the restric-
tions corresponding to the coalitions in T. It follows that
Core(f (t/),v) = Core(v).
The set of essential coalitions can be a considerably smaller set than 2^.
In this case it is clearly an advantage that one only has to take essential
coalitions into consideration.
2.2 Partitioning games
Throughout the remainder of this chapter it is assumed that the collection
S contains all 1-person coalitions as well as the grand coalition iV.
Kaneko and Wooders[27] introduced parhttonrnp james. Let v be a game
with player set N and let S Ç 2^. If a collection T Ç S forms a partition
of 5 Ç TV, then T is called a S-partition of 5 and X^reT "(^) ^ called the
va/ue of T. A B-partition T of 5 with maximal value is called a m ait mo/
B-partition of 5. The game v is called a porttttontnj yame tn</uce<f 6y S if
t>(S) equals the value of a maximal S-partition of 5 for all S Ç JV. The fact
that all 1-person coalitions are members of S ensures that every coalition
has at least one B-partition. The class of partitioning games induced by S
is denoted by GS(N,B). The notation GS is due to Kaneko and Wooders,
and stands for games with sidepayments.
For any S ^ B the S-partition T for which v(5) = X)rer "(^) must
be a non-trivial partition. Hence, 5 cannot be essential. We conclude that
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only coalitions in 5 can be essential for games in GS(7V, B). Therefore, the
fl-restricted core coincides with the core.
Kaneko and Wooders prove that all games in GS(Af, 8) have a non-empty
core if and only if every extreme solution of the system
AB = 1 for a U i e ^ , A B >Ofor all B e B (2.1)
is integral. This theorem is strongly related to the notion of perfect matrices.
Let A be a matrix whose entries are all 0 or 1, having no zero column.
The matrix A is called per/ect if every extreme solution of the system Ax <
l , z > 0 is integral. See e.g. Golumbic[2l]. Let us index the members of
B, except the 1-person coalitions and the empty coalition, and define the
matrix A* by
8 ( 1 if • G S,
' 1 0 otherwise.
We call the collection B per/ect if the matrix A* is perfect.
Observe that Kaneko and Wooders' theorem is equivalent to saying that
all games in GS(JV, B) have a non-empty core if and only if the collection B
is perfect. In order to prove this theorem it is convenient to formulate the
search for a core element as a linear programming problem. Define the core
prot/em or CP(B,v) by
min
subject to z(fl) > v(B) for all B € B.
The dual of CP(B, u) is the /ractiona/ partitioning pro6/em FPP(B, v) defined
by
max £ B 6 B ABV(B)
subject to Z)fl:teB AB = 1 for all i € AT
A B > 0 for all £ G B.
Observe that the integer version of FPP(B,t>), is precisely the problem of
finding a maximal B-partition of TV.
If the optimal value of CP(B,t>) equals v(W), then the set of optimal
solutions of CP(B, u) is exactly the B-restricted core and as we have observed
earlier, for games in GS(JV, B) the restricted core coincides with the core.
In the following we shall prove Kaneko and Wooder's theorem by showing
that the optimal value of both FPP(B,v) and CP(B,v) equal v(JV) for all
u € GS(./V, B) if and only if B is perfect. We need the following two lemmas.
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Lemma 2.1 Let B Ç 2" onrf /et v : B -» J2. For eacA 5 Ç Afwe denote tAe
va/ue o/ a mazt'ma/ S -partition w.r.t. tAe wetaAt/unctton v 6y w(5). TAen
i^  TAc /eofli6/e reoton* o/ CP(B, v) and CP(B, u>) coincide.
froo/ : Proof of i): For each B e 8 the set {B} itself forms a S-partition
of B with value v(B). Hence w(B) > v(B), since u>(B) is the value of
a maximal S-partition. It follows that the feasible region of CP(B,w) is
contained in that of CP(B,v). Now let i be feasible in CP(B,v) and let
# G fl. Choose a B-partition T of B such that u/(£) = EreT "CH- ^
follows that
x(fl) = 2 *(T) > E «(T) = «(fl).
TgT r e r
So z is also feasible in CP(B,w) and we conclude that the feasible region
of CP(B,v) is contained in that of CP(B,u;). Hence, the feasible regions
coincide.
Proof of ii): First we prove that the function u; is superadditive, i.e.
u;(LT) f u;(K) < tw((/ U V) for all f/,V Ç Af with tf n V = 0. Let 5 and 7
be B-partitions of £/ and V respectively, such that w(£/) = Z)seS
= EreT "(^)- Now, S U 7 is a B-partition of £/ U V, so
v(T) =
ses reT
We have to prove that for each 5 Ç
= max{ ^ u;(T) | 7 is a B-partition of 5}.
reT
From the superadditivity of u; we obtain
> max{ ^ u;(T) | 7 is a B-partition of 5}.
TeT
We have seen in i) that w(fî) > v(5) for all B € B. From this it follows
that
tu(S) = max{Erer " C ) I T is a B-partition of S}
< max{EreT *"(^) I T^  is a B-partition of 5} .
D
In Nemhauser and Wolsey[39] (page 536) the following lemma is proved.
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Lemma 2.2 L«( A k a n t n x n matrix, ana* /ft 6 € J?". /4// extreme element*
o/ tAe po/y/»e<fron Ax < 6 ore intégra/ i/ ana* on/y i/ max{cx | Ax < 6} M
intégra/ /or a// c € Z" /or wÀtcÀ tnt.» /infar program Aas an optima/ so/ution.
Now we are in a position to prove Kaneko and Wooders' theorem.
Theorem 2.3 TAt /o//ourtng statement* are effuiva/ent.
i. S i» per/ect.
it. £very same in GS^ TV, B j Aas a non-empty core.
Proo/: Suppose that B is perfect and let v G GS(/V, B). Let A be an extreme
optimal solution of FPP(B.v). The perfectness of B ensures that A~B 6 {0,1}
for all £ € B. Let T = {fl € B I As = 1}. Then T forms a B-partition
of TV, and since it is the result of a maximization, it must be a maximal
B-partition of AT. Since v G GS(/V,B), it follows that EreT "(T) = v(#) .
We proved that the optimal value of FPP(B.v) equals v(/V) and according
to the duality theorem of linear programming it follows that the optimal
value of CP(B,v) is also v(7V). We conclude that Core(B.v) ^ 0, and since
Core(v) = Core(B,t>) for games in GS(JV,B), also Core(v) 5* 0.
Now suppose that every game in GS(7V,B) has a non-empty core. We
have to prove that B is perfect. According to lemma 2.2 it suffices to show
that the optimal value of FPP(B,v) is integral for every integral valued func-
tion v : B —» Z. For each 5 Ç JV we define tu(S) as the value of a maximal
B-partition of 5 w.r.t. the weight function v. According to lemma 2.1 we
have u; € GS(iV, B). By assumption u; has a non-empty core, so we con-
clude that the value of CP(B,u;) equals u>(./V). Also according to lemma 2.1,
the feasible regions of CP(B,t>) and CP(B,u;) coincide, so also the value of
CP(B,t>) equals u>(yV). According to the duality theorem of linear program-
ming the value of FPP(B,v) equals ty(A )^: an integer. •
A coalition 5 Ç TV is called B-sta6/e if
B-partition T of 5.
T6T
A coalition which is 2^-stable is simply called sta6/e. Using theorem 2.3 one
easily proves the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4 Let u 6e o game untA p/ayer set TV ana" /et B Ç 2^ 6e per/ect.
T/ien tAe B-restricted core o/v is non-empty, t/an</ on/y t/tAe grand coa/ition
is B-sta6/e.
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Proo/: The necessity of B-stability is trivial, so let us prove sufficiency. For
each 5 Ç TV we define tu(S) as the value of a maximal B-partition of 5 w.r.t.
the weight function u. According to lemma 2.1 we have u; G GS(TV, B).
Since IV e Î we have tu(TV) > u(^ V). The B-stability of TV in v ensures
that ti;(TV) < v(TV). We conclude that u>(TV) = v(TV). From the fact that
the feasible regions of CP(B,v) and CP(B,w) coincide, it now follows that
Core(B.v) = Core(B,tu). Applying theorem 2.3 to tu € GS(TV, B) we derive
Core(B,t;) = Core(B,u;) = Core(u/) ^ 0.
Our objective is to provide sufficient conditions on B, such that the col-
lection perfect. The theory on per/ect orap/is can guide the search for such
sufficient conditions.
2.3 Perfect graphs and perfect collections
In a slightly different form, the results in this section can be found in
Golumbic[21|. Let G (TV, £) be an undirected graph. A subset 5 Ç TV is
called a c/tgue if {i,j} € £ for all i , j € 5. 5 is called a maxima/ c/içue if
it is a clique and if it is not a proper subset of another clique. The clique
matrix of G is the (0, l)-incidence matrix whose rows correspond to a// of
the maximal cliques of G, and whose columns correspond to the vertices
of G. The graph G is called per/ect if its clique matrix is perfect. This
definition of a perfect graph is the one which is also used in Nemhauser
and Wolsey[39]. Another definition, purely in graphical terms, is given in
Golumbic[2l]. It is shown both in Nemhauser and Wolsey and in Golumbic
that the two definitions are equivalent.
Let A be an m x n (0, l)-valued matrix. Let G be the graph with vertex
set TV = { 1 , . . . , n} and an edge between i and j if the t-th and j-th column
of the matrix .A have a 1 at corresponding places. G is called the intersection
yrap/i of the matrix A. The intersection graph of a collection B is defined as
the intersection graph of the matrix A*. The following lemma establishes a
relationship between a perfect collection and its intersection graph.
Lemma 2.5 // B Ç 2" is a per/ect co//ection, (Aen t/ie intersection orapA
o/ B is a per/ect yrapA.
2.3. Perfect graphs and perfect collections IS
Proo/ : For any m x n matrix M let P(M) = {x € IF* | M i < l , x > 0}
and let P/(M) = conv{x G « " | M i < l , x > 0, x integral}.
Let G = (TV, £ ) be the intersection graph of 8. Furthermore, let A
denote the matrix A*, and let A be the clique matrix of G. We shall first
prove that P(A) Ç P(A). Let a be a row of the matrix A. Obviously, the
collection S = {i G TV | a, = 1} is a clique (not necessarily maximal) in the
graph G. Let C be a maximal clique in G which contains 5 as a subset, and
define the vector â by ôj = 1 if t € C and 5, = 0 otherwise. 5 is a row vector
of the matrix A and we have 5 > a. Observe that the restriction ax < 1 is
implied by the restriction âx < 1 and the restrictions x, > 0 for i G C\S.
Hence, every restriction in the definition of the polyhedron P(A) is implied
by some restrictions in the definition of the polyhedron P(A). It follows that
P(Â) ç P(A).
Now we shall prove that P/(A) Ç P/(A). Suppose x G P/(A). Since A
is without zero column, it follows that x < 1, that is, x is a (0, l)-vector.
Define S = {i G TV | x, = 1}. Suppose I ,J G S are adjacent in G. Then some
row of A, say a, has a 1 at places i and j . This yields ax > 2, contradicting
the fact that Ax < 1. We conclude that no two elements of 5 arc adjacent
in G. It also follows that 5 contains at most one vertex of every (maximal)
clique in G. This yields Ax < 1, and hence x G P/(Â).
Now we have
P/(Â) Ç P(Â) Ç P(A) = P,(ii) Ç P/(Â),
where the first inclusion is trivial, the second and third inclusion were just
proven, and the equality follows from the perfectness of the matrix A. Hence,
we have P/(A) = P(A). In other words, A is a perfect matrix and conse-
quently G is a perfect graph. D
Note that the converse of lemma 2.5 is not true, that is, a collection is
not necessarily perfect if its intersection graph is perfect. A simple coun-
terexample is given by the collection {{1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3}} Ç 2 ^ * > .
A (0, l)-matrix A is said to satisfy the //e//y property if every row in the
clique matrix of the intersection graph of A is a row of the matrix A itself.
We say that a collection S satisfies the Helly property if the matrix A*
does so. Equivalently, £ satisfies the Helly property if for any subcollection
T Ç S with 5 n T 7* 0 for all 5 ,T G T, we have that rirer^ # 0-
Lemma 2.6 A per/ect co//ec£ion aatta/ie« tAe i/e//y property.
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Proo/: Suppose B Ç 2" does not satisfy the Helly property. We shall prove
that 3 is not perfect. Let /I denote the matrix .4*. Choose a maximal clique
C in the intersection graph of 3 which does not correspond to a row of the
matrix A. Observe that |C| > 3. Let c denote the incidence vector of C.
For any row a of the matrix A we have a / c, so it follows that ac <
|C| - 1. Hence, c/(|C| - 1) is a non-integral feasible solution of the system
>4z < l , z > 0. It suffices to show that c/(|C| - 1) cannot be written as a
convex combination of integral solutions of this system.
Let ï be an integral solution of Ax < l ,x > 0. For any pair t , j € C
(' ^ i)> columns t and j of the matrix A have a 1 at some corresponding
place. Hence, z, and z, cannot both be equal to 1, since this would yield
az > 2 for some row a of A. It follows that zc < 1.
Now suppose c/(|C| - 1) can be written as a convex combination of
integral solutions, say c/(|C| - 1) = £?=i •*•**• Then
|C| = c c = (|C| - 1 ) £ A , Z ' C < (|C| - 1 ) ^ A, = |C| - 1,
a contradiction. Hence, c/(|C| - 1) cannot be written as a convex combina-
tion of integral solutions. It follows that A is not a perfect matrix and that
the collection 3 is not perfect. D
The combination of the two necessary conditions for a collection to be
perfect mentioned in lemmas 2.5 and 2.6 turns out to be sufficient.
Theorem 2.7 A co//ection ia per/ect t/ and on/y i/ tt« intersection yrapA »"«
per/ect onrf t/ tt «atts/ïes t/»e //ei/y property.
Proo/ : The 'only if'-part of the theorem follows directly from lemmas 2.5
and 2.6. So let us prove the 'if'-part.
For any m x n matrix M let P(M) = {z G 1R" | M i < l , z > 0}.
Let B Ç 2" be a collection whose intersection graph is perfect and which
satisfies the Helly property. Let A denote the matrix A*, and let A denote
the clique matrix of the intersection graph of fl. Since A satisfies the Helly
property, every row of A is also a row of A. Hence, P(A) Ç P(A). In
lemma 2.5 we already proved that P(A) Ç P(A) (this result did not depend
on the conditions mentioned in the lemma). It follows that P(A) = P(A),
and since P(A) is integral, it follows that P(A) is integral too. Thus, A is a
perfect matrix, and 3 is a perfect collection. •
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The characterization of perfect collections in theorem 2.7 can be very
helpful in proving whether a collection £ is perfect or not, since several
classes of perfect graphs are known in literature.
In their paper Kaneko and Wooders mention the class of assignment
games as an example on which theorem 2.4 can be applied. The collection
of essential coalitions of an assignment games satisfies the Helly property,
and the intersection graph is bipartite. Indeed, the class of bipartite graphs
is a well-known class of perfect graphs (see Nemhauser and Wolsey[39|).
However, bipartite graphs are not the only graphs that are known to be
perfect. Another important class is the class of trianffu/affrf jrapAs (their
definition will follow later). In the next section we give conditions on B such
that it satisfies the Helly property and such that the intersection graph of
8 is triangulated. Hence, a collection satisfying these condition is perfect.
Further, we give some interesting classes of games for which the collection
of essential coalitions satisfies these conditions. These games have therefore
a non-empty core. This shows that the scope of theorem 2.4 is somewhat
larger than Kaneko and Wooders suggest.
2.4 The total dependency property
A player i G TV is called 5 -dependent if there is a player j ^ t such that for
all 5 € B with i G 5 we have that either B = {i} or j G B. Let ir be a
permutation of the elements of TV. The collection B Ç 2^ is said to have the
toia/ dependency property w.r.t. ?r (TD-property) if for each it G {1,2 , . . . , n} ,
player JT* is a B^-dependent player, where B£ = {fin {**,..., *•„} | # G B}.
When we say that B Ç 2^ has the TD-property without referring to some
permutation, we mean that there exists a permutation TT such B has the
TD-property w.r.t. T.
Let G = (TV, E) be an undirected graph with vertex set TV and edge set
£?. A coalition 5 Ç TV is said to be connected in G if the graph that results
from G by deleting all players outside S is a connected graph.
Theorem 2.8 TAe /o/lowing statement* ore eçutva/eni.
ij TAe co//ection B «as *ne TI>-property.
Tfcere eztste a /ores* T = (TV, E) «ucA *na* oi/ mem6er« o/B ore con-
nected in F.
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Proo/ : ii)=>i). We say that a player t € JV is a leaf of F if there is at most
one j ^ I such that {t , j} € £ . Forests always contain at least one leaf.
Choose a leaf in F = Pi and give this player number 1. Now, remove this
player from Fi and denote the resulting forest by F2- Again, choose a leaf in
F2 and give this player number 2. Proceed until all players are renumbered,
such that for each ice W, /c is a leaf in the forest Ft, which results from F
by deleting the players with index less than A: from it. If there is no player
adjacent to fc in the forest F*, then choose / > Jfc arbitrarily. Otherwise, let
/ be the unique player with / > A: and {Jt,/} € E. Let B G B with A: € B.
J9 is connected in F and hence, B n { £ , . . . , n} is connected in F*. Then
B n {it, . . . ,n} must either be equal to the singleton {Jfc}, or it must contain
player / as well. It follows that Jk is dependent in Bfc and that B has the
TD-property.
i)=>ii). Suppose that B has the TD-property. We shall construct a forest
such that all members of B are connected in this forest. In fact, this forest
will be connected, that is, it will be a tree.
Assume without loss of generality that B has the TD-property w.r.t. the
permutation (1 ,2 , . . . ,n). For each it € # \ { n } let p(ifc) denote a player, such
that it is dependent on p(Jfc) in the collection Bk = { B n {Jk,... ,n} | B G B}.
Define the edge set £ by
and define F = (JV, £) . Let B G B. We shall prove that B is connected in
F. Let i , l e f l . Consider the following algorithm to find a path between fc
and /.
i = 0 ; *o =
while fc, ^ /,
42
then *i+i = P(*«) ; *.+i = '•
glas fc,+i = *, ; /,+i = P( / , ) ;
fi
The TD-property ensures that all vertices which are generated by the al-
gorithm are elements of B. Observe that p(Jfc) > it for all & G JV\{n}. Hence,
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the sequence to + /o,*i + '1, • • • is strictly increasing. Since Jfco + /o > 2 and
&,- + /,- < 2n for all i, it follows that the algorithm terminates in at most 2n
steps. When the algorithm terminates, the sequences Jto, Jbj,... and /o>'i> • • •
form a path between A: and / which uses only vertices in fl and edges in i?.
It follows that all coalitions in B are connected in the graph F. The same
algorithm can be used to show that AT is connected in F. In other words, F
is connected. From this, together with the fact that F has only n - 1 edges,
we conclude that F is a tree and thus, all coalitions in B are connected in a
tree. Q
A graph is called /nanyu/atetf if every cycle of length strictly greater
than 3 possesses an edge joining two non-sequential vertices in the cycle.
Such an edge is called a e/iorJ. Therefore, triangulated graphs are sometimes
called cAorcfa/ graphs.
Triangulated graphs are well-known to be perfect (see e.g. Golumbic[2l]).
This result can help us to prove that a collection B which possesses the TD-
property is perfect. In Golumbic it is proved that a collection B which
satisfies property ii) of theorem 2.8 satisfies the Helly property, and that the
intersection graph of such a collection is triangulated. Hence, B is perfect.
We prefer to include an alternative proof, because our proof provides
a constructive way to find elements in the B-restricted core if B has the
TD-property. Consider again the problems FPP(B,v) and CP(B,u). Our
objective is to show that FPP(B,t>) and CP(B, v) are easily solved if B has
the TD-property. In the remainder of this section we assume that B has the
TD-property w.r.t. the permutation ( l , 2 , . . . , n ) .
Define the vector y** recursively by
yf =max{i , (#)-y*(B\À:) | ifc e B G B and B Ç {1.....A:}}. (2.2)
The requirement that all 1-person coalitions are contained in B ensures that
y is well-defined. In a game theoretic context the vector y* can be in-
terpreted as follows. Suppose the players of TV enter a room in the order
1,2, . . . ,n. When player fc enters the room he is allowed to form a coalition
with any subset of players who are already in the room. Say he forms a coali-
tion together with the players in 5 Ç { 1 , . . . ,fc - 1}. The payoff for player
A: will then be the value of the newly formed coalition minus the payoff for
the players in 5 , i.e. v(Su{Jfc}) - y^(5). The most rational choice for player
A; is to join a coalition S which will give him a maximum payoff. If player
A: is allowed to take only coalitions in B into consideration, this procedure
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yields exactly the vector y*. Observe that y* can be computed in O(n|B|)
elementary operations. In the following we shall omit the superscript S in
y* whenever the notation tends to become too complex. '
- i
Lemma 2.9 y* »« a /ea#»6/e «o/ulton o/ CP(B,v).
Proo/ : Let B e 8 and let A: be the player with maximum index in B.
From the definition of y it follows that y* > v(B) - y(B\{A:}) and therefore,
> v(B). D
Lemma 2.9 expresses that we have some reason to regard y as a can-
didate for an optimal solution of CP(B,t/). If S Ç TV has the TD-property,
then this is indeed the case.
Theorem 2.10 // K 2 " Aaa tne TD-property, tAen y* t« an opttmoi flo-
tation o/ C/^B.u), anif FPP(B,v) Aa« an optima/ inteora/ «o/ution.
Proo/ : According to the duality theorem of linear programming it suffices
to construct a partition of TV with value y (TV). Let Bt denote a maximizing
coalition in
m a x { t ; ( B ) - y ( B \ * ) | * e B e B and B Ç {l,...,Jfc}}.
Furthermore, define the collections Cfc (Jfc € TV), recursively as follows.
- _ / Cjk+i if Jb is contained in one of the elements of
* ~ \ Cjt+i U {flt} otherwise.
We shall prove by induction that the members of Cjt are mutually disjoint
for all Âc G TV. The induction hypothesis is trivially true for n. Let A: < n
and suppose that the induction hypothesis is true for A; + 1. If player fc is
an element of one of the coalitions in C*+i, then Ct = Cjt+i- In this case
the induction hypothesis is trivially true for Jb also. If player A; is not an
element of any of the coalitions in Ct+i, then Cfc = Ct+iU{Bjt}. We have to
prove then that £* n 73, = 0 for all B, G C*. In order to prove this, suppose
that j is an element of both Bt and B, for some B, € Ct+i- We choose j
maximal. From Bfc Ç { 1 , . . . , A:} and A: ^ B,, it follows that j < A:. Player j
is a dependent player in the collection B, = {B n { j , . . . , r»} | B e B}. Say
that he is dependent on player / in this collection. Bjt D { j , . . . ,n} ^ {j},
since t e flj. Therefore / e B*. Analogously, one proves that / e B,. This
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contradicts the maximality of j and it proves that the induction hypothesis
is true for Jt also. We conclude that the induction hypothesis is true for all
Ib € # . Applying this result for Jt = 1, we find that Ci forms a partition of
tf. For all fl G Ci we have y(B) = v(B). Therefore,
flee, sec,
Corollary 2.11 / / B Ç 2 " Aaa Me TD-property, Men B « per/ect.
Proo/ : This follows easily from the fact that FPP(B.v) has an optimal
integral solution, regardless of the characteristic function v. D
Combining theorem 2.4, theorem 2.10 and corollary 2.11 we obtain the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.12 Let (N,t>) 6e a game in wAt'cA Me grand* coa/ttton t«
/or tome eo/Zeetion B Ç 2*. / / B naa Me TD-Property, Men y* <fe/inerf
6y ^f.^ w on ezlreme e/ement o/fAe B-re«fncte<f core o/v.
Proo/ : It follows immediately from theorem 2.4 and corollary 2.11 that
Core(B, t>) ^ 0. As observed in section 2.2, the set of optimal solutions of
CP(B,v) is then equal to Core(B,t>), so according to theorem 2.10 we have
y* G Core(B,t;).
To prove the extremality of y* observe that y(#t) = v(B*) for all A: G Af,
where the sets fl* are defined as in theorem 2.4. Let A be the matrix whose
ifc-th column is the incidence vector 1 ^ . For all A; G ./V we have A; G fit and
/ ^ St for / > A:. Hence, A is an upper triangular matrix with ones on the
diagonal. It follows that A is non-singular, or equivalently, the n incidence
vectors 1 ^ (A: G N) are linearly independent. The extremality of y* follows.
D
Using the observation that the £ (v)-restricted core of a game v coincides
with its unrestricted core, we find the following corollary of theorem 2.12.
Corollary 2.13 Let u 6e o jame /or w/ttcn <Ae aranc/ coa/ttton t« sta6/e, ana*
suppose Mat Me co//ectton o/ essential coa/ittons Aas tAc TZ?-Property.
t> Ao« a non-empty core.
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Proo/ : Define S = £(u) U { # } . The addition of TV to the set of essen-
tial coalitions does not disturb the TD-property. Now apply theorem 2.12
to prove that y* is an element of the B-restricted core. Furthermore, ob-
serve that the restricted core coincides with the unrestricted core, so that
y* G Core(w). D
In the following we give some classes of games satisfying the conditions
of corollary 2.13, and therefore also satisfying the conditions of theorem 2.4.
A game v is called a stmp/e game if v(S) = 0 or v(5) = 1 for all 5 Ç JV.
A player i G JV in such a game is called a veto player if v(5) = 0 for all
S Ç JV with i ^ 5 . Let v be a simple game which has a veto player,
say i, and for which v(N) = 1. Then the grand coalition is stable, and
all essential coalitions are connected in the star tree pictured in figure 2.1.
Hence, corollary 2.13 can be applied here to prove that the core is non-empty.
figure 2.1
In Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs[ll] the class of sequencing games is con-
sidered. In their paper they show that all essential coalitions are connected
in a path (see figure 2.2 below). Also, the grand coalition is stable for such
a game. Therefore, corollary 2.13 can also be applied here to prove that
sequencing games have a non-empty core. However, in [11] the stronger
property is derived that sequencing games are convex.
-a—©
figure 2.2
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In chapter 3 we consider the class of routing games. For these games the
value of a coalition is interpreted as a cost. Therefore, we are interested in
the anti-core of such a game. In chapter 3 we consider the dual of a routing
game and we show that all essential coalitions of the dual are connected
in a path. The grand coalition in the dual game is not necessarily stable.
Applying corollary 2.13 we find that the dual of a routing game has a non-
empty core if and only the grand coalition is stable in the dual game, and
consequently the routing game itself has a non-empty anti-core in this case.
Granot and Huberman[24] treat the class of minimum cost spanning tree
games. In their paper they prove the so called minimum excess coalition
structure theorem. This theorem implies that all essential coalitions of the
dual of a minimum cost spanning tree game are connected in a forest whose
node set is the player set. Also, the grand coalition in the dual is stable.
Again, corollary 2.13 can be applied to prove that minimum cost spanning
tree games have a non-empty anti-core. In chapter 4 we use corollary 2.13 to
further investigate the structure of the anti-core of minimum cost spanning
tree games.
2.5 The B-prenucleolus
Let (AT, v) be a game and let 8 Ç 2" be a collection of formable coalitions.
Recall that the prenucleolus of a game is the outcome of a lexicographic
minimization which involves all coalitions. In case only coalitions in B are
formable, it is natural to demand that coalitions outside S should not take
part in this lexicographic minimization. This leads to the following definition
of the B-prenucleolus ^>/(B,t;) of a game t>.
For a vector z G ^ ^ and 5 Ç JV the value v(5) - i(5) is called the
excess of coalition 5 at i . Let tf(B,i) be the vector of all excesses at i
(5 € B) arranged in order of non-increasing magnitude. The B-prenuc/eo/u«
is defined as the set of vectors in Iff^  which lexicographically minimize the
vector tf(B,i) over the set of efficient vectors. Analogously, we define the
B-nuc/eo/ua as the set of vectors in iR^ which lexicographically minimize the
vector 0(B,i) over the imputation set I(i>).
In Maschler, Potters and Tijs[34] also a generalization of the nucleolus is
considered. Their generalization extends to non-transferable utility games
and non-cooperative games as well. For transferable utility games, their
definitions and ours coincide. In Maschler et al. an axiomatization of the
general nucleolus is given. In this section we shall describe how a general
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purpose algorithm for computing the prenucleolus of a game (transferable
utility) should be adjusted when we want to compute the S-prenucleolus
instead. A similar adjustment can be made for the B-nucleolus. However,
the additional constraint that the outcome should lie in the imputation set
complicates things somewhat for the S-nucleolus. For our purposes it will be
sufficient to have an algorithm for the prenucleolus, since we will apply the
algorithm only on games with a non-empty core, in which case the nucleolus
and the prenucleolus coincide. In section 2.6 we shall see that the adjusted
algorithm works particularly well when S has the TD-property.
Let us now describe an algorithm for computing the fl-prenucleolus. It is
a straightforward adjustment of an algorithm for computing the prenucleolus
as it was presented by Maschler, Peleg and Shapley[33]. The algorithm
computes the B-prenucleolus by solving a sequence of linear programs.
First assume that Core(B,v) ^ 0. Then there exists a collection ^ such
that {#} Ç /J Ç B and such that i(S) = v(5) for all i € Core(B,t;) and all
S € >1. Choose a collection >l with these properties. If Core(B, v) = 0, then
choose >J = {yV}. As a first step in finding the B-prenucleolus of the game u
the following linear program is solved.
2(v,B,^) : Minimize t
subject to x(S) = v(S) 5 € .4
Clearly, problem £(v, B, /I) is feasible and the optimal value is bounded.
Observe that />>/(B,v) is a set of feasible solutions of 2 (v,B, .4). If >t = {#}
this is obvious, since then the set of feasible solutions is the set of efficient
vectors, and by definition />>/(B, v) lies in it. If .4 7^  {iV} then Core(B, v) ^
0, and Core(B,v) is contained in the set of feasible solutions. For 1 6
Core(B,u) the vector of excesses is non-positive, while for 1 ^ Core(B,v) at
least one excess is strictly positive. It follows that PA/(B,u) Ç Core(B,t;).
Later we shall see that ^ >/ (B, v) is even a set of optimal solutions of problem
Let Ï be the optimal value of <2(v,B,.d). There exists a non-empty col-
lection yj Ç B\^ , such that x(5) + t = v(5) for all optimal solutions (i ,t)
of 2(v,B,^) and 5 € 7. To make this clear, suppose that for all 5 € B\>1
there exists an optimal solution (15,t), such that 15(5) + Î > v(S). De-
fine ï = Z^se8\yi is/ |£\>t| . Then (ï , ï) is an optimal solution satisfying
ï (5 ) + t > v(5) for all 5 G B\jT This contradicts the minimality oft.
The following theorem explains why the B-prenucleolus can be com-
puted by solving a sequence of linear programs of the type 2(t>j, fl, .rtj),
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(i = 1,2,...). In the proof we use the notation i v y to denote that the
vector x is lexicographically greater than y, i.e. i # y and the first non-sero
coordinate of the vector i - y is positive.
Theorem 2.14 Let I 6e tAe optima/ value o/pro6/em 2(v,S,^), ana* /et >t
6e a non-empty su6co//eetion o/B\^ sucA t/»at x(S) +1 = v(S) /or a// optima/
«o/utior» (x,t) ana" a l l S e j I . Furthermore, rfe/îne tÀe game w 6y
| t ,/seB\j(.
TAen
i^  Core(B,u/) / 0,
ii^ x(S) = u/(S) /or a// x e Core(B,u;) ana* 5 € >f u 7 , ana*
Proo/ : Proof of i): Choose x such that (t,x) is an optimal solution of
problem fi(i;,B,^). For 5 € Jl we have x(5) = v(5) = tu(S), and for 5 €
B\/l we have x(5) > v(5) - t = u;(5). Furthermore, x ( ^ ) = v(A )^ - ui(AT),
so we conclude that x € Core(B,ui). This proves i), and it also follows that
Core(B,u>) is a subset of the set of optimal solutions of 2(v, B, >t).
Proof of ii): Let x € Core(B,tu). For 5 e >t we have x(S) > ty(S) - v(5)
and for 5 € B\>t we have x(5) + t > u;(5) + t = v(5). Hence, (t,x) is an
optimal solution of problem 2(v,B,.>(). It follows that x(5) = v(5) - t =
tu(5) for all 5 € 7 and x(5) = u(5) = tv(5) for all 5 € >J. This proves ii),
and it also follows that Core(B,u;) contains the set of optimal solutions of
2 (v, B, .4) as a subset.
Proof of iii): Let 0«(x) denote the vector of excesses at x for coalitions
in B arranged in non-increasing order in the game t>. Let 0«,(x) be defined
analogously.
We have proved that Core(B,u>) ^ 0, so we have ^>/(B,iy) Ç Core(B,u;).
We shall prove first that also P>/(B,t;) Ç Core(B,u;). Since we have already
observed that ,P.V(B,t;) is a set of feasible solutions of <2(v,B,.4), '*• suffices
to show that 0«(y) >- ^u(^)i for an optimal solution x of 2(u,B,>î), and a
feasible but not optimal solution y. The vector 0u(x) has at least |>J| - 1
coordinates equal to 0, and the remaining coordinates are at most t. The
vector 0u(y) also has |>l| - 1 coordinates equal to 0, but at least one of the
remaining coordinates exceeds t. Hence, tf«(y) >- 0v(*)- This proves that
) Ç Core(B,u/).
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Aaaume /t = {AT}. Then 0«,(z) = tf«(i) - It for all i G 2R", where 1
denotes the all-one vector in £2'*'~*. It follows that
M*) >• My) <» M*) >• My)
for any pair z,y € Core(B,u/). We conclude that />JV(B,u>) = PJV(B,t>) in
this case.
Now assume ^ ^ {^}- Then Core(B.v) ^ 0 and the optimal value t of
problem <2(v, B, >î) is non-positive. Hence, we can write 0«v(z) = 0v(z) — ut
for all i 6 Core(B,u>), where u denotes the vector in 2Rl*l~' which has its
first |>J| - 1 coordinates equal to 0, and the remaining coordinates equal to 1.
It follows that
0«,(z) >• 0«(y) «- *„(*) >• 0,(y)
for any pair z,y 6 Core(B.tw). We conclude that ?>/(B,u;) = />.V(B,v). D
Hence, by solving a sequence of linear programs of the type 2(t»,, B, A)
we obtain a sequence of games v = vi, «2,.. . and a sequence of collections
/J = >li, A i • • -, such that the B-prenucleoli of all games v, coincide and such
that the cardinality of .^ is strictly increasing. Thus, after at most |B| steps
the set of solutions of the system
z(5) = v,(5) for all 5 G yf,
consists of exactly one point, since B contains all 1-person coalitions. This
implies that the B-restricted core of v, consists of one point. Since the B-
prenucleolus is always contained in the B-restricted core, this point is the
B-prenucleolus of Vj, and consequently of v.
Schmeidler[48] proved that the prenucleolus consists of one single point.
This is true for the B-prenucleolus as well when all 1-person coalitions are
contained in B. From now on we shall refer to the B-prenucleolus as a
vector in .R^ and not as a subset of 5?^, since we assume throughout that
all 1-person coalitions are contained in B.
In section 2.3 we proved that the B-restricted core coincides with the
core in case B contains all essential coalitions. For the B-(pre)nucleolus we
have a similar result, expressed in corollary 2.16. In the following theorem
we use the notation Is to denote the incidence vector of S Ç ]V, i.e. the
vector whose i-th coordinate is 1 if i G S and 0 if t ^ S.
Theorem 2.15 Let (W,v) 6e a jame and /et B Ç 2* and /et 5 Ç tf and
T Ç B te suen tnat I5 can 6e written as a /inear com6tnatton 0/tne vector*
i n { l r | T G T } .
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e(7\z) > e(S,î) /or oil T G T and
e(7\y) > e(5,y) /or a// T € T, wAere î denotes >/(B,v) and y rfenoiea
J l / (8u{5},v) . TAen >/(B,u) = JV(B U {S}, v).
Pro©/ : Let 0(z) be the vector of excesses at i of coalitions in B U {5},
arranged in non-increasing order, and let <£(z) be the vector of excesses
of coalitions in B arranged in non-increasing order. Observe that <£(z) is
obtained simply by omitting the excess of coalition 5 in 0(z).
Let z = -V(B,v) and let y = >/(B U {5},u). We shall prove that z = y.
Let A; be such that 0*(z) = e(S,z), and choose it maximal. Furthermore, let
/ be such that 0j(y) = e(5,y), and choose / maximal. Let m = min(/,ifc).
Observe that 0,(z) = &(z) and 0,(y) = &(y) for i < m. So, for i < m
we have 0|(x) = 0i(y), since otherwise we would have either 0(z) > 0(y) or
<A(y) ^ #(*)> contradicting the fact that z lexicographically minimizes ^(z)
and y minimizes tf(y). We not only have 0i(z) = 0|(y) for i < m, but also
the collection of coalitions whose excess at z equal 0,(z) coincides with the
collection of coalitions whose excess at y equal 0i(y).
To prove this, we define >l,(z) = {fl e B | 0,(z) = e(B,z)} for i =
1,2 For convenience, we define ^o(z) = 0. We shall prove by induction
that >li(z) = >l,(y) for i = 0 , 1 , . . . . m - 1. Define z = (z + y)/2. For i 0
it is trivial that >lo(*) = ^o(ï) = ^o(y) = 0 Assume ^,(z) = ^,-(ï) - A(y)
for i = 0 , . . . , / i - 1 (/i < m). Then 0,(z) = 0,(z) for i = 0 ,1 , . . . , / i - 1.
Choose 5 € ^h(z). Then we have
If this inequality were strict then 0(z) would be lexicographically less than
0(y). Since this would be a contradiction, we conclude that e(J3,y) = 0j»(y)
and hence, 23 G >ffc(y)- It follows that >!/,(z) Ç >lfc(y). If >?h(z) were a proper
subset of >f/»(y), then again this would imply that 0(z) is lexicographically less
than 0(y), a contradiction. We conclude that >f/,(z) = ^^(y). Analogously,
one shows that >l/,(z) = X^(z), and hence >f/,(z) = ^fc(y) = ^A(^) -
Since e(T,z) > e(5,z) for all T G T, it follows that each T G T is a
member of one of the coalitions ^ i ( z ) , . . . , ^ t_ i (z) . Analogously, each T G T
is a member of one of the coalitions i?i(y) , . . . , >îj_i(y). Together with the
fact that ^,-(x) = X,(y) for i < m, this implies that c(T,z) = e(T,y) for all
TeT.
Since Is can be written as a linear combination of vectors lx for T G T,
it follows that also e(5,z) = e(5,y). The same reasoning as above can now
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be used to prove that >?m(^ ) = ^m(y)- Since Jt and / were both chosen maxi-
mal, it follows that A: = /. Now it follows immediately that 0(x) = #(y), since
otherwise we would have either 0(x) >• 0(y) or #(y) >- ^ (x). Hence, x = y. D
The above theorem is also valid when the term nucleolus is replaced by
prenucleolus. We may also replace the term nucleolus by anti-nucleolus and
reverse the inequality signs.
Corollary 2.16 Let (JV,v) 6e a jom« and /et S Ç 2" contain a// essenttai
coa/ition« o/v. // Core(t/) ^ 0, Men >/(v) = JV(B,t;).
Proo/ : For x G Core(v) all excesses are non-positive, while for x ^ Core(v)
at least one excess is strictly positive. It follows that .A/(B,v) £ Core(v) and
>/(B U {5},u) € Core(v) for any coalition S outside B.
Suppose 5 ^ 3 . Then 5 is not essential, and there exists a partition
7 Ç S of 5 such that v(5) < E r e r "CO- Let x = JV(B,v) and let y =
We have
e(5,«) = v(5) - x(5) < 2 (v(T) - x(T)) = £ e(T,x)
r e t reT
for all x £ ^?^. Since î , y g Core(u), it follows that ail excesses at x and y
are non-positive. Hence,
e(5,x) < e(T,x) for all T € T,
and
e(S,y) <e(T,y) for all T G T.
Now apply theorem 2.15 to prove that .V(B,t;) = >/(B U {5},v). Repeated
application of theorem 2.15 for all coalitions outside B gives us the desired
result. D
Also in this corollary the term nucleolus can be replaced by prenucleolus,
since the nucleolus and the prenucleolus coincide when Core(v) / 0. If we
define a coalition to be ontt'-essenh'a/ by reversing the inequality signs in
the definition of an essential coalition, then we may also replace essential
by anti-essential, core by anti-core, and nucleolus by anti-nucleolus in the
corollary.
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2.6 The TD-property and the 5-prenucleolus
The algorithm to compute the 5-prenucleolus of a game works particularly
well when the collection 5 has the TD-property. In this case the linear
programs that arise have a special structure, which makes it possible to
solve them efficiently. The linear programs have the following structure.
<2(v,B,Jl) : Minimize (
subject to i(5) = v(5) S € >l Ç B
-I- * >
In this formulation the collection j4 is chosen as follows. If Core(S, i>) / 0,
then there exists a collection ^ such that {/V} Ç j( Ç B and such that
x(S) = v(5) for all i 6 Core(B.v) and all 5 6 A We then choose a
collection ^ with these properties. If Core(B, v) = 0, we choose ^ {W}.
Assume that B has the TD-property. For each t € J? we define the game
by
H ,(5)-I if5€B\>l.
-I
Notice that finding the optimal value of problem fi(v, B, .4) is equivalent to
finding the minimal i for which the game v< has a non-empty B-rcstrictcd
core, and according to theorem 2.12 the latter is equivalent to finding the
minimal t for which the grand coalition TV is fl-stable in t><. In the following
example we suggest an approach to solve problem 2(u,fl,^).
Example : Let TV = {1,2,3,4,5} and /et G = (TV,£) be a path graph,
where E = {{t,t + 1} | i e {1,2,3,4}}. Furthermore, /et B Ç 2" be the
coiiection of coa/itions which are connected in the path G. Hence, B has the
TD-property. Define the game (JV,v) by v(JV) = 10, u(23) = v(345) = 3,
v(123) = 4, u(234) = v(1234) = 5, and v(2345) = 8. For the remaining
coalitions the va/ue is 0. Taie /î = {iV}.
We want to find the minima] t for which TV is B-stab/e in the game vj.
Let us denote this minima/ t by I. We suggest the foiiowing procedure to
findt.
Choose to such that the game v^ is not stabie. /n genera/, to = — (n+2)M
wii/ do the tric/c, where M = max{|v(S)| | 5 Ç TV} and n is the number of
p/ayers in the game (this wiii be shown Jater). So choose to = -70. Now
we use the procedure in the proof of theorem 2.10 to determine a maxima/
B -partition in Vj,,. This partition is the partition of TV into sing/etons, which
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has vaiue 350. Let us denote this partition by S°. C/eariy, to = —70 '« *
iower bound for t.
Now we set ti such that the partition S° just does not vioiate the stability
of AT in the game v<,. So we set ti = —2, since X)«eN v-a(«) = 10 = v_2(AT).
For t < tj = - 2 , the game t»j is certain/y not stabie, since then the partition
S° violates the stabiiity conditions. So also ti = - 2 is a iower bound for t.
We do not have the garantuee that AT is stabie in the game Vf,. Again,
we use the procedure in the proof of theorem 2. JO to determine a maxima/
5-partition in vj,. This gives us the partition S' = {1,2345}, which has
vaiue J2 in the game t^,. We conciude that t>t, is not stabie, so we are not
finished yet. Now, set £2 such that the partition S* just does not vioiate
the stabj/ity of N in the game «|,. So we set tj = — 1. Again, *2 = - 1 *• *
iower bound for t. But this time N is stabie in the game u^> so <2 is aJso
an upper bound for t. We conciude that ? = tj = — 1, and we have soived
probiem 3(v, £,>()• See aiso the tabie beiow, where we have summarized
our findings in this exampie.
S
1
2
3
5
12
23
34
45
123
234
345
1234
2345
N fixed
V
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
4
5
3
5
10
to = -70
« « 0
70
70
70
70
70
70
73
70
70
74
75
73
75
78
10
5° = {1,2,3,4,5}
t, = - 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
5
2
2
6
7
5
7
10
10
5* = {1,2345}
t2 = " l
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
5
6
6
9
10
stabie
Let us formalize the ideas in the example. Let Af = max{|v(S)| | S Ç iV}
and let n be the number of players in the game t>. Consider the following
algorithm to solve problem fi(v,3,^).
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« 0 ~ - (n + 2)A#; t := 0;
determine a maximal B-partition 5° Ç B of TV in the game
while vj, is not stable
j
determine a maximal B-partition S'** Ç f of iV
in the game vj^, ;
i :=i + 1;
fid.
Let us show that the algorithm terminates, and correctly solves problem
Q(t>,B,.d). We may assume that W does not contain all 1-person coalitions,
since otherwise the game v has exactly one core element, which must be the
(pre)nucleolus of v. In this case is is unnecessary to solve problem fi(v, B, >1).
So assume that ^ contains at least one 1-person coalition. Then TV is not
stable in the game v^, since £,g/y t><,,(») > (n + 2)M - nM = 2M > v(/V).
This shows that to is & lower bound for t.
While the game v^ is not stable, a maximal B-partition of t><, always
contains at least one element outside >T When ^ = {TV}, this is trivial.
When ^ / {TV}, we know that Core(B.v) / 0. It follows that for a partition
S Ç ^ of TV we have
ses ses
Since v<^  is not stable, we know that the maximal partition S'"*"' must satisfy
SseS'+' "*t(^) -* "«.-(^)- This partition must then contain at least one
element outside ,/î. Hence, |S'\/J| > 0, and division by zero will not occur
in the algorithm. Furthermore, each t, in the algorithm is a lower bound for
the optimal value of problem 2(v, B, >!). For to we have already shown this.
For i > 0 we have
ses-»
Using the definition of t><, we find
ses- '
So the value t, is chosen such that the partition $'"*, which violated the
stability of «<,._, just does not violate the stability of v .^. It follows that
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V( is not stable when t < t,, implying that t, is a lower bound for problem
<2(v,d,^). If the algorithm ends, say with t = it, then v^ is stable, and
consequently t* is an upper bound for problem 2(v,B,^). We conclude
that if the algorithm terminates, then it terminates with the optimal value
of £(v,S,yf). Furthermore, 7 := S*~*\X ^ 0 and
(2.3)
ses*-»
so that i (5) -+- tjk = v(S) for all optimal solutions (z,*k) of £(v,B,.4) and
5 6 7.
It remains to prove that the algorithm indeed terminates. First we shall
prove that the sequence to, *i. • • • is increasing. To show that t,+j > t,
observe that
and
ses- ses-
This can only be the case if t^  + i > t,.
Now we shall prove that | 5 ' \ ^ | is strictly decreasing. Assume that the
algorithm has not terminated yet at stage i + 1, so that W is not B-stable in
the game v ^ , . Furthermore, suppose |S'**\.tf| > |S'\>Î|. Then we have
contradicting the fact that V^ is not S-stable in the game w^, and that
' is a maximal fl-partition of N in this game. The algorithm starts with
i and in each step the value | 5 ' \ ^ | decreases at least by one. It
follows that the algorithm terminates within n steps.
Let us continue our example and see how we can find the S-prenucleolus
by solving a sequence of problems of the type fi(u,S,>l).
Example : Let W, S, ^ = {W} and v be as in the previous examp/e.
We set >î° = >î and v° = v. Earlier, we have so/ved probiem 2(v°,B,yl°)
success/u/iy and /bund that the optima] vaiue is t = — 1. Let us denote
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the game u? by v'. According to theorem 2.14 we have that f JY(B,v°) =
*), so we are left with the computation of the B-prenucieo/us of u*.
Observe that v'(l)+v*(2345) = 1+9 = 10 = u'(Af). Hence, i ( l ) = v*(l)
and i(2345) = v'(2345) for all x € Core(v'). This is no coincidence, it is the
consequence of equation (2.3j appiied on the game v<, and the partition 5 '
in the previous exampie. We update il* = .4° U {1,2345} and solve problem
£(v \B ,y l ' ) in the same way we solved fi(u°,B,>l°). In the table below we
see how repeatedly a prob/em of the type £(v', B, >T) is solved. The process
ends when ^* contains all singletons: the game v* has only one core-element,
and this must then be the B-prenucieoius of v.
5
1
2
3
4
5
12
23
34
45
123
234
345
1234
2345
N
fixed
fixed
fixed
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
5
6
4
6
9
10
to = - 7 0
1
71
71
71
71
71
74
71
71
75
76
74
76
9
10
S° = {1,2,3,4,5}
*l = - 5 / 4
•/.
1
9/4
»/*
9/4
9/4
9/4
21/4
9/4
9/4
25/4
29/4
21/4
29/4
9
10
S* = {1,23,4,5}
«J = - l
<
1
2
2
2
2
2
5
2
2
6
7
5
7
9
10
stable
Updated := il* U {1,23,4,5} and w* := wi,.
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5
J
5
12
23
34
45
123
234
345
1234
2345
N
fixed
fixed
fixed
fixed
fixed
fixed
1
2
2
2
2
2
5
2
2
6
7
5
7
9
10
to = -70
•?»
1
72
72
2
2
72
5
72
72
76
77
75
77
9
10
S°= {1,2,3,4,5}
«I = -1 /2
1
5/2
5/2
2
2
5/2
5
5/2
5/2
13/2
15/2
11/2
15/2
9
10
stab/e
t/pdate >f* := >J' u {1,2,3,4,5} and v' := v* J,J . Tne coi/ection .4* contains
a// sing/etons. Furthermore, we Icnow that i(5) = v'(S) /or ai/ 5 G >?' and
ai/ z € Core(S,t;'). Hence, v* has exact/y one e/ement in the B-restricted
core: i = (i/*(l),t>»(2),w*(3),v*(4),v*(5)) = (1,5/2,5/2,2,2). This must
then be the B-prenuc/eo/us ofu' and ofv = v°. •
In each step of the algorithm it is necessary to determine a maximal
S-partition of AT in the game v .^. We have seen in section 2.3 that it
takes 0(n|B|) elementary operations to determine such a partition. Conse-
quently, the algorithm to solve problem 2(v,B,^) has complexity 0(n*|B|).
Problem 2(v,B,yJ) has to be solved 0(|B|) times, in order to compute
the fl-prenucleolus. This yields an 0(n*|B|*) algorithm to compute the
B-prenucleolus of a game with the TD-property.
We mentioned in section 2.3 that the collection of essential coalitions
has the TD-property for sequencing games, for the dual of minimum cost
spanning tree games, and for the dual of routing games. In case the core is
non-empty, the nucleolus coincides with the prenucleolus, and according to
corollary 2.16 the prenucleolus coincides with the £(v)-prenucleolus. This
means that the results of this section can be applied directly to sequencing
games and to the dual of minimum cost spanning tree games to compute the
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nucleolus of these games. For the dual of a routing game it should be checked
whether the core is non-empty. Since sequencing games and the dual of a
routing game only have O(n') essential coalitions, where n is the number
of players, this yields an O(n^) algorithm to compute the nucleolus of these
games in case of a non-empty core. However, for these games it is possible to
compute a maximal partition of TV in O(n') elementary operations instead
of O(n') (see chapter 3, the remark after theorem 3.2). It follows that the
nucleolus can be computed in 0(n*) elementary operations.
2.7 Location games
In this section we want to point out the relationships between the frac-
tional partitioning problem that we have discussed in section 2.3 and another
well-known optimization problem in literature, called the /rac/iona/ covering
pro6/em. This relationship is expressed in the similarity of theorem 2.10 of
section 2.3 and theorem 2.21 of this section. In terms of a game v and a
collection 3 of formable coalitions, the fractional covering problem can be
formulated as FCP(B.u)
subject to 5^B:ieB ^B > 1 for all t'G /V
AB > 0 for all B e S
The dual problem is
max
subject to z(£) < v(B) for all B € S
z > 0.
Since the dual problem searches for a non-negative element in the B-restricted
anti-core of the game v, we shall refer to this problem as the poaittve an*i-
corc pro6/em or PACP(fl,v). The problems FCP(B,v) and PACP(B,t>) are
discussed in Hoffman, Kolen and Sakarovitch[26]. Hoffman et al. give con-
ditions such that FCP(B.v) and PACP(B.v) can be solved efficiently. We
shall discuss these conditions.
Index the elements of B and define the matrix /I* by
a f l if.efl,
' 1 0 otherwise.
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The matrix A* is called to(a//y 6a/ance<f if it does not contain a square
submatrix of size at least three, whose row and column sums are equal to two,
and which has no two identical columns. Hoffman et al. show that FCP(fl, v)
and PACP(fl, v) are easily solved when the matrix A* is totally balanced. By
permuting rows and columns, a totally balanced matrix can be transformed
into a matrix with a much simpler structure. A (O,l)-matrix is called a row
ïnc/uston matrix if it does not contain the submatrix F = I I.
Lemma 2.17 flow tne/u«t'on matrices are tota//y 6a/aneea*.
Proo/: Let /I be a row inclusion matrix. Suppose A is not totally balanced.
Then it contains a square submatrix B of size at least 3, whose row and
column sums are all equal to 2, and which has no two identical columns.
Then there exist I , J , ifc,/ with i < j and / < Jfc such that Bjj = Bj* = Byj = 1.
Then Byt = 0, since otherwise £ contains two identical columns. Hence, A
contains the submatrix F, a contradiction. •
In the book of Nemhauser and Wolsey[39] the following lemma is proved.
We do not include a proof of this lemma, since its proof is rather lengthy.
Lemma 2.18 /iny tota//y 6a/ancea* matrix can 6e trans/ormed into a row
tnc/uston matrtz 6y permuttnj? us rows ana' coiumn«.
As a consequence of lemma 2.18, totally balancedness of the matrix A
can be expressed as follows in terms of the collection S. A player t € iV is
said to have the inclusion property with respect to fl if for all A, B € S with
i € A n B we have that A Ç B or B Ç A. The collection S is said to have
the tola/ tnc/usion property (Tl-property) if, possibly after renumbering the
players, player fc has the inclusion property with respect to the collection
B* = {Bn{*, . . . ,n} | Befl}.
Lemma 2.19 77ie matrix A* is tota//y 6a/anced t/ana* on/y t/tAe col/ectton
fl Aas tAe 77-property.
Proo/: Suppose A* is totally balanced. According to lemma 2.18 we may
assume that the elements of fl and the players in JV are indexed such that
A* does not contain the submatrix F. Choose i € 7V and Bt.Bj € fl such
that i G Bfc n Bj. Assume that / < Jfc. We shall prove that B; n {i,. • •, n} Ç
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Bfc n { i , . . . ,n} . Suppose this is not true. Then we choose j > s such that
j G Bj and j ' ^ Bj. Define
Observe that A = F, a contradiction. We conclude that 5 has the TI-
property.
Now suppose that S has the TI-property. For any two subsets S , r ç ^
(S ^ T), let us say that S is lexicographically greater than T or 5 >- T, if
max(Su T) \ (SnT) G 5. Now, arrange the elements of S such that B* y Bj
if ib > /, and construct the matrix X* with respect to this indexation (the
index of players is increasing from top to bottom, and the index of coalitions
is increasing from left to right). We shall prove that A* is a row inclusion
matrix. Suppose this is not true. Then A* contains F as a submatrix.
Equivalently, we can choose i,jf G W with j> > t and we can choose B|, B* G S
with Jfc > /, such that i G Bj, i G B*, j G B/ and j ^ fl*. Furthermore, since
Bfc >• Bj, it follows that A = max(Bj U Bt)\(Bj n fl*) G B». Observe that
Now,
since j G Bj and j ' ^ Bt. On the other hand
since /i G B* and /i ^ Bj. This contradicts the TI-property. We conclude
that /l^ does not contain F as a submatrix, and hence /l^ is a row inclusion
matrix. •
Next we shall prove that problems FCP(B.v) and PACP(S.v) are easily
solved when S has the TI-property and v > 0. Define the vector z* defined
recursively by
zf = m i n { t ; ( B ) - z * ( B n { l , . . . , A : - l } ) | i b G B G S } . (2.4)
Lemma 2.20 TAc rector z* ta a /easi6/c «o/ution o/ Pi4CP(S, v) i /u > 0.
Proo/ : Let B G S and let A: be the largest index in B. By definition we
have zf < v(B) - z*(B n {1, . . . , * ; - 1}) = v(B) - z«(B\{ik}). It follows
that z*(B) < v(B).
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It remains to prove that z* > 0. Let Jk G JV. Choose 5 € B with i e B
such that
zf = t , ( B ) - z * ( B n { l , . . . , * - l } ) .
I f " f l n { l , . . . , f c - 1 } = 0 then it follows immediately that z£ = v(B) > 0.
Otherwise, choose / maximal in B n { l , . . . , f c - 1}. It follows immediately
from the definition of zf that zf < v(B~) - zf ( I n { 1 , . . . , / - 1}), and hence,
z * ( B n { l , . . . , / } ) < t>(B). Now it follows that
Theorem 2.21 TAe vector z* rfe/ined 6y ^2 .^ t« an optima/ so/utton o/
Pi4CP(B,v) t/B Aa« Me 77-property.
Proo/: According to the duality theorem of linear programming it suffices
to construct a cover for TV with value z*(W). Let Bt denote a minimizing
coalition in
min{v(B) - * * ( f l n { i , . . . , f c - 1}) | ifce B e B } ,
and among these minimizing coalitions, choose the one which is lexicograph-
ically maximal. Furthermore, define the collections Ct (A: € TV), recursively
as follows.
Cn = { } ,
J Ct+i if Jfc is contained in one of the elements of C*+i
otherwise.
B
_ J C
Ci is trivially a cover for TV. It remains to prove that its value equals z'(./V).
Suppose j G W is covered twice by Ci, i.e. there exist fc and / (fc ^ /), such
that Bfc, #j G Ci and j € J3t n Bj. Assume that / < A;. Observe that j / /,
since / ^ B^. We shall prove that j > /. Suppose this not true, i.e. j < /.
Because of the TI-property, we must have Bt n { j , . . . , n} Ç Bj n { j , . . . , n}
or Bj D { j , . . . , n} Ç Bfc n { j , . . . , n}. Since / ^ Bt the latter is not possible,
so it follows that B* n { j , . . . , n} Ç Bj n {j, . . . , n } , and that B, ^ B*.
Furthermore, z*(B,) > «*(Bj n { 1 , . . . , it}) > z*(B, n {1,. . . , /}) = v(B,).
We also have z*(Bj) < v(Bj). Combining this we find z*(Bj n {1,. . . ,*}) =
v(B(). We see that Bj is also a minimizing coalition in
min{v(B)-z*(Bn {!,..., i t - ! } ) ! * € B e f l } ,
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contradicting the fact that fl* was chosen lexicographically maximal. We
conclude that the assumption j < / is false, and hence j > /.
Since j > /, it follows that
Moreover, z*(flj) < t/(Bj) and it follows that z*(flj n { l , . . . , j } ) = v
Now we find that
and we conclude 2* = 0. So for all j € TV which appear more than once i
the cover Ci we have zj* = 0. Hence,
£ «»(B) =
sec,
For B G Ci we have z*(B) = t/(B), so it follows that
«(B) = « '
in
flee,
Observe that the proof of theorem 2.21 is very similar to that of theo-
rem 2.10. First, an integral feasible solution for FCP(B,v) is constructed,
much in the same way as the partition was constructed for FPP(fl, v). Then
it is shown that the value of this solution equals the value of z*.
Totally balanced matrices arise in the formulation of some location pro6-
lems. Let G = (V, 75) be an undirected, connected graph and d : /? - • TR+ a
weight function on the edges of G. For each pair of vertices v, u; G V the dis-
tance <f(t>,u>) is defined as a minimum weight path between t» and u>, where
the weight of a path is defined as the sum of the weights of the edges that
lie on this path. A subset TV Ç V is interpreted as a set of customers who
need to have have some kind of service center, for instance a supermarket,
in their neighborhood. Each customer 1 G TV requires that at least one ser-
vice center should be located at a distance not exceeding some non-negative
number M,. Furthermore, let Q Ç V denote the set of possible locations
for a service center and let A:, denote the cost of placing a service center in
ç 6 Q. The problem is to find a set of locations for service centers, such that
the total cost is minimized and such that the requirements of all customers
are satisfied. It is assumed that at least one feasible set of locations exists.
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The location problem can be formulated as a set covering problem aa
follows. For each g G Q let £(g) Ç iV denote the set of customers who
are satisfied when a service center is placed at location 9. Furthermore, let
B = {£(?) I g G Q} and for each fl G B define c(B) = min{Jfc, | fl(g) = B}.
The location problem is now equivalent to solving problem FCP(B,c). The
following theorem is due to Hoffman et al.[26].
Theorem 2.22 //Me uncfer/yinj yrapA G o/Me /ocation pro6/em constrfered
a6ove i« a tree, Men Me matrtz i4* in Me /ormu/ation as a «et covering
pro6/em i« total/y 6a/ance(/.
It follows that the location problem can be solved efficiently if the underlying
graph is a tree.
In a natural way the location problem gives rise to a /oeation jame, where
the cost c(5) is taken to be the worth of an optimal solution which satisfies
the requirements of coalition 5. The following result is due to Tamir[56].
Theorem 2.23 Conatrfer Me «elh'ng a6ove, u/Aere a ^rap/i G = (V, £), a
wet^ At /unction d : £ —» K+, a «et o/p/aj/er« JVC V, a «ct 0/ j>o««t'6/e /oco-
tion« /or «ervice centers Q Ç V an</ a co«t /unction ib : Q —» 1Î"*" </etermine«
a /ocation game (W,c). // tne yrapn G i« a tree, Men c Aas a non-empty
onti-core.
Proo/ : The matrix A* is totally balanced. Hence, the vector z® defined
by (2.4) is an optimal solution for PACP(B.c).
From the feasibility of 2* it follows that z^(£) < c(£) for all £ £ B.
Let 5 Ç JV. The worth c(5) is defined as the value of an optimal cover for
5. Let S Ç B be such an optimal cover. We then have c(5) =
Using the non-negativity of z* it follows that
B€5 B€S
The worth c(7V) of the grand coalition is by definition equal to the op-
timal cover for W. Since the optimal values of PACP(B,c) and FCP(B.c)
coincide, it follows that z*(7V) = c(./V). We conclude that z^ is an element
ofACore(c). D
Chapter 3
Traveling salesman games
Section 3.2 of this chapter is based on Derks and Kuipers[l4). Section 3.3 is
based on Kuipers[28).
3.1 Introduction
Consider the following problem. A repairman has to visit a number of cus-
tomers. He starts in his home city, visits each customer, and returns home.
The total cost of his trip has to be paid by the customers. The problem
is to find a fair allocation of the costs among the customers. This type
of problem was first investigated by Fishburn and Pollack[l7]. In Potters,
Curiel and Tijs[46] the problem was tackled with techniques from coopera-
tive game theory. Their approach was to associate a cooperative game with
the allocation problem. Techniques from game theory can then be applied
to find reasonable outcomes. However, several games can be associated with
the allocation problem. Potters et al. consider two types of games.
The first class of games Potters et al. considered are travc/iny salesman
yames. Let TV = { 1 , . . . , n} denote the set of customers and let 0 denote the
repairman. Furthermore, let G be a directed graph with node set TV U {0},
such that for each ordered pair i, j 6 TV U {0} there is a directed path from
I to j . Furthermore, a non-negative weight is assigned to each arc in the
graph. A tour for coalition 5 is a roundtrip along the arcs in the graph
of the repairman, who starts in 0, visits each customer in 5 at least once,
and returns home. The /enjtA of the tour is defined as the sum of the arc
weights on this tour. The cost of a coalition 5 is defined as the length of
a minimum length tour. This cost is denoted by c(5). Potters et al. give
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sufficient conditions on the weights of the arcs in the graph, such that a
traveling salesman game (TSG) has a non-empty anti-core. A 3-person TSG
always has a non-empty anti-core. However, the anti-core of a TSG can be
empty. Potters et al. gave an example of a 4-person game with an empty
anti-core in which the arc weights of the graph are not symmetric, i.e. the
cost to travel from t to j differs from the cost to travel from j to i. Even if
these weights are symmetric a TSG can have an empty anti-core. Tamir[57]
gave an example of a 6-person symmetric TSG for which the anti-core is
empty. Using a result of Fonlupt and Naddef[l8] he also showed that a
symmetric TSG always has a non-empty anti-core when there are at most 4
players. The question remained whether a 5-person symmetric TSG always
has a non-empty anti-core. The answer is yes, and the proof is given in
section 3.3.
The second class of games Potters et al. considered was the following.
Here, the game is defined on a complete directed graph. The cost of the
grand coalition JV is the sum of the arc weights in an arbitrarily chosen tour
traversed by the repairman, who starts at node 0, visits each customer eract/y
once, and returns home. Such a tour can be represented by a permutation
r = ( r i , . . . , r«) of the elements of W, where T; is the customer who is visited
in i-th place. This cost is denoted by Cr(JV). Each subset 5 Ç TV of customers
can also hire the repairman to serve its members only. For such a subset 5 a
tour is constructed from r by visiting the customers in 5 in the same order
as they were visited in the tour r, and by skipping the other customers. The
cost for coalition 5 is the sum of the arc weights on this tour. The cost is
denoted by c,.(S). A game defined in this way is called a /ïzed-route trave/ing
«a/esman yame or a routing yame.
Potters et al. proved that a routing game has a non-empty anti-core if
the weights in the graph G satisfy the triangle inequalities and if the tour
r which is chosen for the grand coalition is a tour of minimum length. In
section 3.2 we give an alternative proof of this result. This proof has the
advantage that it provides an efficient algorithm for constructing an element
in the anti-core. In that section we also prove that a routing game has a non-
empty anti-core if the tour r for the grand coalition is an adapted nearest
neighbour tour.
Keeping the order of the players fixed makes a routing game mathemati-
cally tractable, while results for a traveling salesman game are much harder
to obtain. However, the routing game model seems not very satisfactory
from an economic point of view. It is likely that a coalition will object to
a proposed sharing of the costs, when this coalition can do better on its
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own by rearranging the order in which its members are visited, or by vis-
iting some players or the home city more than once. If in such a situation
the repairman is indeed capable and willing to deviate from the fixed order
tour, then the TSG model should be prefered above the routing game model.
However, one can think of situations in which the repairman cannot deviate
from the fixed order tour. This could be the case when the repairman made
an appointment with each individual player to meet him at a specified time.
Rearranging the order of the players means that some appointments have
to be canceled. This is not in the interest of the players if they have tight
schedules with other activities as well. Another good reason for considering
the routing game model is that there exist interesting instances where the
characteristic functions of the routing game and the traveling salesman game
coincide.
Suppose the repairman repairs yachts. He lives at the coast of an island
and his customers all live at the coast too. Furthermore, assume that travel
costs are proportional to the Euclidian distances. In this case it is well-
known that an optimal tour is cross-free, i.e. the repairman should not come
across a point in the Euclidian plane more than once. This is still true if
we restrict ourselves to some connected area in the Euclidean plane (e.g. an
island). If all the cities lie on the boundary of this area, as in the case of
our repairman, there are only two tours that are cross-free: the tour which
visits the cities in the order as we meet them when we go clockwise along
the boundary of the area, and the tour which goes anti-clockwise along the
boundary of the island. When travel costs are symmetric, both tours must
be optimal. An optimal tour for a subset of cities can be found in the same
way, by going clockwise or anti-clockwise along the boundary of the island,
thereby skipping the cities that are not in the subset. This is exactly the
tour that the repairman would follow in a routing game. Hence, the routing
game and the traveling salesman game coincide, and the nice mathematical
results for routing games can be applied to the traveling salesman game as
well.
3.2 Routing games
3.2.1 In t roduc t ion
In this section we consider the class of routing games into more detail. As
a first result we show that the anti-core of a routing game may be empty.
Consider the graph in figure 3.1, let r - (1,2,3) and a = (1,3,2).
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Figure 3.1
The corresponding characteristic functions c,- and c<, are given in the table
below.
5
C<,
1
4
4
2
2
2
3
4
4
12
5
5
13
5
5
23
5
5
123
8
6
Suppose that i £ JR' is a vector in the anti-core of c,. Then x(12) <
c,(12) = 5, x(13) < c,(13) = 5 and i(23) < c,-(23) = 5. Thus, i(123) =
^i(12) + £X(13) + ^i(23) < 7± < 8 = c,(123), a contradiction. This shows
that the anti-core of c, is empty. Clearly, the emptiness of the anti-core
depends on the choice of the tour along N u {0}, since (2,2,2) is an element
of the anti-core of c<,.
In section 3.2.2 we address the following problem. Let G be a graph with
node set V^ U {0} and let r be a tour along this node set. Is the anti-core of
the associated routing game empty or not? And is it possible to compute an
element in the anti-core efficiently if it is non-empty? We show that the anti-
core of a routing game can be described by at most ^n(n+1) restrictions, and
we provide an O(n') algorithm which computes an allocation in the anti-core
if it is non-empty. Furthermore, we show in this section that the anti-core of a
routing game is non-empty under the mild condition c(7V) < c(5) + c(Af \S)
for all 5 Ç W. A game with this property is called 7V-8u6ad</it»vc. In
section 3.2.3 we provide some procedures to construct a tour r which will
guarantee that the corresponding routing game is TV-subadditive.
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S.2.2 The anti-core of a routing game ,u>?Q
Let (TV, v) be a game. Recall that the dual of a game is defined by v*(5) s
v(/V) - v(/V\S) for all 5 Ç TV and that Core(v') = ACore(v).
In the following we shall see that the number of essential coalitions in
the dual c* of a routing game c with n players is at most | n ( n f 1). Hence,
Core(c') = ACore(c) can be described by only | n ( n + 1) restrictions.
Let G be the complete directed graph with node set V = W U {0} and
let d : V x K —» 2R+ be a weight function on the arcs of G. Furthermore, let
r be a tour that visits each node in V exactly once and let c be the routing
game associated with r. Without loss of generality assume that on this tour
the players are visited in the order 1 ,2 , . . . ,n. Let i , j € TV with i < J. We
denote the coalition {Jb € JV | i < * < j } by (i,j).
Lemma 3.1 Let (TV, c) 6e a routtn; game. TAen, po«*i'6/y a/ter ret'na'eriny
tAe p/ayera, a// e««enfiai coa/t(ton« o/ (Ac dual c* are o/ (Ae /orm [i,ji].
Proo/: Let us first express the dual value of a coalition |i, j] in terms of arc
weights in the graph. We have
i - l n+l
and
n+l
where arithmetic is done modulo n. Hence,
e'([i , i l) = c(/V) - c(/V\[,-,j]) = £ d ( * - 1,*) - <*(,• - l , j + l) .
In figure 3.2 the arcs that have a positive sign in this expression are indicated
with '+', and the arc that has a negative sign is indicated with '-' .
Now, let 5 Ç iV. 5 can be partitioned into coalitions of the form [i't, jt],
A: = 1 , . . . , /f, where the coalitions [*jt, jjt] are taken maximal w.r.t. inclusion.
Furthermore, define jo = - 1 and ijf+i = n + 2. Then
c'(5) = c(/V) -
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We conclude that in the dual of a routing game only coalitions of the form
[i,j] can be essential. D
In figure 3.3 we have pictured a coalition 5 which consists of two com-
ponents, Si and 5 Î . To compute the dual value of 5 we have to add the
weights of the arcs that have a positive sign in this picture, and subtract the
arcs with a negative sign. This is precisely the sum of the dual values of Si
and S2.
Observe that there are only |n(n + 1) coalitions of type [»,j]. Hence,
the anti-core of a routing game can be described by at most ^n(n + 1)
linear restrictions. In Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijsjll] it is proved that also
sequencing games possess this property.
S: shaded area
Let P be the graph with vertex set ./V = { l , . . . ,n} and edge set i? =
{{«',1 + 1} I 1 = 1,2,... , n - 1}. Then the subgraph on a coalition of the type
[•.i] Ç N is a connected graph. Hence, all essential coalitions of the dual of
a routing game are connected in the path graph P, and it follows that the
collection of essential coalitions has the TD-property. Hence, we can apply
the findings of chapter 2 to deduce the following result.
Theorem 3.2 Lei (W,c) 6e a routing game. De/me 1 = (11,.. . ,i«) recur-
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S: shaded area
«tve/y 6y
(S.I)
TAen x G Corc(c*)(= j4Corc(c)) 1/ on</ oniy i/ tne
in c'.
coa/ttton t«
Proo/ : Observe that the vector i defined by (3.1) coincides with the
vector y* defined by (2.2) when we take B = {(i,j] | 1 < i < j < n}.
According to theorem 2.12 we have y* 6 Core(B,c*) if and only if TV is
B-stable. Since B contains all essential coalitions, the restricted core coin-
cides with the core and B-stability is equivalent to stability. It follows that
i = y^ G Core(c*) = ACore(c) if and only if TV is stable in the game c*. Q
The vector x defined by (3.1) can be computed in 0(n*) elementary
operations. Thus, it is possible to verify in 0(n*) time whether a routing
game has an empty anti-core or not. At the same time an element in the
anti-core is computed in case it is non-empty.
Theorem 3.3 .4 routing game Aoa a non-empty anti-core i/ana* on/y t/tAe
jame »« 7
Proo/ : /V-subadditivity of a game is trivially a necessary condition for the
non-emptiness of the anti-core. It remains to prove that for routing games
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this is also a sufficient condition. According to theorem 3.2 it suffices to
prove that TV-subadditivity of a routing game c implies the stability of TV in
the dual game c*. A maximal partition of TV in the game c* can be found
among partitions into essential coalitions. Let T = ((«t,.7*])tLi be such a
maximal partition of TV with 1 = I'I < t'2 < .. . < ijf and j * = «jt+i - 1 for
Ifc = l , . . . , / f - l , and j'jf = n. Define S.,,,, as the union of coalitions with even
index in this partition, and 5^^ as the union of coalitions with odd index.
We have seen earlier that the dual value of a coalition equals the sum of the
values of its maximal components. Thus, c*(S.v,,J = £ * ,»,„ c*([*k>.?*l)
c*(S,dd) = £ t ..dd^"([*'*«i*])- Using the TV-subadditivity of c we find
() (
= 2c(TV) - (c(5..
< c(TV) = c'(TV).
Thus, TV is stable in c*.
3.2.3 Routing games with a non-empty anti-core
In the previous subsection we did not put any restrictions on the tour for the
grand coalition in a routing game and as we have seen in subsection 3.2.1,
non-emptiness of the anti-core may very well depend on the choice of this
tour. In this section we adress the problem of constructing tours, which
guarantee the non-emptiness of the anti-core. This is not always possible.
Consider the symmetric case in which the weight of an edge {»,0} is 0 for
all 1 € TV and in which the weight of an edge {t,j} is 1 for all i , j G TV. In
this case the game has an empty anti-core, no matter which tour is chosen
for the grand coalition.
The weight function d is said to satisfy the irtany/e tneçua/ttiea if
<f(i\i) <<*(•,*)+ rf(*,i) (3.1)
for all t',j, ib G TV U {0}. In the example above the weight function does
not satisfy the triangle inequalities. It turns out that it is always possible
to construct a tour r such that the associated routing game c,. has a non-
empty anti-core if the weight function satisfies the triangle inequalities. In
fact, even the weaker condition
) (3.2)
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for all », J G Af is sufficient to guarantee the existence of such a tour. We
shall say that d satisfies weal; triang/e t'neoualttïe* if it satisfies (3.2).
Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 provide two methods for constructing tours which
induce a routing game with a non-empty anti-core. Theorem 3.4, which
states that a minimum length tour has the desired property, was proved ear-
lier by Potters, Curiel and Tijs. They provided two different proofs. In [46]
they define an associated game c with a routing game c. The associated
game satisfies c(5) < c(S) for all 5 Ç Af and c(/V) = c(N). Furthermore, c
is a linear production game in the sense of Owen[43]. Since these games have
a non-empty anti-core, it follows that ACore(c) 3 ACore(ë) / 0. Another
proof by Potters et al. is given in [47]. Here they give a direct proof that
the balanced ness conditions of Shapley-Bondareva hold, when the repairman
travels a tour of minimum length. We provide an alternative proof which
makes use of theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.4 Let G 6e (Ae comp/ete directed prap/» unf/i node «et Af U {0}
ana* /et <f 6e a non-negative wetgnt /unction on tAe area o/C wnt'en aatto/tea
wea/t triang/e tneoua/ttie*. Let (Af,c) 6e tAe routing game a««ocia/e<f wt'tA a
minimum /engtn tour r along Af u {0}. TÀen c Àa« a non-empty anti-core.
Proo/ : According to theorem 3.3 it is sufficient to prove that c satisfies
the W-subadditivity condition c(AQ < c(S) + c(A^\5) for all S Ç AT. Let
•S Ç A', ri the tour that results from r by skipping the players in Af\S, and
f2 the tour that results from r by skipping the players in 5. Construct the
tour o* as follows. Start in 0 and follow the tour rj up to the last player,
say i in 5. Then, instead of returning to 0, jump to the first player, say j ,
in T2. Finally, follow r2 until the home city 0 is reached. Using the triangle
inequality djy < d,o + do;, it follows that the length of <r is at most the
sum of the lengths of n and 7"2- Since r is a minimum length tour, it also
follows that the length of r is at most the sum of the lengths of n and f2,
i.e. c(W) < c(5) + c(JV\S). D
Constructing a minimum length tour for the grand coalition is not the
only way of ensuring the non-emptiness of the anti-core. An adapted nearest
neighbour tour also possesses this property.
Two games t; and u; are called s<rate</tca//y eautva/ent if a > 0 and /? € JR"
exist such that v(5) = au;(S) + £(5) for all 5 Ç AT. Clearly, the core (anti-
core) of v is empty if and only if the core (anti-core) of u; is empty. Now,
consider the following adaptation of the weight function <f. Choose i 6 AT
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and c > 0 and raise the weights of all outgoing arcs from i with the amount
e. Denote the adapted weight function by d. The weight function d satisfies
the weak triangle inequalities if d does. Let r be a tour along AT U {0}, and
let c and c be the routing games associated with r and the weight functions
d and d respectively. We have
• ( :
Thus, c and c are strategically equivalent. The same is true if we raise all
ingoing arcs from t. Now, let m be the maximum weight of the arcs (0, t) and
(«,0) (i G Af). First, raise all outgoing arcs from player 1 such that the arc
(1,0) gets weight m. Proceed with player 2,3, etc. until all arcs (i,0) have
weight m. Analogously, raise the ingoing arcs from all players such that all
arcs (0,t) get weight m. Finally, divide all arc weights by m. Let us denote
the adapted weight function by d. Let c be a routing game corresponding to
some tour r and to the original weight function d, and let c be the routing
game corresponding to the same tour r and to the adapted weight function
d. Then c and c are strategically equivalent. The weight function d satisfies
the weak triangle inequalities if d does. Observe that for d the weak triangle
inequalities are equivalent to the property d(i, j ) < 2 for all i,j> € TV.
The following theorem states that a routing game has a non-empty anti-
core if r is a nearest neighbour tour with respect to the adapted weight
function d.
Theorem 3.5 Let G 6e tAe comp/ete rft'rectetf jrapA u/ttA node set TV U {0}
and /et d 6e a non-negattve wety/it /unction on tne are* o/G wÀïc/i sotis/îe«
d(0,i) = d(i,0) = 1 /or a//1 G AT, and d(t,j) < 2 /or a// i , j G A/. Let r 4e o
nearest neijAfcour tour a/onj A/ U {0} starftnj untA tAe Aome city 0 and /et c
6e tAe routing yame associated wtta r. TAen c Aa« a non-empty and-core.
Proo/ : Without loss of generality we assume that ( 1 , 2 , . . . , n) is a nearest
neighbour tour. Then we have d(i,i + 1) < d(t,j) for all i G Af and all
j G Af with j > i + 1. According to theorem 3.3 it is sufficient to prove the
A/-subadditivity of c. Let 5 C Af, n the tour that results from r by skipping
the players in Af \ S and 7*2 the tour that results from skipping the players in
5 . If i G 5 we denote by / ( i ) the follower of i in the tour n . If i G A^\5 then
/( i ) is the follower of i in the tour rj. Clearly, we have either / ( i ) > i + 1
or / ( i ) = 0. There are two players i G AT with / ( i ) = 0, namely the players
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which are visited last in n and rj. One of them must be player n. Let us
denote the other player by Jfc. Then we have
= 2 + E * * «l(.\ /(t)) >
> 4 + £ , * * , „ <*(i,t + l ) >
> 2 + <f(M+1)+ £<**.„ <*(«,t + l) =
Both the minimum tour and the nearest neighbour tour have a serious
drawback. Finding a minimum tour is a well-known .V^-hard problem, so
that for a large number of players the problem becomes intractable. On the
other hand, the ratio between the length of a nearest neighbour tour and an
optimal tour can be arbitrarily bad (see e.g. Papadimitriou and Steiglitz[45j.
This may be unacceptable to the players, who are naturally interested in a
low cost for the grand coalition.
Suppose that some approximation algorithm, no matter which one, is
applied for finding a sub-optimal tour r for the grand coalition. If a good
approximation algorithm is used, then the cost for the grand coalition will
not be too high. However, we do not have the guarantee then that the
associated routing game has a non-empty anti-core. We shall describe an
0(n*) procedure, which takes r as its input, checks whether the routing
game associated with r has an element in the anti-core, and computes a
tour a of strictly lesser length than r if this is not the case.
Let (JV, c,.) be a routing game associated with a tour r for the grand
coalition. First, determine a maximal partition S i , . . . ,St of TV in the game
cj. Such a partition can be found using the algorithm of theorem 2.10. The
complexity of this algorithm applied on a routing game is O(n^).
The elements of the partition are all of the type [i,j]. Without loss of
generality we assume that the elements of the partition are indexed in such a
manner that the last player in 5, and the first player in Sj+i are consecutive
players for i = 1 ,2 , . . . , Jt- 1. Now, let S = U^dS*. According to lemma 3.1
we have
fcodd
and
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Suppose that Core(c^) = 0, and thus TV is not stable in the game c*. Then
•si
and hence
c,(5) + c,(tf\S) = 2c,(tf) - c;(5) - c;(tf \S) <
Then construct the tour (7 as follows. Start in the home city 0 and visit the
players in 5 as prescribed by the tour r. From the last player in 5, jump
to the first player in W\S. Then visit the players in N\S as prescribed
by r. Finally, return to 0. Using the triangle inequalities it follows that
Repeating the above procedure a number of times, eventually produces
a tour for which the associated routing game has a non-empty anti-core.
In the worst case it reaches a minimum tour after at most n! steps. We
were not able to give better bounds on the number of steps needed before
termination. We leave it as an open problem whether the number of steps
is polynomially bounded by the number of players in the game.
3.3 The 5-person TSG
In this section we discuss the symmetric version of the traveling salesman
game. Therefore, the game will be defined on an undirected graph and we
shall omit the word symmetric from now on. The traveling salesman problem
defined on a graph G may be formulated as an integer programming problem.
In their paper Fonlupt and Naddef[18] consider a relaxation of the integer
problem in which the integrality constraints and some other constraints are
left out. They provide sufficient conditions on the graph G such that the
value of the relaxed problem equals the value of the original problem.
An edge contraction is the process of replacing two adjacent vertices, say
i and j , by a single vertex. As a result of this the edge {t,j} disappears.
Other edges that had i or j as an endpoint will now have the new vertex as
an endpoint.
The conditions of Fonlupt and Naddef that ensure that the relaxed travel-
ing salesman problem equals the value of the original problem require that G
contains no minor which is isomorphic to one of the following three graphs.
Here, a minor of G is a graph that results from G by a sequence of edge
deletions and edge contractions.
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Figure 3.4 Figure 3.5 Figure 3.6
Tamir observed that as a direct consequence of this, a TSG has a non-
empty anti-core if the graph G contains no minor which is isomorphic to
one of these graphs. An immediate corollary is that all TSG's with 4 or less
players have a non-empty anti-core. Since the graph of a 5-person TSG has
only six nodes, it cannot contain a minor isomorphic to one of the graphs in
figure 3.4 and 3.5. Thus, a 5-person TSG can only have an empty anti-core
if its graph G contains a minor isomorphic to the graph in figure 3.6. Using
this observation one easily proves the following two lemma's.
Lemma 3.6 Le* (iV,c) te a 5-per«on T5G de/ïnerf
M
{0}, £). / /, )   ( 
ere ezists a jj/ayer i G iV «ucA tnat tAere ore at moit J? e</ye« in
as on endpoinJ, tnen >4Core(c) ^ 0.
Proo/: For each node of the graph in figure 3.6 there are exactly 3 edges
with this node as an endpoint. Hence, G cannot contain a minor isomorphic
to the graph in figure 3.6. It follows immediately that the TSG has a non-
empty anti-core. •
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Lemma 3.7 Let (JV,c) 6c a 5-per«on TSG de/med o n G = (JV
ana* suppose tAat tne comp/emeni o/G contains a cyc/e on /c«« tnan 6 nodes.
TA en ,4Core(c) ^ 0.
Proo/ : The complement of the graph in figure 3.6 forms a cycle graph
on six nodes. Thus, if a graph of six nodes contains a minor isomorphic to
the graph in figure 3.6, then its complement is a minor of the cycle graph.
Therefore, this complement cannot contain a cycle on less than six nodes.
Consequently, G cannot contain a minor isomorphic to the graph in fig-
ure 3.6. It follows that the TSG has a non-empty anti-core. •
Let c be a TSG defined on the graph G = (TV U {0},E) with weight
function cf. In this section we find it convenient to denote the weight d(t,j)
by d,y. Let G be the complete graph with node set TV U {0} and define the
weight d,y of an arbitrary edge {t, j} in G as the length of a shortest path
in G between the t and j . It i'i obvious that c is also the cost function of
the TSG defined on the graph G with weight function d. Furthermore, the
weights <f satisfy the triangle inequalities, and therefore each coalition 5 Ç Af
has a shortest tour that visits the players in 5 exact/y once. In the following
it is assumed throughout that a TSG is defined on a complete graph and
that the weight function satisfies the triangle inequalities, unless explicitly
stated otherwise.
A cooperative game (JV, v) is called p-norma/ized if v({t}) = p for all
• € iV.
Lemma 3.8 £acA TSG is strateyica//y eguiva/ent to a 2-norma/ized TSG.
Proo/ : Let c be a TSG with weight function d. Choose A: arbitrarily in iV
and e > 0. Define the weight function d by
^ \ d,, + e if i = fc or j = Jfc
Let c be the TSG associated with the weight function d. It is easily verified
that the weight function d still satisfies the triangle inequalities and that
«(5) = :(S) if it £ S
:(5) + 2f if it € 5
So c is strategically equivalent to c. Now, let m be the maximum weight
between any player and 0, i.e. m = max^/v^oy- First, raise the weight of
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all edges {1, j>} such that {1,0} gets weight m. Then raise the weight of all
edges {2,j} such that {2,0} gets weight m. Proceed until all edges {j',0}
have weight m. The game associated with the new weight function is a
2m-normalized TSG which is strategically equivalent to the original TSG c.
Finally, divide all edge weights by m. Q
Notice that in a 2-normalized TSG d,o = dot = 1 for all i € N and that
the weight of any edge {i, j} with i , j € TV is bounded by 2, since the triangle
inequalities imply 4 / < <Ao + do; = 2.
Lemma 3.9 For eoc/i 2-norma/ïzerf T5G c (Acre t« a 2-norma/ùea' T5G c
e /o//owtny
t. c Aaa a «Aorte«t tour /or /V containing an e</ye o/ maxima/ wrtont, t.e.
it. i4Corc(c) ^ 0 => ^Core(c) # 0.
Proo/ : Let c be a 2-normalized TSG with weight function <4. If the game c
has a shortest tour for TV containing an edge of weight 2, then define £ = c.
Now suppose that each shortest tour for TV contains only edges that have
weight less than 2. Let t > 0. Define
if t = 0 or j = 0 or <fjy = 2
otherwise
Note that for c such that d,y < 2 for all I , J e TV, the weight function <f
still satisfies the triangle inequalities. Let c be the TSG associated with the
weight function d. All shortest tours for /V contain only edges of weight less
than 2, so for e small enough we have
c(AT) = c(/V) + ( n - l)e and
c(5) < c(5) + ( |5 | - l)t for all 5 Ç TV
Suppose that £ is an element in the anti-core of c. Define i , = x< - ^ * c
for all i 6 TV. It is straightforward that z G ACore(c). So, ACore(c) # 0 =>
ACore(c) ^ 0. Choose f such that one of the tours containing an edge of
weight 2 becomes a shortest tour or such that the edge with largest weight
among the edges with weight less than 2 gets weight 2. (Whatever happens
first.) If c now has a shortest tour containing an edge of weight 2, then
stop. Otherwise repeat the process of raising edge weights, until an edge of
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weight 2 appears on a shortest tour. •' - • Q
We have seen earlier that in proving that all 5-person TSG's have a
non-empty anti-core, it is allowed to restrict ourselves to TSG's defined on
complete graphs with weight functions that satisfy the triangle inequalities.
From the above two lemma's it follows that we may further restrict ourselves
to 2-normalized TSG's that have an edge of weight 2 on a shortest tour.
Without loss of generality we may assume that on this shortest tour the
players 1,2,3,4 and 5 are visited in this order. There are 4 possible locations
for the edge of weight 2 on this tour, but for reasons of symmetry we only
need to consider the cases (f^  = 2 and ^ 3 = 2. Both cases are pictured
below. We shall refer to the first case as a type / TSG and to the second
case as a type // TSG.
4.
s;
Figure 3.7 Type / TSG Figure 3.8 Type // TSG
Theorem 3.10 Type // T5G's Aovc o non-empty anti-core.
Proo/: We have that [1,2,3,4,5] is a shortest tour and that 0^ 3 = 2. The
tour [2,1,5,4,3] uses the edge {1,5} instead of the edge {2,3}, but for the rest
it uses edges of the same length as the tour [1,2,3,4,5]. We conclude that the
edge {1,5} must have weight 2. Analogously one shows that the edges {1,3}
and {2,5} also have weight 2. These edges form a cycle. Remove all edges of
weight 2 from the graph G and denote the resulting graph by G'. If a tour
in the graph G uses an edge {i,i} of weight 2, then the tour which uses the
edges {i,0} and {0,j} to go from 1 to j instead, has the same cost. Hence,
the removal of the four edges of weight 2 does not change the characteristic
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function of the TSG. The complement of G' contains a cycle on less than 6
nodes. From lemma 3.7 it follows that the TSG has a non-empty anti-core.
a
It remains to prove that type / TSG's have a non-empty anti-core.
Lemma 3.11 Let c le a type / TSG. TA en /or eocn coa/ttt'on 5 containing
j>/ayer« 3 antf 4 Mere exùto a «Ziorteat tour /or 5 a/ony tAe edge {3,4}.
Proo/: Let 5 be a coalition containing players 3 and 4. The cases | 5 | = 2
and | 5 | = 5 are trivial. First assume that |S | = 3, say 5 = {3 ,4 , i } . There
are only three possible tours for this coalition. These are [3,4,i], [4,3,i] and
[3,i,4]. Since the tour [1,3,2,4,5] is at least as long as [1,2,3,4,5] it follows that
<*13 + 2^4 > J u + ds4 = 2 + ds*. Thus, <f is > ds4 and dj« > dj*. Analogously
one shows that <fjs > ds4 and d u > dj4. So the edges {3 , i } and {4, i} cannot
both have lesser weight than {3,4} . Therefore, either [3,4,i] or |4,3,i) is at
least as short as [3,i,4j.
Now assume that |S | = 4. There are three coalitions of cardinality 4 that
contain players 3 and 4. These are {1 ,2 ,3 ,4} , {1 ,3 ,4 ,5} and {2 ,3 ,4 ,5} . It
is obvious that [2,3,4,5] is a shortest tour for coalition {2 ,3 ,4 ,5} .
Let 5 = {1 ,2 ,3 ,4} . If a tour for 5 uses the edge {1,2} then it is possible
to construct another tour, which replaces {1,2} by some other edge, but for
the rest it uses the edges of the same length as the original tour. For instance,
[1,2,3,4] can be replaced by [2,3,4,1]. This tour is at least as short as the
original tour. Therefore, in searching a shortest tour for 5 we may restrict
ourselves to tours that do not make use of the edge {1 ,2} . Furthermore, if
a shortest tour for S ends with player 4, then it is possible to construct a
shortest tour for TV by visiting the players in 5 as prescribed by this tour and
visit player 5 directly after player 4. Therefore, any tour for 5 ending (or
starting) with player 4 must be as least as long as [1,2,3,4] and this tour is at
least as long as [1,4,3,2]. We conclude that a shortest tour for 5 can be found
among tours that do not make use of the edge {1,2} and do not start or
end with player 4. There are only four such tours. These are ri = [1,4,3,2],
rj = [1,3,4,2], T3 = [1,4,2,3] and r* = [2,4,1,3]. It was shown earlier that
^13 + 2^4 > 2 + ^34. From this it follows that di3 + d24 > ^23 + ^34. Therefore
T4 cannot be shorter than n . It also follows that <f24 > ^34, so 73 is not
shorter than TV We have proved that either ri or r2 is shortest for 5. Both
tours use the edge {3,4} .
It remains to prove that a shortest tour for 5 = {1 ,3 ,4 ,5} uses the edge
{3,4} . Observe that the tour [1,5,4,3,2] is at least as short as [1,2,3,4,5]
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and therefore the edge {1,5} must have weight 2. After renumbering the
players: x(l) = 1, JT(2) = 5, *(3) = 4, *(4) = 3 and JT(5) = 2, it is clear that
this case is similar to the case 5 = {1,2,3,4}. •
Lemma 3.12 Let c 6e a type / TSG. TAen Mere eziats a type / T5<7 c
Me /o/Zounny properties.
t. 5e«u/e« {1,2} an<f {1,5} Mere ta another e</ye o/iueiyAf £ wt'M a «Aort-
es* tour a/ony t/it« c<fye.
«. i4(7ore(c) ^ 0 => MCore(c) # 0.
Proo/: Let tf denote the set of edges {{2,3}, {2,4}, {2,5}, {4,5}, {3,5}}.
The edges in /f are drawn in the picture below. ,
Figure 3.9
Remark that any tour for W must use at least one of the edges in if.
First suppose that there is a shortest tour for TV, say r, that uses exactly 1
edge in X. Let L denote the set of edges {{1,3}, {3,4}, {1,4}} and £ the
set of all edges between players. Since the three edges in L form a cycle,
any tour can use at most 2 edges in L and therefore it uses at least 2 edges
in £\L = if U {{1,2}, {1,5}}. Since r uses only 1 edge in /C, it must use
one of the edges {1,2} or {1,5}. It is easy to check that any tour starting
with player 1 and then visiting player 2 or 5 must use at least 2 edges in
A\ Therefore, r does not start or end with player 1. Because r contains
an edge of weight 2, also the edge between the first and the last player in
this tour must have weight 2, since else an improvement would be possible.
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Furthermore, there is & shortest tour along this edge. Since 1 is not the first
or last player in r, this edge cannot be {1,2} or {1,5}, which proves the
lemma in this case.
Now suppose that all shortest tours for N use at least 2 edges in AC.
Raise the weights of each edge in Af by t if this edge has weight less than 2.
Note that the new edge weights still satisfy the triangle inequalities. Let c
denote the TSG associated with the new edge weights. Since all shortest
tours in the game c use at least two edges in Af, it follows that [1,2,3,4,5] is
still a shortest tour, provided that < is small enough. Using lemma 3.11 we
find
c(AT) = c(/V) + 2<
c ( S ) < c ( S ) + 2< if 2,5 € 5
c ( S ) < c ( S ) + f if 2 € S , 5 £ 5 or 2 ^ 5 , 5 6 S
c(5) = c(5) if 2,5 £ S .
Assume that i € ACore(c). Define Xj = £j for j -^  2,5 and iy = £ y - « for
j = 2,5. It is staightforward that z € ACore(c). Thus, ACore(c) ^ 0 =•
ACore(c) / 0. We can raise the edge weights of edges in AC until one of the
following cases occur.
i) An edge in Af gets weight 2.
ii) A tour along an edge in AT that has weight 2 becomes a shortest tour,
iii) A tour that uses at most 1 edge in AC becomes a shortest tour.
If ii) or iii) occurs the proof is finished. If i) occurs we can repeat the process
of raising edge lenghts until ii) or iii) occurs. D
Theorem 3.13 Type / T5G's Aave a non-empty ontt-core.
Proo/: Let c be a type / TSG. According to lemma 3.12 we may assume that
besides {1,2} and {1,5} there is another edge of weight 2 with a shortest tour
along this edge. If this edge is on the tour [1,2,3,4,5], then one easily shows
that the game is also of type / / (possibly after renumbering the players),
so the game has a non-empty anti-core according to theorem 3.10. If the
edge has player 1 as one of its endpoints then the anti-core is non-empty
according to lemma 3.6. If it is the edge {2,5} the anti-core is non-empty
according to lemma 3.7. So we assume that none of these situations occur.
Then only the cases ^4 = 2 and 3^5 = 2 remain. Both cases are easily seen
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• - >
0
d> 1
Figure 3.10
to be equivalent for reasons of symmetry. Therefore we assume that (^ 4 = 2.
This situation is pictured in figure 3.10.
Let r be a shortest tour along the edge {2,4}. If {2,4} is the third or
second edge in this tour then the game is also of type //, so the game has a
non-empty anti-core according to theorem 3.10. So assume that it is the first
edge in this tour. If player 4 is the first player in this tour then there must
be another edge {4, j} of weight 2 and the game has a non-empty anti-core
either according to lemma 3.7 or to theorem 3.10. So assume that player 2
is the first player in r and 4 the second player in this tour. If 1 is not the
last player in r then there must be a third edge {2,j} of weight 2 and the
game has non-empty anti-core according to lemma 3.6. So we may assume
that player 1 is the last player in this tour. There are only two tours that
satisfy these conditions. These are [2,4,3,5,1] and [2,4,5,3,1]. If [2,4,3,5,1] is
a shortest tour then also [2,1,5,3,4] is a shortest tour, thus the game is also
of type //. From theorem 3.10 it follows that the game has a non-empty
anti-core. Finally suppose that [2,4,5,3,1] is a shortest tour. Since the tour
[4,5,3,2,1] is at least as long as [1,2,3,4,5] it follows that 4*35 > ^34. So also
[2,1,3,4,5] is a shortest tour and the edge {2,5} has weight 2. It follows
both from lemma 3.6 and from lemma 3.7 that the game has a non-empty
anti-core. •
Corollary 3.14 J4// 5-person TSG'a Àave a non-empty anti-core.
Proo/ : This follows directly from theorems 3.10 and 3.13, and the fact
that we may restrict ourselves to 2-normalized TSG's which have an edge of
weight 2 on a shortest tour. D
Chapter 4
Minimum cost spanning tree
games
Section 4.3 of this chapter is baaed on Kuipers[29j.
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is based on a problem which was initially raised by Claus and
Kleitman[9]. Roughly, the problem is as follows. A set of customers all
need to be connected to a common supplier, for instance to a transmitter
of cable television. This is done by establishing a set of links that connect
two customers or that connect a customer to the supplier. The total cost
of establishing the necessary links has to be shared by the customers. The
question is how to divide this cost among the customers.
Bird [5] was the first to follow a game theoretic approach to tackle the
problem. He associated a cooperative cost game with the problem, which he
called the minimum coat spanning tree (MCST) game. This way, solution
concepts known in game theory can be used to solve the problem. Granot
and Huberman[24] were the first to provide a correct proof that the anti-
core of a MCST game is never empty. This proof also provided an efficient
procedure to construct an element in the anti-core.
In section 4.2 we investigate the structure of the anti-core of MCST
games. As in the case of routing games it turns out to be a fruitful approach
to consider the dual of a MCST game. We shall prove that the essential
coalitions of the dual are connected in a forest. With this observation we
shall be able to characterize a number of extreme elements of the anti-core
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of a MCST game, though certainly not all of them. In section 4.3 we restrict
ourselves to MCST games for which the cost to establish a link can take only
two different values, which gives rise to so-called tn/ormation yrap/i games. In
this case we are able to give a nice characterization of the set of all extreme
elements of the anti-core as well as the anti-nucleolus. In section 4.4 we
consider a more general setting in which there are several common suppliers,
each of them offering a different type of service. Each customer needs to be
connected to at least one of these suppliers. We call these games minimum
coat /ore«t (MCF) games. We provide sufficient conditions such that an MCF
game has a non-empty anti-core.
4.2 The anti-core of MCST games
Let TV = {1 , . . . ,n} denote a set of customers and let 0 denote a common
supplier to which the customers need to be connected. To each pair {i,j}
with i,j € TV u {0} a non-negative number d^ j- is assigned, which denotes
the cost of establishing a link between i and j . The customers need to be
connected to the common supplier by establishing a suitable set of links. Let
us denote this set of links by £. The goal of connecting all customers to the
common supplier is achieved if the graph with node set W u {0} and edge
set £ is a connected graph. The total cost of establishing the links in this
graph is £{i,;}eJ5 diy. If we assume that the customers want to be connected
to the supplier at minimal cost, then the links in £ will form a spanning
tree on JVu {0} of minimal cost. If a coalition 5 Ç TV decides to operate
on its own, it is assumed that they are not allowed to establish a link which
involves a customer outside 5. Hence, the cost of coalition 5 is the cost of a
minimum cost spanning tree on the nodes 5 U {0}. Let us denote this cost
by c(5). A game defined in this way is called a minimum cost spanniny tree
game or shortly a MCST game.
Granot and Huberman[23] proved that the anti-core of a MCST game
is never empty and they provide the following procedure to construct an
element in the anti-core. Let F denote a minimum cost spanning tree for the
grand coalition. For every customer i G TV let /(i) denote the node which
follows i on the path in F from i to the common supplier 0. Define
i, = rf,-j(j) for all i G TV. (4.1)
We shall refer to this vector as the tree vector. We include a proof of Granot
and Huberman's theorem, since it is instructive to see that the fundamental
idea in this proof is also used in the proof of theorem 4.5 and theorem 4.25.
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Theorem 4.1 (Granot and Huberman) TAe tree vector <fe/tne<f 6y ^ . i ^
u an e/ement o/ tAe antt-core o/ tÀe MC5T game c.
Proo/ : Let i be the tree vector defined by (4.1). It is trivial that
e(JV). Let S Ç # . It remains to prove that i (S) < c(S). In order to prove
this, we construct a graph with node set JVu{0} in the following way. First,
construct a minimum spanning tree with node set 5 U {0}. Then add the
vertices in Af\S together with the edges ( i , / ( i ) } for i € Af\S. The resulting
graph, which we shall denote by G, is connected. To see this, we choose
i € TV and we construct a path in G from t to 0. If i € 5, then a path in G
from i to 0 exists, since G contains a spanning tree on 5 U {0}. If i € AT\S,
then follow the path i,/(«')./(/(•))»•.. until a node in 5 U {0} is reached.
This will surely happen, since the edges {i,/(•')} for t € JV\S contain no
cycle. Once a node in 5 U {0} is reached it is trivial again that a path to
0 exists. Since we can reach 0 from every i € Af, we conclude that G is
connected. Therefore, the costs of construction are at least c(JV). Thus,
>c(JV).
Now, using that i(AT) = c(JV), we find that
Notice that the tree vector is a maratnal a/location vector, i.e. there exist
coalitions Si Ç S2 Ç . . . Ç Sn with the property i(5*) = c(S*) and |S*| = Jfc
for all A: e { 1 , . . . ,n} . Hence, the tree vector is an extreme element of the
anti-core.
Assume for a moment that the customers in a coalition S are allowed to
use links which involves customers outside S. Let d(S) denote the cost of
coalition 5 in this model. Observe that d(S) = min{c(T) | S Ç T}, where
c(S) denotes the cost of 5 in the ordinary MCST game. Consequently
ACore(d) = ACore(c) n 1R£. It follows that the tree vector is not only in
the anti-core of the MCST game c, but also in the anti-core of the game <f.
Notice that d(5) < <f(T) if 5 Ç T. For this reason the game <f is called a
monotonte MCST game. From now we discuss again the ordinary MCST
game model.
Granot and Huberman argue in [24] that the tree vector will often be
considered unfair, since players which are connected directly to the supplier
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will have to pay their link to the supplier, while other players profit from
this link without contributing to it. Therefore, it is desirable to further
investigate the structure of the anti-core. In their paper Granot and Hu-
berman give procedures to generate other vectors in the anti-core. One of
these procedures is called the u/eaifc rfcmanif operation. Although they do not
mention it explicitly in their paper, it follows easily from their results on the
weak demand operation that for each player ï G TV there exists an extreme
element in the anti-core in which player t pays his marginal contribution to
the grand coalition, i.e. c(W) - c(Af\{i}). In this section we prove a gener-
alization of this result. If a coalition 5 Ç jV is stable in the dual game c*,
then there exists an extreme element z in the anti-core of c, which satisfies
In [24] Granot and Huberman proved a theorem which they called the
minimum ezee«« coa/ttton structure theorem. This theorem implies that all
essential coalitions of the dual of a MCST game are connected in a forest
with node set AT Their proof of the theorem contains some statements which
are presented as being trivial, but which are not trivial at all in our opinion.
Therefore we provide our own proof.
In the next lemma we use the following notation. Let V be a finite set
and let £ Ç V x V be a collection of edges. Then for any 1/ Ç V we denote
the set {{v,tu} € E | w6f/ and u; G {/} by £[/.
Lemma 4.2 Let F = (V, £) 6e o tree and !e( {/ Ç V k a act u/Aose
components untn respect to F are £/i,...,t/fc. Furthermore, /et Fy^y =
(V\t/, £V\l/) 6e tÀe /orest wÀtcn resu/ta /rom F wnen a// vertices o/£/ are
removed. Ftna//y, /et F 6e a co/Zection o/ edoes sucn tAat (V\f/, £v\t/ U "^)
/orms a tree. TAen tAere ezists a partition Fi , . . . ,F t o/ F suc/i tAat a//
yrapAa (V\(/,, £V\l/, U Fj) are connected.
Proo/ : For all / € F define /( / ) as the set of indices i for which the path
between the endpoints of / in the tree F has a non-empty intersection with
[/,. / ( / ) T^  0 for all / € F, since otherwise the addition of / to the forest
Fy\y would create a cycle.
Let us first consider the case that | / ( / ) | = 1 for all / G F, and hence
E / € F I ' ( / ) I = 1*1- Then define F, = {/ G F | / ( / ) = {i}}. Trivially,
(F,)*_j forms a partition of F (possibly some of the sets in this partition are
empty). It remains to prove that all graphs (V\£/,-, .Ey\i/,.uF,) are connected.
Obviously, the graph (V\£/,-, £y\[/.uF) is connected. Choose / G F\F,. The
path between the endpoints of / in F does not meet the set f/j. Therefore,
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this path is also present in (V\f/,, £V\i/, U F), and it follows that / lies on a
cycle in this graph. Therefore, / can be removed, while the resulting graph
remains connected. Now choose another edge in F\F,. Again, the path
between the endpoints of this edge in F does not meet the set £/<, and the
path does not use any edge we have already removed, since we do not remove
edges in F. Now, apply the same reasoning to find that also this edge can be
removed without disturbing the connectedness of the graph. This way, we
can sequentially remove all edges in F\F, and we conclude that the graph
(V\f/,, ^V\i/, U F,) is connected.
Now we shall prove that the lemma also holds when ]£/eJ* U(/)l = M >
|F|. Assume the lemma holds when £ / e f | / ( / ) | < M. Since M > |F|,
there exists an edge / G F such that | / ( / ) | > 2. Removal of the edge 7
from the graph Fv\i/ = (V\J7, £V\i/ U F) causes the graph to break into two
components. Let us denote the vertex sets of these components by L and
ft. Let (vo,... ,v/i) be the path in F between the endpoints of / = {vo. v*}.
Assume that vo G L and v* € ft. For two adjacent vertices vy and vy+i
on this path it is impossible that one of them lies in 1/ and that the other
lies in ft, since otherwise L and ft would also be connected in the graph
(V\(/, £v\yUf\{/}) . Hence we can choose vj G L and tv G ft with / < r - 1
such that w, G V\(L U ft) = £/ for all j G {/ + 1,... ,r - 1}. Furthermore,
there exists an index ï such that all vertices vy with jf G {/ + 1,... ,r — 1}
belong to C/7, since {vj+i,... , v,.-i} is connected in F. Define 3 = {vj.tv}.
Now it is clear that the removal of the edge / from Fy\[/ and the addition
of jj to it, results in a tree again, and that |/(jj)| = 1 < | / ( / ) | .
Define G = F u {$}\{7}- Then the graph (V\C/, £v\yUG) is a tree and
X^ yeG |^ (<7)| < H/ef l^(/)l- According to the induction hypothesis there
exists a partition (G,)*_j of G, such that all graphs (V\£/j, £V\tf, U <*,•) are
connected.
Assume for a moment that the partition is such that j G Gf with t ^ ï.
The path in F between the endpoints of «7 does not meet the set C/f, so this
path also exists in the graph (V\C/{, £y\t/.). It follows that «7 lies on a cycle
in the graph (V\£^, i<V\t/; U G{). Therefore, J7 can be transfered from Gf to
GÏ, still leaving all graphs (V\L/,-, Ev\i/. UG,) connected.
Assume from now on that p G Gj. Define
F, = ( ^ ' - * • * *
The graphs (V\£/,-, ^ V\t/_-UF,-) are trivially connected for 1 ^ ï. It remains to
prove that (V\£/f, Ev\if-UFj) is connected. We know that (V\C/j,
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is connected. Removal of the edge y = {vj,v,} causes the graph to break
into two components. The path from t/o to vj in F uses no vertices of t/j.
Hence, in the graph (V\£/j-, 2?v\i/7 U G Ï \ { J } ) the vertices vo and vj lie in the
same component. Analogously one shows that tv and t>* lie in the same
component. It follows that vo and v^ lie in different components. Thus,
addition of the edge / = {vo,v/,} results in a connected graph. •
Let V be a finite set and let d be a weight function which associates a
non-negative number to each pair {i,j} with I , J € V. In the following the
ordered pair (V, d) will be called a networib.
Lemma 4.3 Let (V, d) 6e a network and /et F te a minimum spanning tree
on V in tAi« netu/orfc. Furtnermore, /et 1/ Ç V onrf ({/,£[/) 6e tAe /oreat
wAicA results /rom F u>Aen o// vertices out«t(fe £/ ore removed. TAen tAerc
eziat» a meat Fy = ({/, F) on [/, sucA tAot £y Ç F.
Proo/: Let 7V = (£A ^) be a mest for £/ with respect to the weight function
d. If £y Ç F, or equivalently, if |Ei/ n F| = |#t/|, then the proof is finished.
Therefore assume that |#c/ n F| = * < |E{/|. Choose an edge e € #t/ \F.
When e is deleted in the tree F, the result is a forest which consists of two
components. At least one edge on the path between the endpoints of e in
the tree 7V connects these two components. Let us denote this edge by / .
From the minimality of F it follows that d/ > d«. From the minimality of
7V it follows that <fg > d/. Hence, d, = d/. Replace the edge / in Ty by e
and the result is a mest for C/ which has A: + 1 edges in common with Ey.
The replacement of edges can be repeated to obtain mcst's for £/ which have
A: + 2, Jt + 3 , . . . edges in common with Ey. We conclude that there exists a
mest on t/ which has |/?i/| edges in common with Ey. •
Theorem 4.4 Let (W,c) 6e a minimum cost spanning tree yamc rfe^ned on
tAe network (TV U {0},d), and /et F = (# u {0},£) 6e a mest /or tAe yrond
coa/ttt'on V^. TAen o// essentia/ coa/tttons o/ t/ie duo/ oame c* ore connected
in tAe /orest, wÀicÀ resu/ts /rom F 6y de/etiny tAe common supp/ier 0 /rom
it.
Proo/ : Let S Ç TV and let Si ,Sj , . . . ,S* denote the components of S with
respect to F. Let ÎV = JV U {0} and as usual, let £?jy, ^ Ç £ denote the
set of edges which have both endpoints in Af\S. According to lemma 4.3 it
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is possible to construct a minimal tree F^.^ for 77\5 which uses all edges
in £jv\5- Equivalently, we can choose a collection of edges F, such that
^ f ) is a mcst for 77\S. Hence,
c'(S) = c(AT) - c(AT\S) = j ; 4 . - X X
According to lemma 4.2 there exists a partition (fi)?=i °f ^\ "^ch that
all graphs (7V\5,, £ ^ 5 U F,) are all connected. Hence,
c ' (S . ) = c(AT) - c(AT\5.) > £ ( * . - £ < * . for all • € { 1 , . . . , * } .
Observe that E\£^ , ^ is the collection of edges in F with at least one
end point in 5, (1 € { 1 , . . . , it}), and £"\£^>^ is the collection of edges in P
with at least one endpoint in 5. Hence, (£\£jv\5.)*=i forms a partition of
\ it follows that
= Et= 1 (
Thus, 5 cannot be essential in c* when it consists of more than one compo-
nent with respect to F. The theorem follows. •
Combining theorem 4.4 and theorem 2.8 it follows that the collection of
essential coalitions of the dual of a MCST game possesses the TD-property.
Also the grand coalition AT is stable in the dual game c*, since the tree
vector lies in its core. Therefore, we can apply theorem 2.12 to generate
other vectors in the core of c*. That such a procedure really produces other
core elements than the tree vector, is shown in the following example.
Example : Consider the graph J/I figure 4.1 consisting of 4 nodes, the
common supp/ier 0 and three customers, 1,2 and 3. The minimum spanning
tree F contains three edges, {0,1}, {1,2} and {2,3}. Let S be the coWection
of coaiitions which are connected in F. According to theorem 4.4 aii essen-
tiaJ coaiitions of the dua/ game c* are contained in S. The characteristic
functions of c and c* are given in the tabie beiovv.
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5
c
c*
1
1
0
2
3
J
3
2
12
3
1
J3
4
2
23
5
4
123
5
5
£ has the TD-property with respect to two different permutations of AT,
name7y (3,2,1) and (1,2,3). If we app7y theorem 2.12 with respect to the
first permutation, we obtain the vector (1,2,2), the tree vector. However, if
we appiy theorem 2.12 with respect to the second permutation, we obtain
the vector (0,1,4), which is aiso an extreme eJement of Core(c') (and of
ACore(c)! •
Figure 4.1
In the example above the MCST game has four extreme elements in
the anti-core, namely the two vectors found in the example and two other
vectors, (1,1,3) and (0,3,2). So even in this simple example we do not find
all extreme elements by applying theorem 2.12. It is worth noting that the
procedure offered by theorem 2.12 can be strengthened in the following way
for MCST games.
Let (N,c) be a MCST game and suppose that £/ Ç JV is a stable coalition
in the dual game c*. Let c^ denote the subgame of c* restricted to the
coalition £/ and let Cyv\i/ denote the subgame of c restricted to the coalition
JV\(7. From theorem 4.4 and corollary 2.13 it follows that c^ has a non-
empty core. Furthermore, it is trivial that c#\y is a MCST game. Hence, a
vector z = (2i/,2Af\l/) ^ ^ ^ with the following properties exists.
Property 4.1 zy is a core element of the subgame c^.
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Property 4.2 *jv\u is a tree vector of the subgame
Theorem 4.5 j4ny vector z w/uc/i satta/iea properties ^.2 ana* ^ .f t« an e/-
(tnenl o/ Me anti-core o/ tÀe A/C5T ;ame c fanJ an e/ement o/ Core(c')/
Moreover, t/zy w eÀo«en extreme tn Core(c^) Men z i« extreme in >4Core(c).
Proo/ : Let Fjvu/ be a minimum spanning tree on the node set Af\(/ U {0}
such that Zjv\[/ is the tree vector associated with F^u/. For each player
i € JV\£f, let /(i) denote its follower, i.e. the node which is visited directly
after i on the unique path in F/^y from i to 0. Hence, for any player
i 6 yv\f/ we have z* = < ,^/(i).
Now, let S Ç JV. We have to show that z(5) > c*(S). Therefore, we
construct a graph G with node set {0}uAT\(Snt/) as follows. First, construct
a minimal spanning tree on the node set {0}uAT\S. Then, add the remaining
nodes Sn7V\t/, together with the edges {i,/(•')} for i G SnW\i/. This graph
is well defined, since the endpoints of all edges lie within {0} U /V\(S H [/).
The costs of construction of G equal z(S n W\C/) + c(W\S). Furthermore,
G is a connected graph. To see this, we show that for each i € Af\(S n £/)
there exists a path to 0. If i e yV\5 this follows directly from the fact that
G contains a spanning tree on {0} U 7V\S. If i € 5 n JV\t/, then follow the
path i,/(i), /(/(«)), until a node in {0}uyV\5 is reached. This will surely
happen, since the edges {i, /(»)} (i € 5n7V\t/) contain no cycle. Once a node
in {0}u7V\5 is reached, it is trivial again that a path to 0 exists. We conclude
that G is connected (in fact, it is a tree). The costs of construction therefore
are at least c(JV\(S n tf)). Thus, z(S n tf\£/) + c(7V\S) > c(^ \ (5 n f/)).
Using this inequality, we find
n ./V\t/) - c(^T\(5 n f/)) =
) + c'(Sn£/)<
< z(5n JV\{/) + z(S n I/) = z(S).
The efficiency of z follows from *(#) = z([/) + z(tf\I/) = c*(C/)+ c(AT\î/) =
Suppose zy is an extreme core element of c^. We shall prove that z is an
extreme element in ACore(c). Let u denote the cardinality of £/ and assume
without loss of generality that {/ = {1,2, . . . , u } . Since zy is extreme, we
can choose u coalitions S i , . . . , Su Ç £f such that ^(S,) = Cy(S,) for all
i e { 1 , . . . , u} and such that the incidence vectors «j of these coalitions are
linearly independent. We may assume that Su = f/. Define T, = ./V\S,
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for i € { l , 2 , . . . , u - 1} and define T^ = IV. Then z(T,) = c(T,-) for » €
{1,2, . . . , u } . The tree vector z#\j/ is extreme in the game c^\y. Hence,
we can choose coalitions Tu+i , . . . ,T* Ç JV\f/ such that z(Tj) = c(T.) for all
i € { u + l , . . . , n } and such that the incidence vectors t,- (i = u + 1 , . . . , n)
are linearly independent.
It will be sufficient to prove that the incidence vectors t, of the sets T<
(i G {1,2 , . . . ,n}) are linearly independent. To see that this is indeed the
case, suppose that ]JC?=i <*t*i = 0- After some rearranging we obtain
u - l n u
«=1 I=U+1 1=1
where 1 denotes the all-one vector. Observe that the coordinates u + 1 , . . . , n
of the vectors «, are all 0, and that the coordinates 1 , . . . ,u of the vectors t,
(i = u + 1 , . . . , n) are also 0. It follows that
u - l u
£ « > (4.2)
and that
n u
2 a,*, = (1-«„)£<*,. (4.3)
i = u + l «=1
Since the vectors «,• (i = 1 u) are linearly indepedent, it follows from (4.2)
that a, = 0 for i = 1,. . ., u, and (4.3) can be rewritten as
n
E <M< = 0. (4.4)
•=u+l
Since the vectors tj (i = u + 1 , . . . ,n) are also linearly independent, it fol-
lows that otj = 0 for i = u + 1 , . . . , n. We conclude that t i , . . . ,*„ are inearly
indepedent. •
Theorem 4.5 suggests the following approach for generating new (ex-
treme) core elements. Choose a coalition £/ C TV. Use theorem 2.12 to find
out whether coalition (/ is stable in c* and compute an extreme core element
Z(/ of Cy if this is the case. Then compute a tree vector z^\[/ associated with
a minimum spanning tree on {0}uiV\£/. Then z = (Z^,ZJV\U) is an extreme
element of ACore(c).
Example : (continued) Earlier, we missed the extreme core allocations
(1,1,3) and (0,3,2). l/sing the procedure which we have just sketched, we
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can generate both vectors. Choose (/ = {2}. This coa/ition is trivia//y stabie
in c*. We charge p/ayer 2 with the amount c* (2) = 1 and we charge p/ayers J
and 3 according to the tree vector with respect to the minima/ tree with node
set {0,1,3}. This gives us exact/y the missing core eiement (1,1,3). (0,3,2)
can be /bund by setting t/ = { l } . •
Still it is not dificult to construct examples in which not all extreme
core elements can be found in this way. One of the reasons is that not all
coalitions need to be stable in c*.
Example : Consider the graph in figure 4.2 consisting of 5 nodes, the
common supp/ier 0 and four customers, 7,2,3 and 4. The minima/ spanning
tree T contains four edges, {0,1}, {1,2}, {2,3} and {2,4}. The tab/e be-
iow contains on/y the va/ues c*(S) for coa/itions 5 , which are connected in T.
S II 1
c* 1 0
2
0
3
2
4
2
J2
-4
23
3
24
3
123
2
J24
2
234
6
N
8
The vector (0,0,3,5) is an extreme core e/ement of c*. However, the pro-
cedure sketched in theorem 4.5 wi// not produce this particular vector, no
matter how the set £/ is chosen. This is easi/y seen by observing that £/
shou/d contain both p/ayer J and p/ayer 2. The on/y stab/e coa/ition that
contains both p/ayers is iV. The co//ection of connected coa/itions in F has
the TD-property w.r.t. eight different permutations of AT. Jn six of them
p/ayer 2 is the /ast p/ayer in the permutation, and a// of these permutations
produce the vector (0,4,2,2). The remaining two permutations produce the
tree vector (2,2,2,2). •
The solution to the problem in this example seems to be simple. We
cannot use theorem 4.5 with respect to the set 1/ = {1,2,3}, because £/
is not stable in c*: c*({l}) + c*({2,3}) = 3 > 2 = c'({l ,2,3}). If we
simply lower the weight of the edge {0,4} from 6 to 5, we achieve that the
dual value of {1,2,3} becomes 3, while the values of other stable coalitions
remain unchanged. Hence, the core of the game does not change, but the
coalition {1,2,3} becomes stable. Now apply theorem 4.5 with respect to
the set {1,2,3} (permutation: (1,2,3)), and we obtain the vector (0,0,3,5).
Naturally, we wonder whether this approach can be formalized.
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Figure 4.2
In this light it is interesting to discuss briefly the work of Aarts and
Driessen in [2] and [1]. In these papers they also investigate the structure of
the anti-core of MCST games. Their goal is to deduce elements in the anti-
core directly from the underlying network, other than the tree vector. Their
approach is to lower the weights d,y of establishing a link between t and j ,
such that the anti-core remains unchanged. In general, much computation
is needed to verify whether a specific weight reduction of a link will leave
the anti-core unchanged. However, Aarts and Driessen propose two types of
weight reductions which can be carried out efficiently. We state these results
without proof.
Let (^ V,c) be a MCST game and let F be a minimum spanning tree with
node set iVu{0},
Reduction 1) Let I',J, Jfc,/ be such that there is a path in F from fc to
/ which visits t and j . Furthermore, suppose that d,y > du. Then
the weight of the edge {»,./} can be lowered from d,y to d*j without
changing the anti-core of the game.
Reduction 2) Let I,J>, Jfc,/ be such that there is a path in F from fc to /
which visits t and j . Moreover let i and j be adjacent in F and let t be
visited before j on this path. Suppose that dt/ + d,y > cfjt> + ^w• Then
the weight of the edge {&,/} can be lowered from d^ j to d^ y -H d»i — d,/
without changing the anti-core of the game.
In the example we actually applied the second weight reduction. We
see that d^ + du = 8 > 7 = doj + d^. The result of Aarts and Driessen
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tells us that we can lower the weight of the edge {0,4} from do« = 6 to
ioa + <fu - rfia = 5 without changing the anti-core of the MCST game. So
indeed, the approach of lowering edge weights in order to obtain a greater
number of stable coalitions in the dual game without changing its core, can
be generalized. However, the following example shows that is unlikely that
such an approach allows us to characterize all extreme elements of the core.
Figure 4.3
Example : Consider the minimum cost spanning tree game with p/ayer
set /V = {1,2, . . . , 7 } and minimum cost spanning tree as pictured in fig-
ure 4.3. The weights of ai/ edges in this minima/ tree are equa/ to 2. The
weights of the other edges are iisted in the tab/e be/ow.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
3
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
3
3
2
5
-
-
-
-
-
4
3
2
5
5
-
-
-
-
5
5
4
2
4
5
-
-
-
6
5
4
5
2
4
5
-
-
7
5
4
4
5
2
5
5
-
Observe that c(3,5,6) = 9 and c(AT\3) = c(AT) = 14, so for any a: =
(« l , . . . ,17) in the anti-core of c we have 13 + 15 + i$ < 9 and 13 > 0.
We conciude that 15 + z$ < 9. Anaiogousiy, one proves that 15 + 17 < 9
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and ie + *7 £ 9- Adding these inequa/j'ties and dividing by 2 gives us
15 + ie + Z7 < 27/2. The Jast constraint turns out to be binding, i.e. eie-
ments in the anti-core exist which satisfy 15-1-16 + 17 = 27/2. /t is a matter
of verification that (1/2,0,0,0,9/2,9/2,9/2) is an extreme eiement of the
anti-core of the game. •
The example above is constructed such that no edge weight can be low-
ered without changing the anti-core of c. Since all edge weights are integers,
it follows that the values of all coalitions are integers too. Therefore, our
procedure to generate extreme elements of the anti-core will only produce
integral vectors and hence, the fractional vector (1/2,0,0,0,9/2,9/2,9/2)
will not be found in this way.
4.3 Information graph games
4.3.1 Introduction
In the previous section we have provided a method for constructing many
extreme elements of the anti-core of a MCST game. We have seen that this
method does not characterize all extreme elements, and to our knowledge,
no such characterization of the extreme elements exists.
The anti-nucleolus of a MCST game can be computed using the algo-
rithm described in section 2.6. Although the computational savings of this
algorithm are considerable compared to a general purpose algorithm, the
algorithm is still not polynomial in the number players of the game. To
our knowledge no polynomial time algorithm exists for computing the anti-
nucleolus of a MCST game.
However, for some subclasses of MCST games and monotonie MCST
games the results are more satisfactory. Earlier we discussed monotonie
MCST games. These games are not necessarily defined on a complete
weighted graph, but they can also be defined on any connected graph.
Megiddo[36] considers the case where the underlying graph is a tree. He
shows that in this case it is possible to compute the Shapley value in 0(n)
elementary operations and the anti-nucleolus in O(n') elementary opera-
tions, where n is the number of players in the game. In this section we
restrict ourselves to a subclass of MCST games, called tn/ormatton yropA
yarned. In this case a full characterization of the extreme elements of the
anti-core is possible and also the anti-nucleolus can be computed efficiently.
Given is a set of customers iV who are all interested in a particular
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piece of information, e.g. a computer program. A subset Z of /V, called
the tn/orme<f «et, already possesses this information. Other customers may
purchase the information from a supplier for a fixed price, say 1, or they
may share the information with a friendly customer, who already has the
information. These friendly relations between customers are stored in an
undirected graph G = (AT, £ ) , called the ïn/ormatton jrapV Players i and j
can send information to each other if and only if {i,jt} € £.
Suppose a subset of customers 5 Ç /V decides to form a coalition. As-
sume that the customers in 5 all need to get informed and that they do
not seek the cooperation of customers outside 5 in order to achieve this
goal. Consider the graph G5 that results from G by deleting all vertices
(customers) outside 5 and all edges with at least one endpoint outside 5.
Customers within one component of C5 can freely share their information.
So, if this component contains a customer in the informed set, then the cost
to get all customers of this component informed equals 0. Otherwise, one
of the customers in this component will have to purchase the information
from the supplier at cost 1 and then share it with the other customers in the
component. Thus, the cost to get all players of 5 informed is equal to the
number of components of G5 that have no customer in the informed set. We
denote this cost by c(S). The cooperative cost allocation game with player
set TV and characteristic function c is called an information graph game.
One may also view information graph games as a subclass of minimum
cost spanning tree games. This is seen as follows. Let (JV,c) be an informa-
tion graph game with informed set Z and information graph G = (TV, £) .
For a pair i , j € W define d,j = 0 if { i , j} 6 £ and d,j = 1 otherwise.
Furthermore, define djo = 0 if ï € Z and d,o = 1 otherwise. Now, observe
that the characteristic function of the MCST game defined on the complete
graph with vertex set V^ U {0} and weight function d equals c.
4 .3 .2 Concave informat ion graph g a m e s
Let (JV,c) be a cooperative cost allocation game. The game c is said to be
concave if
c(5) + c(T) > c(5 n T) + c(5 u T)
for all 5,T Ç JV.
In this section we give necessary and sufficient conditions on the infor-
mation graph and the informed set, such that the associated information
graph game is concave. First we need some preliminary definitions.
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Let G = (V, £7) be an undirected graph. G is called 2-connecte</ if it
is connected and if removing one vertex, no matter which one, leaves the
remainder of the graph connected. For convenience we shall say that a set
[/ Ç 7 is connected, 2-connected, complete, etc., if the graph Gt/, which
results from G by deleting all vertices outside £/, has this property.
The maximal 2-connected subsets of a graph G are called the 6/ocifca of
G.
We call a graph cyc/e comp/ete (see van den Nouweland and Borm[41]
and van den Nouweland[40]) if every for cycle in the graph the subgraph
on the vertices in this cycle is a complete graph. In chapter 6 we also use
the properties of cycle complete graphs. There it is proved in lemma 6.14
that the collection of connected coalitions of a cycle complete graph is closed
under taking intersections. This result also follows from theorem 2.2.3 in van
den Nouweland[40]. We shall use that result here too.
Lemma 4.6 Let G = (V, E) 6e a cyc/e comp/ete jropA and /et 5, T Ç V
u>itA components 5 j , . . . , 5 t anrf T i , . . . ,7} respecttve/y. Furthermore, /et £
6e tAe 6iporttte yrapn untA node «et V = { S i , . . . , 5*} U {Ti , . . . ,T/} onrf e<fye
«et £ = {{5,-,T,-} | 5, UT, t« connected }. TAen £ t« a /orest.
Proo/: Suppose that £ is not a forest. Then let (£/i , . . . , i/,,,£/i) (with
n > 3) be a cycle in <?.
Choose Uj e f/, for i = 1 , . . . , n. Since C/< U E/,-+i is connected for i =
1 , . . . , n — 1, there exists a path in G from u, to u,+i (t = 1 , . . . ,n - 1). Also,
there exists a path in G from «„ to uj . After concatenation of these paths
we obtain a path in the graph G, which visits all sets {/,, and which has ui
as its initial and final vertex. Let us denote this path by P. The path P is
not necessarily a cycle, because it may visit some vertices more than once.
However, a cycle which visits at least three of the sets £/, can be constructed
from P as follows.
If P is not a cycle, then it contains a sequence of vertices ( « i , . . . , «t, vi)
for which only the initial and final vertex coincide. (It is not necessarily
a cycle, perhaps the sequence contains only two different vertices.) If this
sequence visits at least three of the sets £/,, then stop: we have found a cycle
which visits at least three of the sets £/,. Otherwise, contruct a new path P
by replacing the sequence (t / i , . . . ,t>t,vi) in P by its initial (and final) vertex
vi. The path P still visits all sets t / i , . . . , £/„. Let us make this clear. If
the sequence ( v i , . . . , t>*, vi) visits only one set £/,, then this is trivial. Thus
suppose that the sequence visits precisely two of the sets £/,. Obviously,
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these sets must be consecutive. Without loss of generality assume that the
sequence visits l/j and C/j and that its initial vertex t>i lies in (/j. The path
P still visits i/i because it contains vi € I/}. The path P also visits f/j
since otherwise the path would jump from a vertex in t/j to a vertex in [7s,
contradicting the fact that t/j and f/j are either both components of 5 or
both components of T. Repeat the process until a cycle is found which visits
at least three of the sets t/, or until the path P has become a cycle which
visits all of the sets I/,.
We have found a cycle in G which visits at least three of the sets [/*.
Without loss of generality we assume that at least two of these sets are com-
ponents of 5 , say l/j and (/*. Choose a vertex vj € t/j which lies on the
cycle, and a vertex v* € t/* on the cycle. From the cycle completeness of G
it follows that {vj, vjt} € E. Hence C/j U I/* is a connected set, contradicting
the fact that £/j and (/* are components of 5. We conclude that the graph
£ contains no cycles. In other words, £ is a forest. D
The following theorem gives necessary and sufficient conditions on the
informed set and the information graph, such that the corresponding infor-
mation graph game is concave.
Theorem 4.7 Let (^><0 6e an in/ormation orapn game un'tn in/ormatton
yrap/i G = (TV, E) ana" tn/ormerf set Z. TAen c ta concave t/ ana* on/y t/G
and Z satis/y tne /o/Zowtny properties.
i/ £ac/i e/ementary pat/i wtt/t tt« t'nttta/ an<f/îna/ vertez m Z ts contained
tn Z.
tt^  ^ac/i cyc/e, wAose intersection u/tt/i Z contains at most one e/ement,
is comp/ete.
Proo/: To prove the 'only if'-part suppose that c is concave. Let (v i , . . . , v*)
be an elementary path with t>i,v* € Z. Let i be such that 1 < i < A;. Define
5 = { « i , . . . , v,} and T = {v , , . . . , v*}. Then 5, T and 5 U T are connected
and contain at least one element of Z. Therefore c(5) = c(T) = c(SuT) = 0.
From the concavity of c it follows that c(5nT) = c({w,}) = 0 and thus u, 6 Z.
This proves that Z satisfies property i).
Let £/ Ç JV be a cycle whose intersection with Z contains at most one
element. Choose t , j G [/. Clearly there exist two vertex-disjoint paths
in {/ from i to j , say (i,t>i,..., t>t, j) and (t,wi,. •. ,tf/,i)- Define 5 =
{«,»! , . . . , v t , j } and T = {t,u/i , . . . .tuj.j}- Consider three possibilities, a)
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Neither 5 nor T contains an element of Z. b) Precisely one of the coalitions
S and T contains an element of Z. c) Both S and T contain the unique
element of Z D [/. In all three cases it is easily verified that {i,j} ^ £7
implies c(S n T) + c(S U T) >c(5) + c(T). This contradicts the concavity of
c, so it follows that {t,j} £ £. This proves that (7 and Z satisfy property
ii).
To prove the 'if'-part suppose that G and Z satisfy properties i) and ii).
Suppose that 5 forms a cycle, which is not complete. Then it must contain
at least 2 vertices in Z, say zi and *2. Let ï G 5. Clearly, an elementary
path from 21 to 22 exists that contains 1. And hence, t € Z. It follows that
S Ç Z. Now it is clear that the characteristic function c does not change if
an edge is added between two vertices in 5. Therefore we may assume that
all cycles are complete.
Let 5 ,TC TV. Denote the components of 5 by Si , . . . ,S* and the compo-
nents of T by Ti , . . . ,Tj. Construct the graph £ = (V, £) as in lemma 4.6, i.e.
V = {Si, . . . , S*} U {Ti,... ,Tj} and <£ = {{S,-,T,-} | S, U T,- is connected }.
According to lemma 4.6 this graph is a forest. Therefore, the number of
edges equals the number of vertices minus the number of components, i.e.
where A:(S), fc(T) and Jfc(S U T) denote the number of components of S, T
and S U T respectively.
Le* $2 = (^z,£z) be the graph that results from $ when all vertices
S, and T, are removed that have empty intersection with Z. This graph is
also a forest and its number of edges therefore equals the number of vertices
minus the number of components. c(S) + c(T) vertices have been removed,
so the graph £7 has ifc(S) - c(S) + Jfc(T) - c(T) vertices. It follows from
property i) that within each component of p the vertices that have a non-
empty intersection with Z form a connected set in £. Thus, the number of
components that have been removed equals c(5 U T) and it follows that the
graph £z has A:(S U T) - c(S U T) components. It follows that
Furthermore, if S, n 7y / 0 and S,- n T,- n Z = 0 then it follows from property
i) that S,- n Z = 0 or Ty D Z = 0. Using these results the concavity of c now
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follows from
c(5nT)= c((u^,S,) n (uJ^T,))
KO.» I 5, n T, / 0 and S< n T,- n Z = 0}|
|{(«,i) I S, n 7, yt 0 and (S, n Z = 0 or T, n Z = 0)}|
< |{(i, jf) | S, U 7y connected and (S, n Z = 0 or 7y n Z = 0)}|
|{(i, j) I S, U Ty connected}|-
|{(i, j) I 5j U T, connected and S, n Z ^ 0 and T, n Z / 0} |
Kl-lfll
c(S) + c(T)-c(SuT).
D
Theorem 4.7 is closely related to a theorem of van den Nouweland and
Borm[4lj. In that paper they consider so called communication «iiuatton*.
A communication situation is a triple (TV,u, £) , where (^ V,t/) is a game and
(Af,£) is an undirected graph. The worth v(5) of a coalition 5 represents
the potential profit of 5, provided that all players in 5 can cooperate. The
graph (TV, £) represents the communication possibilities of players. Players
i and jf can communicate with each other if and only if { i , j} G J5. In
the commumication model it is assumed that two groups of players cannot
cooperate if they cannot communicate. This assumption gives rise to a new
game, the so called orapA resÉrtcteff jam( V£, in which the limited possibilities
for cooperation are reflected. Let S Ç J\f and let S i , . . . , S t denote the
components of 5 with respect to the graph (TV, £7). The worth of coalition
5 in the graph restricted game v^ is defined by
The main result of van den Nouweland and Borm is stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.8 Let (TV, t>,i?) 6e a communication «ituatton u;/iere t/ie oame
(TV,u) is cont/ez anrf tnc yrapA (TV,/?) i« cyc/e comp/ete. Tnen tAe corre-
spon<ftna orapA reatrictca" ;am( (TV,V£;) ia convex.
Theorem 4.8 is still valid when the term convex is replaced by concave.
Using theorem 4.8 it is possible to give an alternative proof of the 'if'-part
of theorem 4.7 in case |Z| < 1. We give a short sketch of the proof.
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Let TV be a set of players, let Z Ç TV with |Z| < 1 and let (TV, £ ) be an
undirected graph. Define the game (iV,c) by
fo ifsnz?<0
\ 1 i f S n Z = 0.
Observe that the game c is concave. Furthermore, the graph restricted game
CE is precisely the information graph game with information graph (TV, £ )
and informed set Z. Now, suppose Z and (TV, 7?) satisfy the properties of
theorem 4.7. It follows from property ii) in theorem 4.7 that the graph
(TV, 75) is cycle complete. Now we can prove the 'if'-part of theorem 4.7 by
applying theorem 4.8 to deduce that C£ is concave. When |Z| > 2 a proof
along these lines fails, since then the game c defined above is not concave.
At first glance, it is not obvious that the conditions in theorem 4.7 can be
verified efficiently, since the number of cycles and the number of paths in a
graph may be exponential in the number of vertices of the graph. However,
an efficient check is possible. This will be shown in the following. The next
lemma can be found in many text books on graph theory and is therefore
stated without proof (see e.g. Berge[4]).
Lemma 4.9 fA/enjer, /flfff/ J4 orapA i« 5-connected t/ and on/y »/ eacA
pair o/ c/iâttnct vertices con 6e joined 6y two vertez-disjoint pa</is.
The conditions in theorem 4.7 are equivalent to the conditions in the
following corollary of the theorem.
Corollary 4.10 Let (7V,c) 6e an in/ormation grapA jame witA in/ormation
orapA G and in/ormed act Z. TAen c ia concave i/ and on/y t/ G and Z
aatta/y tAe /o//owino properties.
iy" For eacA component /f o/tAe in/ormation orapA G we Aave tAat if PlZ
is connected.
ii^ £acA 6/ocit o /G w contained in Z or it Aas at most one e/ement in
common u/itA Z.
ii»7 2?acA 6/ocJt, wAose intersection witA Z contains at most one e/ement,
is comp/ete.
Proo/ : We shall prove that the conditions in theorem 4.7 are equivalent
to the conditions in this corollary. In this proof we shall denote the two
conditions in theorem 4.7 by Ti) and Tii). The three conditions in this
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corollary are denoted by Ci), Cii) and Ciii). First suppose that Ti) and Tii)
hold. We have to to prove that Ci), Cii) and Ciii) hold. Ci) follows directly
from Ti). To prove that Cii) holds, let B be a block which contains at least 2
elements of Z, say t and j . We have to prove that B Ç Z. Choose Jb G B.
According to lemma 4.9 there exist two vertex-disjoint paths from i to it
that use only vertices in B. At least one of these paths does not contain j ,
so there exists a path in B from i to Jb not containing jf. Furthermore, there
exist two vertex-disjoint paths in B from it to j . These paths may all be
taken elementary. Follow the path from i to it until it hits one of the paths
from j to A:. From here, follow this path until the vertex it is reached. Then
finally, follow the second path from j to it backwards. This way we have
constructed an elementary path from i to j which contains the vertex it. It
follows directly from Ti) that Jt G Z. Since it G B was chosen arbitrarily, we
conclude that B Ç Z.
To prove that Ciii) holds, suppose that B is a block which contains at
most one element in Z. Choose t , j G B. There exist two vertex-disjoint
paths from i to j in B, and these paths may be taken elemetary. Hence, the
vertices on these paths form a cycle which contains at most one element of
Z. It follows from Tii) that t and j are adjacent. Since i and j were chosen
arbitrarily, it follows that B is complete.
Now assume that Ci), Cii) and Ciii) hold. We shall prove that Ti) and
Tii) hold. We prove Ti) using an inductive argument. Let i , j G Z, and
suppose that p(i,j) is an elementary path from i to j . If the path p(t,j)
consists of only two vertices, namely i and j , then the path is trivially
contained in Z, so in this case Ti) holds. Assume that p(i,j) contains A:
vertices (it > 3), and assume that Ti) holds if the path contains less than it
vertices. First assume that t and j are the only elements of Z on the path
p(i,j). Clearly, ï and j lie in one component of the information graph. Let
us denote this component by /f. According to Ci) the set / f n Z is connected.
This means that there exist an elementary path ç(«, j) from i to j that uses
only vertices in Z. Thus, the paths ç(i, j) and p(i',j) are vertex-disloint, and
the vertices on these two paths form a cycle. Since a cycle is a 2-connected
set, there must be a block, say B, that contains the cycle. It follows from Cii)
that B Ç Z, since B contains more than one element of Z. This contradicts
the fact that i and j were the only elements of Z on the path p(i,j). So we
may assume that the path p(«,i) contains another vertex in Z besides t and
jf, say it. Now apply the induction hypothesis twice, once to the path from
i to A:, and once to the path from it to j . It follows that the complete path
p(t, j) is contained in Z.
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Finally, Tii) follows directly from Ciii). Q
There exist algorithms to determine all blocks of a graph, which are
linear in the number of edges of the graph (see Tarjan [58]). Therefore, it is
also possible to verify the conditions in corollary 4.10 efficiently.
4.3.3 A descript ion of the ant i-core by means of l inear con-
s t ra in ts
Let (Af, c) be an information graph game with information graph G = (iV, £7)
and informed set Z. Assume for the moment that the graph G is connected.
Let G, denote the graph that results from G if vertex t and all edges with ï
as an endpoint are deleted. Furthermore, let K, i , . . . , A",*,, denote the vertex
sets of the components of G,. Let us denote the collection of coalitions Jf,-y
over all graphs G, by /C. Of course, ACore(c) is contained in the set G(c)
described by
f
< c(tf) for all K e AT.
In fact we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.11 The set C(c) equals ACore(c). Furt/iermore, the number o/
con«tratnto in the description o/ C(c) ù at most 2rt — 1.
Let us first prove that the number of constraints that describe C(c) is
bounded by 2n - 1. Suppose that we remove an edge from the graph G,
such that the resulting graph remains connected. Clearly, this can only
increase the number of components of the graphs G,. Thus, we get the
maximum number of restrictions when no edge of G can be deleted without
disturbing its connectedness, i.e. when G is a tree. Therefore, in deriving
an upper bound for the number of restrictions, we may assume that G is a
tree. Consequently, the graphs G, are all forests. Let us denote the number
of edges in G, by c,. Jfc, denotes the number of components of G, and the
number of vertices of G, is n - 1. Thus we have
, *i = n - 1 - Cj.
Suppose that {11,12} is an edge of the graph G. It is clear that this edge is
an edge in all graphs G,, except in G,, and in G,-,. Thus,
£ > = (n - 2)(n - 1),
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since each edge of G is counted n - 2 times and there axe n - 1 edges in G.
So it follows that
I.e. the number of inequalities in the description of C(c) is precisely 2(n - 1)
when G is a tree. We have one extra equality x(W) = c(7V), which makes
a total of exactly 2n - 1 constraints when G is a tree. When G contains
cycles, there are even less constraints.
Now we have to prove that ACore(c) = G(c), i.e. we have to prove that
each constraint of the form i ( 5 ) < c(5) is implied by the constraints of
C(c).
Let S Ç TV. First suppose that 5 is connected. Let us say that a vertex
v ^ 5 «tporatea the vertex u ^ v from 5, if all paths with initial vertex u
and final vertex in 5 contain the vertex v. Equivalently, the vertex u and
the set 5 lie in different components of the graph G,,. Define
£/ := {u G TV\S | no vertex in Af\S can separate u from 5 } .
We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.12 For eocA vertex t> G W\(tf U 5) Mere i« preci«e/y one uertez
u G 17 *Aa£ separates v /rom 5.
Proo/ : Suppose v G Af\(£/ U S). We first prove that at least one vertex
u G £/ separates t; from 5. By definition there exists a vertex uo G W\S
that separates v from 5. If uo G 1/ then the existence part of the proof is
finished. If not, choose ni G JV\S that separates txo from 5. Obviously, ui
also separates v from 5. Continue this process until finally a vertex u^€ (/
is found, which separates v (and uo, •., ut_i) from 5. We shall prove now
that at most one vertex u G 17 separates v from 5. Suppose that u, u» G AT\S
(u ,£ tu) both separate r from 5. Then each path from v to 5 contains both
u and w. On such a path the vertices u and tu are always visited in a fixed
order, since otherwise it would be possible to construct a path from v to 5
with only one of the vertices u or w. Assume that w is always visited before
u. Then u separates tu from 5 and therefore u; cannot be an element of £/.
It follows that [/ contains at most one element that separates v from 5. The
existence of such an element was already proved, which shows that there is
precisely one element in £/ that separates v from 5. D
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For each u € 1/ let if,, denote the component of <?„ that contains 5 and
let x G iR^. Using lemma 4.12, we obtain the following equality.
(4-5)
This is explained as follows. Let t be a player in 5. Then by definition
t € A"u for all u € £/. Thus, the variable x, is counted |f/| times on the left
hand side of the equation. Trivially, x, is also counted |£/| times on the right
hand side.
Now suppose that i G (7. Trivially, ï is not an element of Kj and since t
cannot be separated from 5 it is an element of #„ for all u ^ i. Thus the
variable ij is counted |£/| - 1 times on the left hand side and also |(7| - 1
times on the right hand side of the equation.
Finally, suppose ï ^ £/ U S. According to lemma 4.12, t G #„ for all
U É { / except one. Thus the variable x, is counted |f/| - 1 times on the left
hand side and also |£/| - 1 times on the right hand side. We conclude that
equation (4.5) is correct.
The coalitions /£„ are all members of the collection AT. Together with
the constraint x(Af) = c(W), they imply
x(5) = 2 *(*„) - (|t/| - l)x(tf) < £ c(*u) - (|t/| - l)c(AT).
It remains to prove that
<:(*„) - (|t/| - l)c(tf) < e(5). (4.6)
We distinguish three cases.
i) The informed set Z is empty,
ii) 5 contains an element of Z.
iii) The remaining case, i.e. Z ^ 0 and Z n S = 0.
Let us first consider case i). If the informed set is empty, then all connected
sets have a cost equal to 1. Recall that G is still assumed to be connected.
Thus,
c(A\,) - (|tf| - l)e(tf) = |CT| - (|ET| - 1) = 1 = e(5).
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Case ii): In this case all connected sets containing an element of £ have a
cost equal to 0. Thus,
<:(*„) - (|V| - l)c(tf) = 0 = c(5).
Case iii): Let z € Z. Since z £ S, it follows from lemma 4.12 that z is
an element of precisely |t/| - 1 of the sets #„. These |t/| - 1 components
therefore have a cost equal to 0. The remaining component can have a cost
of at most 1. Thus,
< 1 = c(5).
We have proved that the constraints of C(c) imply all constraints of the
form x(S) < c(S) for connected coalitions 5. Let us suppose therefore that
5 is not connected. Let 5 i , 5 j , . . . , 5 t denote the components of S. We
have just proved that the constraints x(5<) < e(5<) are all implied by the
constraints of C(c). And thus,
x(S) =
is also implied by these constraints.
We conclude that ACore(c) = C(c). Up to this moment it was assumed
that the information graph G was connected. If this is not the case then one
can deal with each component of G separately, because the anti-core of the
game associated with G is the Cartesian product of the anti-cores associated
with the components of G.
Here the proof of theorem 4.11 ends.
4.3.4 The extreme elements of the anti-core
In this subsection we shall use the results of subsections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 to
prove that each information graph game has an associated concave informa-
tion graph game, which has the same anti-core as the original game. This
result is implied by two theorems, that tell us how to adjust the information
graph and the informed set of an information graph game without changing
its anti-core. After a finite number of adjustments we end up with a concave
information game which has the same anti-core as the original game. This
gives us a nice characterization of the extreme elements of the anti-core of
an information graph game, since these are precisely the marginal allocation
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vectors of the associated concave game (see Shapley[49]). Also, every ex-
treme vector in the anti-core is a marginal allocation vector in the original
game, though not all marginal allocation vectors need to be elements of the
anti-core.
Theorem 4.13 Let (Af, c) 6e on in/ormation yrapA jome wttA tn/ormatton
$rap/i (7 = (TV, £) on«i in/ormed «et Z. 5uppo«e tAere ta a p/ayer i € Af\Z
and an e/ementary patA /rom one vertex tn Z to anotner vertex tn Z t/»at
contains p/ayer i. Let c 6e tAe in/ormation grap/i jame wttn tAe «amt tn/or-
mofton orapA G and tn/ormerf «et Z = Z u { i } . TAen j4Core(c) = i4Core(c).
Proo/ : Suppose K is a component of the graph Gy (j G AT). If t ^
if then trivially c(/() = c(J(). Thus suppose i e A". There exists an
elementary path with both endpoints in £ containing player t. The removal
of j from the graph G can separate i from at most one of these endpoints
in Z. Equivalently, at least one of these two points in Z also lies in K, so
c(A") = c(A") = 0. We also have c(JV) = c(iV), so, using theorem 4.11, it
follows directly that
ACore(c) = C(c) = C(c) = ACore(c).
D
Also, the information graph of an information graph game can be ad-
justed without changing the anti-core. This is expressed in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.14 Let (Af,c) 6e an tn/ormatton yrapA ;ame ttntA tn/ormation
arapA G = (AT, E) and tn/ormed «et Z. 5uppo«e i , j G AT are non-adjacent
p/ayer« contained in a cyc/e S Ç JV. Let c 6c tne in/ormation arapA yame
utttn in/ormation orapÀ G = (AT, £ u {{»,i}}) and in/ormed «et Z. TAen
i4Core(c) = XCore(c).
Proo/ : Let u G Af. We shall first prove that the components of G« and
Gu are the same. To this end we show that v and tu lie in one component
of Gu if and only if they lie in one component of Gu. To prove the 'if'-part
suppose that v and u> lie in one component of Gu. Then apparently there
exists a path from v to w in the graph G that does not use the vertex u.
This path also exists in G, since the edge set of G contains the edge set of
G as a subset. Therefore, v and u; lie in one component of the graph Gy.
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To prove the 'only if'-part suppose that t» and u» lie in one component of
Gu Then there exists a path from v to w in G that does not use the vertex
u. Suppose this path uses the extra edge {t , j} . Since the vertices i and j
lie on a cycle there exist two vertex-disjoint paths from i to j in the graph
G. At least one of these paths does not use the vertex u. Use this path to
get from i to j instead of the edge { i , j } . Thus, we have constructed a path
from v to w that does not use vertex u in the graph G. Therefore, v and w
lie in one component of G«. It follows that the components of G» &nd G«
are the same.
Obviously, also the costs of these components is in both cases the same.
Using theorem 4.11 it follows immediately that
ACore(c) = C(c) = C(c) = ACore(c).
From theorems 4.7, 4.13 and 4.14 we deduce
Corollary 4.15 Lei (/V,c) 6e an tn/ormaiton orapA oame un'tA tn/ormah'on
yrapA G = (TV, E) and in/ormc(f «ft Z. Let £ 6e tAe «et o/ a// vertice* Mat
/ie on an e/ementary pain un'tA 6ofA enjoint* in Z and /et Ê 6e iAe «et o/
a// pairs { t , j } , «ticA tAat tAere ts a cyc/e 5 in G untA i , j G 5. Let c 6e tAe
tn/ormatton yrapA yamc untA in/ormatton yrapA G = (AT, £) anrf in/ormerf
«et Z. TAen c t« concave and /4Core(c) = y4Core(c).
The extreme elements of the anti-core of an information graph game can
now be characterized as being precisely the marginal allocation vectors of
its associated concave information graph game. It follows that the extreme
elements of the anti-core of an information graph game are integer, since the
marginal allocation vectors are integer. This observation is helpful in the
proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.16 Let (TV, c) 6e an tn/ormation ;amc t/ntA in/ormatton yrapA
G = (TV, f?) and in/ormed «et Z. TAen tAe «et o/maroina/ a//ocation vector»
o/c contains tAc «et o/ eztrcme e/ement« o/tAe anti-core o/ c a« a «u6«et.
Proo/ : Without loss of generality we assume that G is a connected graph.
Let i be extreme in ACore(c). We shall show that there exist coalitions
Si Ç S: Ç . . . Ç Sn with the property i (5t ) = c(St) and |5t| = Jk for
A: = 1 ,2 , . . . , n. We shall provide a proof using an inductive argument.
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First we show that there exists a player ï G TV with z, = c({t}). Since
c({»}) < 1 for all i € TV, we have x,- < 1 for all t G TV. If z,- = 1 for some
i € TV, then apparently i ^ Z and i , = 1 = c({t}). Therefore, suppose
x,- < 1 for all t 6 TV. From the integrality of z it follows that i , < 0 for all
ï G TV and thus z(TV) < 0. This can only be the case if Z ^ 0 and z* = 0 for
all i G TV. Thus, for an arbitrary player i 6 Z we have i , = 0 = c({i}).
Let 5 ^ TV be a coalition such that z(S) = c(£). We shall prove that
there exists a player i G TV\5 such that z(5 U {t}) = c(5 U {i}). Define for
all i G TV\5 the number ç,- as the number of components of 5 that contain
a player adjacent to player i and that contain no player in Z. Furthermore,
define d,; = 0 if i G Z or if there exists a component of 5 that contains both
a player in Z and a player adjacent to ». Otherwise <i, = 1.
It is not hard to see that c (5u {i}) = c(5) + d,- - g,-. Clearly, z< < d,- - ft
for all i G TV\S. Suppose that z< < 4 - g, for all t G TV\5. It then follows
from the integrality of z that Zj < d, - g, - 1 for all t G TV\5. And thus,
i(/V) < c(5) + d(TV\5) - g(TV\5) - |TV\S|.
If 5 / TV then each component of 5 has at least one adjacent player in
TV\S. (Here we use the fact that G is connected.) Thus, g(TV\5) > c(5).
Furthermore, notice that d(TV\S) = |TV\5| if Z = 0 and that d(TV\5) <
|TV\S| if Z / 0 .
It follows that z( TV) < c(5) + d(TV\5)-ç(TV\5)-|TV\5| < O i f Z = 0and
that z(TV) < c(5) + d(TV\5) - g(TV\5) - |TV\5| < 0 if Z ^ 0. In both cases
we have z(TV) < c(TV), a contradiction. We conclude that there is a player
i G TV\5 satisfying Zj = dj - g,, and consequently z(5 U {t}) = c(5 U {t}).
D
4.3.5 The anti-nucleolus of information graph games
There is a very efficient way for computing the anti-nucleolus of an infor-
mation graph game. In this subsection we shall provide a system of linear
equations, with the property that the unique solution of this system coincides
with the anti-nucleolus of the game.
Let c be an information graph game with information graph G and in-
formed set Z. We have seen in subsection 4.3.3 that the coalitions in AT are
the only coalitions which are needed in the description of ACore(c). The
coalitions in £ are also the only coalitions we need to consider when we
want to compute the anti-nucleolus of c. This will be shown in the sequel.
Again, assume that the information graph G is connected.
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Let i € AI(c). The excess e(5,x) of coalition 5 Ç tf at i is defined
by e(S, i ) = c(5) - i (S ) and 0(z) is the vector whose coordinates are the
excesses at z arranged in non-decreasing order. Recall that the anti-nucleolus
is defined as the vector which lexicographically maximizes the vector 0(z)
over the anti-imputation set AI(c). When ACore(c) / 0 the anti-nucleolus
is an element of ACore(c), so in this case one may restrict oneself to a
maximization over ACore(c), implying that all excesses are non-negative.
Consider a coalition 5, which is not connected in the information graph
G and let us denote its components with respect to G by S i , . . . , 5*. Then
c(S) = £?=i c(5i). According to corollary 2.16 we do not have to consider
coalition 5 in the lexicographic maximization, so we only have to consider
coalitions which are connected in G in the lexicographic maximization.
Now consider a coalition 5 which is connected in G. In section 4.3.3 we
obtained the equality (4.5)
for some suitably chosen collection < j Ç <. Furthermore, we obtained the
inequality (4.6)
Combining this we find
for any efficient vector z.
Now, let z denote >UV(/C,c) and let y denote JjJVf/C U {5},c). Since
z,y G ACore(c), it follows that all excesses e(/f,z) and e(/f,y) are non-
negative for all if 6 Ks. Hence,
e(tf,z) < e(S, z) for all /if € JC$
and
e(tf,y) < e(S,y) for all tf € <s .
Apply theorem 2.15 to prove that z = y. Repeated application of theo-
rem 2.15 learns us that
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Therefore, let us introduce the vector ^>(i) whose coordinates are the
excesses of the coalitions in /C, arranged in non-decreasing order. Comput-
ing the anti-nucleolus comes down to the lexicographic maximization of the
vector ^(i) .
The blocks of the information graph play an important role in the char-
acterization of the anti-nucleolus by means of a system of linear equations.
Therefore, we shall prove some properties of the blocks of a graph. Let
G = (TV, 7^) be a connected graph and let B be a block of G. For each
6 € 73 let ffa.fc denote the component of the graph Gj which contains the
set 73\{6}.
Lemma 4.17 Let G = (TV, 7?) 6e a connecte*/ yrapA an</ /et 73 Ç AT 6e a
6/ocJfc o/G. TAen tne co//ectton (iV\#f^j)i£fl /orm« a partition o/TV.
Proo/ : Let i € TV. We have to prove that there is exactly one 6 G 73 such
that i 6 W\i^0 j - We first prove the existence of such a 6.
If i € 73, we choose 5 = i. Then trivially i G 7V\7Tg j . Now assume that
i ^ 73. Then choose i 6 fl arbitrarily and let p(«, 6) = (t,«x,... ,vjt,6) be
an elementary path from i to ft. Let 6 be the first vertex of 5 on this path.
We shall prove that t ^ ^ j - To see this, let ç(i, 6) = (t,u>i,... , u>i,6) also
be an elementary path from t to 6 a nd let 6 be the first vertex of 73 on
this path. Suppose 6 / 6 . Let x be the last vertex that the paths p(ï, 6)
and 9(1,6) have in common before they enter the set 73. Follow the path
p(i,6) backward from 6 to 1 and the follow the path ?(t,6) forward from 1
to 6. This way we have constructed an elementary path from 6 to 6 and
besides its initial and final vertex this path uses only vertices outside 73. Let
T denote the set of vertices on this path not including 6 and 6. Then T / 0
since 1 € T. Clearly, B u T i s a connected set. It is even 2-connected. This
is seen as follows. Choose j € BUT. First assume j € T. The removal
of j leaves the remaining vertices of T\{j} still connected to either 6 or 6.
Hence, BuT\{ j} is connected. Now assume j € fl. Since 5 is 2-connected
we have that B\{jf} is connected. The vertices in T are still connected to
B\{j}, since this set contains at least one of the vertices 6 and 6. Hence,
B u T \ { j } is connected. It follows that 73 U T is 2-connected, contradicting
the maximality of 73. The reason for the contradiction was the assumption
6 / 6 . We conclude that 6 = 6. It follows that every path from 1 to 6
contains the vertex 6. Equivalently, t and 6 lie in different components from
the graph G .^ Hence, i ^ ifg j or i G
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To prove the uniqueness of 6 observe that we have constructed a path
from i to 6 that uses only vertices outside B. Hence, i and 6 lie in the same
component of the graph G* for all 6 6 B\{6}. It follows that i £ A B > or
i £ AT\XB> for all 6 € fl\{6}. ' D
Lemma 4.18 Let G = (TV, £ ) 6e a connected yropn and /et 5 denote tne
co/fcction o/ 6/ocJfc« o/G. TAen we nave
Proo/ : We shall give a proof using induction on the number of vertices of
the graph. If |AT| = 1, then there is one block which contains one element,
so X^ BeB | £ | - 1 = 0 = |Af| - 1. Assume that |Af| = n and that the lemma
is true if |JV| < n. First consider the case that the graph G is 2-connected.
Then there is one block of cardinality n, and it follows that the lemma is
true for n also. Now consider the case that G is not 2-connected. Choose
a vertex v G TV, such that the removal of v causes the graph to break into
at least 2 components. Let Vi, Vj , . . . , V* denote the vertex sets of these
components. For each i G { 1 , . . . , ife} let G, denote the subgraph of G with
vertex set V, u {v} and let S, denote the collection of blocks of the graph G<.
We shall prove that B i , . . . , Bt forms a partition of B.
Let B ë B. Since any two adjacent vertices form a 2-connected set, it
follows that B contains at least two elements. Hence, B\{v} is a non-empty
connected set. It follows that B\{v} Ç V, for precisely one î G {1 , . . .,lfc}
and that B forms a 2-connected set in the graph Gf. If £ were not a
maximal 2-connected set in Gj, then B would not be maximal in G either,
a contradiction. Hence, B G flf. The uniqueness of î implies that B ^ B,
for i ^ î. So far, we have proved that each coalition in B is a member of
precisely one collection Bj. It remains to prove that B 2 U*_jB,-.
Let fl € Bj. B is also a 2-connected set in G. We have to prove that
B is maximal in G. Let B G B be a block in the graph G that contains B
as a subset. We have just proved that there is precisely one î such that B
is a block in Gf. From the maximality of B in G, it follows that t = ï and
B = B: B is a maximal 2-connected set in G.
According to the induction hypothesis we have ]£B€B,(I^I ~ 1) = l^ il for
all i G { 1 , . . . , fc}. It follows that
i) = E E d*i -1) = £ Ml = M - »•
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Let IC* denote the collection of coalitions Z^B,* over all blocks B and all
6 G B. We trivially have /C* Ç K.
Lemma 4.19 /C* = JC.
Proo/ : It suffices to prove that /C Ç /C*, so let if £ /C. Choose i € AT
such that if is a component of the graph Gj. Choose J G if such that j is
adjacent to t in G and choose a block S which contains both t and j . Such a
block exists, since {», j} is 2-connected. iffl.j is the component of the graph
G< which contains £\{i}. We conclude that j € ifB.i- Since we also have
ji € /f, it follows that if = if^, and hence, if € AT*. •
For each block fl of the (connected) information graph G = (JV, £?) we
define
46B
Let 3 denote the collection of all blocks of G and consider the following
system of equations.
f x(iffl.i) = c(ifa,t) - A(B)/|fl| for all fl G S and for all 6 G B , .
Lemma 4.20 5ystem ^.7^ A as ezact/y one so/utton.
Proo/ : Let us give each element of /C* an index, say /C* = {ifi, -.. , ifm}-
Furthermore, let i4 be the (0, l)-matrix whose i-th row is the incidence vector
1/f,., and whose (m+ l)-th row consists solely of ones. Then system (4.7) is
a system of the type Ax = 6.
In section 4.3.3 it was proved that
ACore(c) = {i G « " | i(if ) < c(if ) for if G JC and x(iV) = c(AT)}.
Since ACore(c) has at least one extreme element, it follows that the collection
of incidence vectors {1* | i f6/C} together with the all-one vector contains a
set of n independent vectors. According to lemma 4.19 each incidence vector
Iff (if G /C) is a row of the matrix A, and hence A has rank n. Therefore,
any system of the type Ax = 6, like system (4.7), can have at most one
solution. However, the matrix A is not square, so we cannot conclude yet
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that the system indeed has a solution. We shall prove that some of the
restrictions are redundant.
Let fl G B be a block of the graph G, and let fc € B. We shall prove that
the restriction
z(ffj.») = C(*B.») - A(B)/|B|
is implied by the restrictions corresponding to the other elements of the block
fl, together with the restriction x(Af) = c(N). According to lemma 4.17 the
collection (Af\#B,k)*€fl forms a partition of AT. This implies that
Now it follows that
- l)c(JV) -
= c ( i f^ ) - A(B)/|B|.
Thus, we can delete this restriction without changing the set of solutions
of system (4.7). The same can be done for each block of C, so in total |fl|
restrictions can be deleted. The number of restrictions that remains is
ses
According to lemma 4.18 this number equals n. Hence, system (4.7) is
equivalent to a system of the type Ai = 6, where A is a square non-singular
matrix. This system has exactly one solution. •
Theorem 4.21 TAe untrue «o/utton o/system ^.7^ ts tAe anft-nuc/eo/us o/
tAc tn/ormatton prap/i yame c.
Proo/ : Let us number the blocks of G such that
A(Bi)/|Bi| < A(Bj)/|B2| < .. . < A(B«)/|B«|,
where m is the number of blocks of G. For all i € AI(c) we have
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Therefore, the smallest excess of a coalition in K* (the first coordinate of
<£(z)) will be at most A(Bi)/|Bi|. Equality is only possible if the first |Bi|
coordinates of #(z) are equal to A(Bi)/|Bi|. The solution of system (4.7)
indeed has its first |Bi| excesses equal to A(Bi)/|Bi|, so in the lexicographic
maximization of >^(z) we may restrict ourselves to imputations which satisfy
€(*«„»,«) = A(Bi)/|Bi| for all 6 G B».
Given this restriction we know that the (1 + |Bi|)-th coordinate of ^(z) can
be at most A ( B 2 ) / | B Î | . Again, equality is only possible if the coordinates
of <£(z), numbered 1 + |Bi| through |J5i| + |Bj|, are equal to A(B2)/|B2|.
Since the solution of system (4.7) satisfies this property, we now see that we
may restrict ourselves to imputations which satisfy
e(*fl,,6,x) = A(Ba)/|Ba| for all 6 G Ba.
We can repeat this reasoning for the blocks B3, . . . , Bm, and we realize that
we may restrict ourselves to imputations which satisfy
e(ffB,»,i) = A(B)/|B| for all B G B and 6 G B.
Hence, the solution of system (4.7) gives us the anti-nucleolus of c. •
4.4 Minimum cost forest games
In this section we shall deal with the situation in which there are several sup-
pliers, each supplier offering a different type of service. Let AT = {1 , . . . ,n}
denote the set of customers as usual, and let Af = {n + 1,. . . ,n + m} de-
note the set of suppliers. For each customer 1 6 JV let M(i) Ç M denote
the set of suppliers to which customer 1 wishes to be connected. We shall
assume throughout that Af(i') 7^  0 for all i 6 JV. Furthermore, let <f be a
non-negative weight function on the edges in the complete graph with ver-
tex set TV U Af. Suppose the coalition S Ç TV forms. The set of links £
that have to be established in order to connect each player 1 G 5 to Af(i')
does not necessarily form a connected graph. In contrast to the model of
ordinary MCST games with only one supplier, we allow the coalition 5 to
use any edge in the network to establish a link. Hence, the cost c(5) that
this coalition incurs is equal to the minimal cost of any forest that connects
each player 1 G 5 to the set of suppliers M(i). Games defined in this way
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are called mtntmum coat /oreat games, or briefly, MCF games. A MCF game
with only one supplier is a monotonie MCST game. Hence, the class of MCF
games contains the class of monotonie MCST games as a subclass.
Several other generalizations of MCST games or monotonie MCST games
have been studied in literature. Granot and Granot[22] introduced /iied coat
apanntna /orrst oamea. In this model, like in our model, there may be more
than one supplier, but in contrast to our model, all suppliers offer the same
type of service, so the customers need to be connected to only one supplier.
These games may have an empty anti-core. However, spanning forest games
need not be defined on a complete graph and if the game is defined on a
tree, then the anti-core is non-empty.
Another generalization of monotone MCST games, called apanntna net-
«/orit aamea, was considered by van den Nouweland[40] and by van den
Nouweland, Maschler and Tijs(42). They showed that this class coincides
with the class of monotone games.
Capacitated networik a*eaton aamea were introduced by Skorin-Kapov and
Beltran(55]. Their model unifies capacitated versions of fixed cost spanning
forest games, location games and Sfetner tree aamea, which we will discuss
next.
Steiner tree games were introduced by Megiddo(37]. In this model we
have only one supplier. However, a link not necessarily connects two cus-
tomers or a customer and the central supplier, but also other nodes, called
switches, can be used as the endpoint of a link if this is favourable. Fur-
thermore, a coalition 5 is also allowed to establish links with an endpoint
in JV\5. The class of Steiner tree games is easily be seen to be a sub-
class of MCF games, by interpreting the switches as suppliers to which no
customer needs to be connected. Steiner tree games were also studied by
Skorin-Kapov [54]. In that paper a sufficient condition is given to guarantee
the non-emptiness of the anti-core. Moreover, an efficient algorithm is given
which constructs an element in the anti-core if the Steiner tree game satisfies
this condition. Megiddo[37] observed that a Steiner tree game without any
switches is a monotonie MCST game, and that the anti-core is non-empty in
this case. However, if there are switches, then a Steiner tree game may have
an empty anti-core. Megiddo gave a 5-player example in which he showed
that this negative result even holds if the Steiner tree game is situated in
the Euclidean plane.
In this section we are interested in sufficient conditions such that a MCF
game has a non-empty anti-core. Megiddo's result shows that a MCF game
has a non-empty anti-core if there is only one supplier and all the customers
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wish to be connected to this supplier. In the following we shall prove a
generalization of this result. We first need some preliminary results. The
following lemma is due to Aarts and Driessen[2].
Lemma 4.22 Let V 6e a /ïnite «et and /et d 6e a non-negative weigAt /unc-
tion on V x V. Let F 6e a spanning tree un'tn node set V. for eacA pair
v,u> £ V, /et d ^ denote tAe maztmum over a// u/eigAts amonj tAe edye«
a/ong tAe uniaue patA /rom v tow »n P. TAen tAe /o//owing statements are
eguiva/ent.
t°y T i« a minima/ spanning tree in tAe network (V, d).
«^ d«w > d|^, /or eacA pair v,tu G V.
Proo/: Suppose that i) holds. Choose «,u)€ V arbitrarily. Let {i , j} be an
edge of maximal weight on the path from v to u; in F, so d,y = d ^ . Remove
the edge {i,j} from F and insert the edge {v,u;}. The resulting graph is
again a spanning tree on V. Prom the minimality of F it follows immediately
that d,,^ > d ^ . Hence, i) => ii).
Suppose that ii) holds and let T be a minimal spanning tree with respect
to the weight function d. Let Jfc be the number of edges that T and F have in
common. In case ifc = |V| - 1, the proof is finished: T and F coincide, and it
trivially follows that F is a minimal spanning tree. Therefore, suppose that
A; < |V| - 1. Choose u, u; G V, such that {v,u>} is an edge of T, but not of F.
Now, remove the edge {t>,u>} from T. Let us denote the resulting graph by
F. F consists of two components, where v and u; lie in different components.
Denote the vertex sets of these components by K and L (v € ^ and u» € L).
Let P««, denote the set of edges along the path from v to w in the tree
F. Obviously, at least one edge in P,,^ connects an element of if with an
element of L. Choose such an edge, say {&,/}. The edge {A:,/} does not
belong to T, since {v,u>} is the only edge in T which connects an element of
if with an element of L. Add {it,/} to the forest F, and the result is a tree.
Denote this tree by T.
We have djti < d ^ < d ^ , where the first inequality follows from the
definition of d ^ and the second inequality is simply property ii). Hence, the
sum of the weights in 7 is at most the sum of the weights in T. It follows
that T is a minimal spanning tree, which has A;+ 1 edges in common with F.
The process of replacing edges can be proceeded to produce minimal trees
which have Jfc + 2, Jfc + 3 , . . . edges in common with F. We conclude that F
itself is a minimal tree. •
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Suppose that F is a minimal tree with respect to the weight function d.
The following lemma expresses that the numbers <f^  do not change when
we compute them with respect to another minimal tree. This lemma is also
due to Aarts and Driessen[2j.
Lemma 4.23 Let (V, (/) 6« a network and /ft F and Q te two minima/ «pan-
ning tree* on V in tAi* networit. For eacA pair v,u; € V, /et d{^, fd[^j denote
tAe mazimum over a// tveiyAt« amona tAe edye* a/ono tAe uniaue patA /rom
v t o i v in tAe tree F fty. TAen dj^ = dj^ /or a// v.u; € V.
Proo/ : Choose v,u/ € V. Let i?'* denote the set of edges on the path from
v to w in F and let £ " denote the set of edges on the path from v to w in
ft. Let {•, j } be an edge of maximum weight in £*\ Remove this edge from
the tree F. The resulting graph is a forest consisting of two components, say
K and L, where v € /f and u; G L. When we follow the path from v t o u i
in ft, we must come across an edge {it,/} £ £^ with Jfc G Af and l e t , Add
{it,/} to the forest, and the result is a tree again. Prom the definition of dj\^
it follows that d^, > d^. Prom the minimality of F it follows that d*{ > d,y,
while {i , j} was chosen such that d,, = d ^ . Combining this we conclude
that d ^ > dj^,. Exchanging the roles of F and ft, one proves in a similar
way that d ^ > d j^ , and hence d[^ = d[^. D
Let F be a minimal tree with respect to the weight function d. In the
following we use the notation d ^ to denote the maximum weight of an edge
along the path between v and tv in F. Lemma 4.23 justifies this notation.
We call the edge {u, u;} minima/ if d ^ = d«^. We call the network (V, d)
minimal if d«« = d,,*, for all u, u; G V.
Lemma 4.24 Let (V, d) 6e a networJfc and /et F 6e a minima/ spanning tree
on V in tAia networit. TAen
i^  tAe cost o/ a minima/ spanning tree on V in tAe networJt (V, d) eaua/s
tAe cost o/a minima/ spanning tree on V in tAe oriyina/ networit (K, d),
and
«^ /or eacA J7 Ç V tAere exists a minima/ spanning tree F on V in tAe
networit (V, d), sucA tAat 17 ta a connected set in F.
Proo/ : It is trivial that (d) = d. Hence, the weight function d satisfies
property ii) of lemma 4.22. It follows that F is also a minimal tree with
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respect to the weight function d. Since d,,^  = d ^ whenever {v,u>} is an
edge in F, i) follows.
Let £/ Ç V. Suppose that there is no minimal tree with respect to the
weight function d, such that £/ is connected in this tree. Then let T be a
minimal tree for which the number of components of £/ is minimal, and let
l / i , . . . , I/* denote its components (A: > 2). Pick two elements of £/ that lie
in different components, say u and t>. The path in T from u to u contains
at least one vertex outside {/. Let u; be such a vertex. Let u be the last
element of £/ on the path from utoui, and let v be the first element of C/ on
the path from u» to v. We have found tl and v such that the path in T from
û to tJ contains solely vertices outside £/, besides of course the vertices û and
tJ themselves. According to lemma 4.23, d^ equals the maximum over all
weights among the edges on the path from û to v in T. Remove the maximal
edge on this path and insert the edge {û, v}. The result is a minimal tree
in which 1/ consists of fc - 1 components, a contradiction. We conclude that
there exists a minimal tree in which £/ is connected. •
Now we proceed with some results which characterize classes of MCF
games with a non-empty anti-core.
Theorem 4.25 Le£ c 6c on A/CF yame unitn p/ayer set V^ and «et o/supp/tera
Af, de/ined on tne network (AT U M, d). Suppose tnat tAere is a p/ayer i € iV
u/ttA M(i) = M. 77»en Me yame nas a non-empty anti-core.
Proo/ : Let î be such that M(t) = M. The optimal forest for the grand
coalition must be a tree, since t has to be connected to all suppliers. Let us
denote this tree by T. Let c be the MCF game associated with the minimal
weight function d. According to lemma 4.24 we have c(AT) = c(7V), and since
<*„„ < d™ we have c(5) < c(5) for all 5 Ç JV. Hence, ACore(c) Ç ACore(c)
and it will be sufficient to prove that ACore(c) ^ 0.
According to lemma 4.24 it is possible to construct a minimal tree with
respect to the weight function d, such that Mu{î) forms a connected set. Let
F be such a tree. For each i G AT\{î}, define /(i) as the vertex which is visited
directly after i on the path from i to î in T. Let £ = {{i, /(i)} | i € W\{t}}.
Since the edges {i, /(»')} are all different, the cardinality of E equals |iV| - 1.
Let F denote the set of remaining edges of F. Since F has |W| + |M| - 1
edges, it follows that |F| = |M|. Furthermore, E contains no edges with
both endpoints in M U {î}, so F contains all of these edges. There are |M|
such edges, so it follows that F consists of precisely the edges for which both
endpoints lie in M U {î}.
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Define the vector i G JÎ* by x, = 3jj(,j for i G #\{î} and Xf =
I2{»,w}€F^»«- *" * ^ of ^ e **<* '"** £ n f = | and that £ u F equals the
edge set of F, it follows that the vector i satisfies x(/V) =
Let 5 Ç TV. We have to prove that x(5) < c(5). Suppose that t £ 5.
We construct a graph with node set TV u M as follows. First, construct a
minimal forest for coalition 5, such that each player i G S is connected to
his set of suppliers A/(i). Add the edges in F to this graph together with
the edges {i, /(«)} for i € Af\(S U {î}) (only the ones which are not already
in the forest). The resulting graph is connected. To see this, we show that
for an arbitrary vertex v 6 TV U M there exists a path from v to î. For
v € A/u {t} this is trivial, since the addition of the edge set F to the graph
ensures that Mu{i} is connected. For each i € 5, the graph contains a path
from i to any element m € M(i). We have just observed that there exists a
path from m to î. After concatenation of these two paths, we obtain a path
from i to î. For i G JV\(Su{î}), we follow the path i, /(i), / ( / (•)) , . . . until a
vertex in S u M u { i } is reached. This will surely happen, since the edges in
£ = {{i, /(i)} | i e #\{î}} contain no cycle. Once a vertex in 5 U M U {?}
is reached, it is trivial again that a path to î exists. The construction costs
of the graph are at most c(S) -f- x(Af\S). Since the graph is connected, it
follows that c(5) + x(iV\S) > c(tf) = x(AT), and thus, x(S) < c(5).
Now suppose that î G 5. Again, we construct a graph with node set
JV U M. We do it in the following way. First, construct a minimal forest
for coalition 5. Then add the edges {»,/(»)} for i G AT\S (only the ones
which are not already in the forest). Also this graph is connected. To see
this, we show that for an arbitrary vertex i»6 JVuM there exists a path
from v to t. Since î G 5, the optimal forest for 5 must contain paths from
m to î for all m G M. For t G 5, observe that the optimal forest for 5
contains a path from i to any m G Af(i'). Furtermore, there exists a path
from m to î, so after concatenation of the two paths, we obtain a path from
i to î. Finally, for t G W\S, follow the path «, /(i), /(/(«)), • • • until a vertex
in 5 U M U {t} is reached, and from there it is trivial again that a path to
î exists. The construction costs of the graph are at most c(S) +
Since the graph is connected, it follows that c(5) + x(JV\S) > c(W)
and thus, x(5) < c(5). D
We know that the anti-core is always non-empty if an MCF game has only
one supplier, since then it is a monotone MCST game. The following example
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shows that the anti-core may be empty when there are three suppliers.
Example : Let iV = {1,2,3} be the set of piayers and /et M =
{/,//,///} be the set of supp/iers. Each p/ayer wishes to be connected to
exact// one suppiier: M(l) = {/}, M(2) = {//} and M(3) = {/7/}. Tie
weight of an edge between any two piayers is 3, the weight of an edge be-
tween any two suppiiers is 5. Furthermore, the weight of an edge between
a piayer and the supp/ier to which he wishes to be connected is 5, but the
weight of an edge between him and to the two other supp/iers is 3. See the
graph in figure 4.4, where a// edges of weight 3 are drawn. The cost of any
two-piayer coa7ition is 9. For examp/e, the optima/ forest for coa/ition {1,2}
consists of the edges {1,//}, {2,7} and {1,2}, a totai cost of 9. However,
c({l,2,3}) = 14, since the grand coa/ition must use an edge of weight 5.
Suppose that the anti-core is not empty. Then for reasons of symmetry the
a//ocation in which each p/ayer pays c(^V)/3 shouid be an e/ement of the
anti-core, but c/ear/y it is not. Hence, the anti-core is empty. •
Theorem 4.25 can be regarded as a generalization of Granot and Huber-
man's theorem 4.1 on MCST games. The next result is another generaliza-
tion of their theorem.
Theorem 4.26 Let c 6c a A/CF yame u/ttA p/ayer set AT ana* set o/supp/ters
M. Suppose Mat tne optima/ /orest F = (AT u M, 22) /or tne yrarta* coa/ttton
consists o/ exact/y |A/| components. Tnen c Aas a non-empty antt-core.
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Proo/ : Clearly, each component of the forest F contains exactly one sup-
plier. For each m € M let W(m) Ç JV denote the set of players which are
connected to supplier m. Since the players in Af (m) are not connected to any
other supplier we conclude that M(i) = {m} for all i £ N(m). We shall prove
that a tree-like vector lies in the anti-core of the game. For each i € JV let / ( i )
denote the vertex in F which is visited directly after i on the path from i to
its unique supplier in Af(i). Define the vector i = ( i i , . . . ,*„) by ij = rfi,/(i).
It is trivial that z(AT) = c(JV). It remains to prove that x(S) < c(S) for all
S Ç Af. Let 5 Ç TV, let Es be the edge set in an optimal forest for coali-
tion 5 and define £^ \ s = {{t , / ( i )} I « G Af\S}. Now, consider the graph
with node set Af u A/ and edge set J£ = Es U £^\s- The costs of construc-
tion of this graph are x(Af\S) + c(5). Furthermore, one easily verifies that
each player i G Af is connected to his supplier M(i) in this graph. Therefore
i(7V\5)-(-c(5) > c(tf), and it follows that x(S) = c(JV) - x ( t f \ S ) < c(S). D
The following theorem treats the situation of two suppliers in which there
is one supplier to which none of the customers needs to be connected. This
supplier can be regarded as a switch, so that the MCF game is actually a
Steiner tree game.
Theorem 4.27 Let (Af, c) 6e a Steiner free game in w/itc/» Mere is on/y one
«untcn. TTien c Aaa a non-empty anti-core.
Proo/ : Assume first that the grand coalition does not use the switch
to connect all players to the supplier. In this case the core is non-empty
according to theorem 4.26. So assume TV = { 1 , . . . ,n} uses the switch. Let
us denote the switch by n+1. Consider the MCST game c in which n+1 does
not act as a switch but as an extra player, who also wishes to be connected
to the supplier. Let x G 7R""*"* denote a tree vector in this game. This
vector trivially satisfies x > 0 and we have x G ACore(c). According to
theorem 4.5 there exists a vector y G Acore(c) satisfying y, > 0 for all i G TV
and y,j+i = c(7Vu{n+l})-c(./V). Observe that yn+j < 0, since otherwise the
grand coalition in the Steiner tree game c would not have used the switch.
If in+i = yn+i = 0, then set z = x. Otherwise we have x,,+ i > y^+i and we
set A = Xn+i/(in+i - yn+i) and z = (1 - A)x + Ay. Now z is an element in
ACore(c) satisfying z > 0 and Zn+i = 0.
Let 5 Ç tf. We have
= min{c(T) | 5 Ç T Ç A T u { n + 1}}.
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Let T be such that 5 Ç T Ç AT u {n + 1} and c(5) = c(T). Since z > 0, we
have
z(S)<z(r)<c(T) = c(S).
Furthermore,
z(JV) = z(tf U {n + 1}) = c(tf U {n + 1}) = c(JV).
Hence, the restriction of z to the player set Af is an element of ACore(c). •
We will show that a MCF game with two suppliers has a non-empty
anti-core. For the proof of this we need the following notion and lemma.
Let (V,d) be a network and let £/ Ç V\ Consider the weight function d^
defined by
and
<#, = min{4, | j G £/} when t €
Since the set 1/ acts as a single node in the network (V\(7 U {£/},d^), we
say that the set £/ is contracted.
Lemma 4.28 Let (V, d) 6e a netu/orJb wAteA ta mtntma/, /et £/ Ç V ana" /et
(V\£/u{£/},d^) 6e tAe nettwor* tn twAtcA [/ t« contractea*. For any 5 Ç V /et
Jfe(S) denote tAe cost o/a mtntma/ 5tetner tree/or 5 tn tAe nettworib (V, d) and
/or any S Ç V\{/ /et A;^(5) denote tAe cost o/a mtntma/ Stetner tree/or 5 tn
tAe contracted network (V\î/u{C/},d^). TAcn ifc(5) > ik^(5\t/) + fc(S n f/)
/or a// S Ç V . A/oreover, Jt(K) = Jt^(V\f/) +
Proo/ : Let 5 Ç V, let F be a minimal Steiner tree for 5 in the network
(V,d), such that 5 n £/ is connected. That such a tree exists follows from
the minimality of d and lemma 4.24. Let £ be the set of edges with both
endpoints in 5 n C7 in this tree, and let F be the set of edges with at least
one endpoint in S\£/. So
Since S n [/ is connected in F, it follows that ( S n £ / , £ ) is a tree. Hence,
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t- We shall also construct a tree for 5\t/ in the network (V\l/ U
Let {t, j} £ f. At least one of the endpoints of this edge, say i, lies in 5\t/.
If also j € 5\f/, then use this edge in the tree. Otherwise, use the edge
{i, [/} (with smaller weight than {t,j} in the network (V,d)) instead. These
edges together form a tree for 5\f/ in the network (V\(/ U {t/},<^). The
total added weight is at most X)eef **•• Hence,
We conclude that
n tf) + it"
To prove that Jfc(V) = *([/) + ifc^(V\f7) let Fy be a minimal Steiner tree
for £/ in the network (V, rf) and let Fy\[/ be a minimal Steiner tree for V\t/
in the network (K\£/ u {£/},<^).
Let E denote the edge set of Ft/. Define the edge set F as follows. If
{i,j} is an edge in Tv\y with i e V\(/ and > G V\[/, then put {i,j} € #\
If {t,(/} is an edge in IY\t/> then find j £ t/ such that d /^ = d,, and put
{ I , J} e f. Now (V, E u F) forms a tree with node set V in the network
(V,d). Hence,
The reversed inequality was already proved, so it follows that
jfc(V) = *(£/) + *" (V\[/).
•
Theorem 4.29 Let (iV,c) 6e a A/CF yomc tvifA «et o/aupp/iera Af,
on t/ie networik (^ V U Af, d). // |Af | = 2, tAen c Ao« a non-empty anti-core.
Proo/ : We denote the two suppliers by 6 (black) and u; (white). Fur-
thermore, we denote the set of players who wish to be connected to 6 by
fl, and the set of players who wish to be connected to u; by W\ We as-
sume fl n W = 0, since otherwise the anti-core is non-empty according to
theorem 4.25. Furthermore, we assume that all minimal forests for ,/V are
spanning trees with node set iV U {if} U {6}, since otherwise the anti-core is
non-empty according to theorem 4.26.
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First assume that the weight function d is minimal. Let fl = B u {6}
and 1V = WU {w}- Furthermore, let (W,c) be the Steiner tree game in the
network (W U {B},d*), where W is the player set, tu is the supplier and
B is contracted to one node, which acts as the only switch in this Steiner
tree game. According to theorem 4.27 this game has a non-empty anti-core.
Choose i G ACore(c).
Let (fl,Cfl) be the subgame of (TV, c) restricted to the player set B, i.e.
CB(5) = c(5) for all S Ç B. Since the weight function d is minimal, it
follows from lemma 4.24 that for each 5 Ç .0 there exists a minimal forest
for 5 in which 5 U {6} is connected. Hence, this minimal forest is a minimal
tree with node set 5u{6}. We conclude that (B ,CB) is a MCST game. Such
a game has a non-empty anti-core, so choose y € ACore(cfi).
Let 5 Ç TV. If the minimal forest for coalition 5 consists of a minimal
Steiner tree that connects the nodes of (Sniy)u{u>} plus a minimal Steiner
tree for ( S n f l ) u {6}, then we have
c(5) = c(5 n W) + c(5 n B) > c(5 n W) + CB(5 n B).
If the minimal forest for coalition 5 consists of one Steiner tree that connects
all nodes in 5 U {w} U {6}, then we have according to lemma 4.28 that
c(5) = Jfc(_S U {6} U {tu})
Furthermore, we have
If we define z = (i,y), then
z(S) = y(5 n B) + i ( 5 n W) < CB(S n B) + c(5 n W ) < c(5)
and
z(AT) = y(B) + z(H0 = CB(B) +
We conclude that ACore(c) / 0, which proves that the lemma is true when
the network is minimal.
Now assume that (ATu A/, d) is not minimal. Then choose an edge {t,j}
which is not minimal. Lower the weight of the edge {«, j} until one of the
following two happens.
i) The edge {i,j} becomes minimal.
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ii) An optimal forest exists which consists of two components.
Let us denote the game with the lowered weight function by c. Since ê < e
and ê(JV) = c(Af), it is sufficient to prove that ACore(c) / 0. If ii) is the
case, this follows from theorem 4.26. Otherwise, we choose another edge
{•>j} which is not minimal and we repeat the process. We continue until
ii) happens or until the weight function becomes minimal. In both cases we
conclude that the anti-core is non-empty. Q
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Chapter 5
Assignment games
This chapter is based on Kuipers[3Oj.
5.1 Assignment problems
In this section we consider the mu/tt-</tmen«tona/ aast'jnment pro6/em. We
derive upper bounds for the ratio between the value of its LP-relaxation and
the value of the integer problem. Furthermore, the worst case behaviour of
a greedy algorithm for the p-dimensional problem is analysed. In section 5.2
these results are used in the analysis of assignment games.
Consider the following situation. Given are a set A of amplifiers, a set fl
of pairs of loud-speakers and a set C of cd-players. With these we are able
to assemble a number of stereo-sets (at most min(|A|, |fl|, |C|)) consisting of
one amplifier, one cd-player and one pair of loud-speakers. Not all cd-players,
amplifiers and loud-speakers need to be identical and therefore some stereo-
sets that can be assembled may have a higher appreciation than others. Let
&oic denote the appreciation given to the stereo-set consisting of amplifier
a € A, pair of loud-speakers 6 € B and cd-player c G C. The problem is to
assemble a number of stereo-sets such that the total added appreciation of
these sets is maximized. This can be formulated as an integer programming
problem.
max
Eo,c
Subject to £»,e laic < 1
1
{0,1}
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I P describes a 3-dimensional assignment problem. It is a maximization
version in which the restrictions are inequalities, reflecting that it is not nec-
essary to use every component in a stereo-set. So this version differs slightly
from the standard formulation, in which the total weight is minimized, the
restrictions are equalities and |A| = |B| = |C|. The standard version is
well-known to be .A/P-hard. It is A/P-hard even when all weights fc<,ic are
0 or 1 (see e.g. Garey and Johnson[20]). By subtracting 1 from all weights
in such an instance, we obtain an instance where all weights are 0 or - 1 .
Hence, the standard version is also .V-P-hard when all weights are 0 or — 1.
The maximization version with weights 0 and 1 is easily transformed into
a minimization version with weights 0 and - 1 by altering the signs of all
weights. Hence, the two versions are equivalent when |A| = |B | = |C|. We
conclude that also 7P is .A/P-hard. Furthermore, no f-approximate polyno-
mial algorithm exists for the standard version unless P = .A/P (see Crama
and Spieksma[10]). For our version the case is different, as will become clear
in the proof of theorem 5.1. From now on we only discuss the maximization
version with inequality constraints.
By W we denote i4UÔuC, the collection of all objects in the assignment
problem. By v/p(7V) we denote the value of an instance of the assignment
problem. The LP-relaxation of I / ' is obtained by replacing the constraints
*a6e G {0>l} by Xa6c > 0- We denote the value of the LP-relaxation by
An obvious generalization is possible to p-dimensional assignment prob-
lems. In the p-dimensional case it is the aim to construct an optimal set of
p-tu pies, where the p objects of each tuple are to be chosen from the sets
A j , . . . , Ap respectively.
Suppose we have an instance of the 3-dimensional assignment problem
in which |A| = |B| = |C| = n and in which all weights fc<,4<. are non-negative.
Consider the following greedy algorithm to solve the problem.
x = 0 ; i = 0 ; A,- = A ; fl,- = fl ; C< = C ;
while i < n
begin
find di € A{, 6,- € 2?t, Cj G C, such that fca.t.c, is
maximal in {Jfcaie | a G A,-,6 € Bi,c € C,} ;
Ai+i = A, \ {a,} ; B,+i = flj \ {&,} ; C,+i = C, \ {c,} ;
*a,»,e. = 1 i
end
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In case A, £ and C do not have the same cardinality or in case some of
the weights are negative, the greedy algorithm should stop when no triples
are left or when only triples with negative weight are left. The algorithm
terminates with a feasible solution of the assignment problem, although this
solution need not be optimal. On the other hand the ratio between the value
of the greedy solution and the value of an optimal solution is bounded, as is
proved in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 For any instance o/ tne p-a*tmen«tona/ ajnj/nmcnl pro6/em
tne areea*y a/^ orttAm construct a «o/utton un</i va/ue at /east ^
To avoid notational complexity we prove the theorem for p = 3.
The generalization to arbitrary p is straightforward. The theorem is trivially
true when |A| = |fl| = |C| = 1. Assume the theorem is true when |/t| =
|fl| = |C| = n - 1. Let (ô,6,ë) be the triple which is chosen in the first
step of the greedy algorithm and let TV" = JV\{5,6,c}. Furthermore, let
/P(AT) denote the value of the solution provided by the greedy algorithm.
Let i be an optimal LP-solution for ./V. Construct an LP-solution for AT"
by removing all triples associated with ô, 6 or c. If we remove all weights
associated with 3 we, we remove
The same upper bound holds if we remove the triples associated with 6 and
c, so in total at most 3fc^ will be removed. We conclude that
«Lp(tf-) > « « » ( * ) - 3 * 3 . .
Furthermore, it is clear that
Combining these results and using the induction hypothesis we find
The theorem has two interesting consequences. First, it shows that the
value of the LF-relaxation stays within p times the value of the optimal
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integer solution. Second, since V£/>(.Af) > v/p(AT), the greedy algorithm
constructs an integer solution with value at least a fraction - of the optimal
integer solution. In a more general setting the second result was already
proved by Hausmann, Korte and Jenkyns[25]. The following example shows
that the greedy algorithm can actually reach its worst case bound of - times
the optimal value. This was also proved by Hausmann et al.
Example : Define the p x p matrix A as folio ws.
Define the p-row vector 6 b/ 6, = 1 for aii j . We see that two different rows
from the matrix A have no equai entries at corresponding places and that
row i from the matrix A a/ways has its i-th entry equai to 6j.
Now, we construct a p-dimensionai assignment problem as follows. By
P we denote the set {1,2,... ,p}. A p-tup/e in P*" has weight 1 when this
tuple corresponds to the vector i or to a row of the matrix A. Otherwise it
has weight 0. The vaiue of this assignment problem is p, because all p-tuples
that correspond to the rows in A can be assigned simultaneously. However,
the greedy a/gorithm may choose the tuple that corresponds to the vector 6
in its first step and it w/ii find a solution with vaiue 1. •
Let Ai , . . . , Ap denote the sets from which the p-tuples are to be con-
structed.
Lemma 5.2 Let i 6e on eztreme e/ement o/ tAe /ea«t'6/e region o/ tAe LP-
re/azatton o/tAe p- «ft menst on a/ assignment pro6/em. Suppose maxj*_j |A,| =
|Ai|. TAen i Aas anâG /4i tAat taites port in no more tAan p - 1 p-tup/es,
i.e. tAere ore at most p - 1 p-tup/es (3,02,..., Op) sucA tAat iâ,aj,...,o, ^ 0.
Proo/ : The set of equations of the LP-relaxation of J^ consists of fl
non-negativity constraints and 5ZI-^ «I assignment constraints. The rows of
the Sl^ i l assignment constraints are easily seen to be dependent. There-
fore the row space of the assignment constraints has dimension at most
£ |A, | - 1. An extreme point of the poly tope must then satisfy at least
FI I •A» I - (!£ l^ «l - 1) of 'he non-negativity constraints with equality. Thus,
an extreme point has at most £} |A |^ - 1 non-zeros. Now, suppose that all
points a G Ai take part in at least p different p-tuples, then this corresponds
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to a point in the poly tope with at least p| Ai | non-seros, which is more than
£?=l I-**»! ~ 1- The lemma follows. D
We use lemma 5.2 to derive a sharper bound for the ratio
in the following case.
Theorem 5.3 tVÀen ai/ weiyAto tn a p-rfim«rn»iona/ a««tonmen( proi/f m are
0 or 1, fAen Vip(AT) < (p - 1) t;/p(AT).
Proo/ : Again, we prove the theorem for the case p = 3. The theorem
obviously holds when |A| + |B| + |C| < 3. Assume the theorem holds when
|A| + |B| + |C| < n. Now, suppose |A| + |B| + |C| = n+1. Let x be an optimal
solution of the LP-relaxation. We may assume that |A| = max(|A|, |£ | , |C|)
and that x is an extreme point. According to lemma 5.2 we know that there
is an 5 e A which takes part in at most 2 triples. When B or C is empty the
theorem is trivial, so suppose B and C are non-empty. Choose 61,62 £ £
and ci.cj G C such that Xâ^e, = <*i» £3»,^ = aj and 13^ = 0 in all other
cases. We distinguish two possibilities.
0 kôtici = kô62C2 = 0- Let JV~ denote W\{a}. From the optimal LP-
solution for TV we obtain a feasible solution for W~ with the same value
by deleting the triples associated with a. So we have v ,^p(7V~) = «r,p(Af)
and v/p(./V~) < v/p(^). Using the induction assumption we find vj,p(Af) =
ii) At least one of the weights Jk .^c, equals 1. Without loss of generality
we assume that ai is the largest of the a's for which fcât,c, = 1- Construct
an LP-solution for 7V~ = TV \ {3,61,ci} by removing all triples associated
with a, 61 and ci. The total added weight that will be removed is at most
"2 + <*i + 2(1 - ai) < 2. Thus we have
- 2
Using the induction assumption we get V£,p(JV) < 2v/p(7V). •
It is well-known that for any instance of the 2-dimensional problem we
have V£p(iV) = v/p(./V). Hence, for the 2-dimensional case, the bound in
theorem 5.3 holds for arbitrary weights. We conjecture that the theorem
holds for arbitrary weights in the p-dimensional case with p > 2 also. The
following theorem states that the bound in theorem 5.3 is sharp in at least
some cases.
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Theorem 5.4 H<7ien p - 1 w a prime pou/er £Àere ore tn«tances o/ tAe p-
(/tmen«tona/ aâ«tynment pro6/em sucA tAa* V£/>(AT) = (p —
Proo/ : Let p - 1 = 7 be a prime power and let 5"^  be a field with cardinality
ç. Addition in this field is denoted by '©', subtraction is denoted by '0 ' ,
and multiplication is denoted by '•'.
Define for each A: in 5 ,^ the ç x ç matrix A* by
A£ = i 0 A: • i,
Consider two rows in two different matrices, say row t'i in matrix A*' and
row ij in matrix A ' . We ask the question whether these rows have an
equal entry at corresponding places, say at place j . Therefore we solve the
equation ii © iki • j = «2 © &2 • jt. This equation has the unique solution
j = (Jfci Qjtj)~i •(t20ii), where a~* denotes the unique inverse of a non-zero
element a E F, . It means that two arbitrary rows from different matrices
A*' and i4** always have exactly one equal entry at corresponding places.
The equation has no solution when Jbi = A:2 and ii ^ 12, meaning that two
different rows from one matrix do not have equal entries. Let £ denote the
9-column vector with all entries equal to 1. Define
We see immediately that any two rows from different matrices B* or two
different rows from one matrix always have exactly one equal entry at cor-
responding places.
We construct a (ç + l)-dimensional assignment problem as follows. By
f!^ "*"' we denote the cartesian product of ç + 1 fields ^ , . A (ç + l)-tuple
in F*+* has weight 1 when this tuple corresponds to a row in one of the
matrices B*. Otherwise it has weight 0. The value of this assignment prob-
lem is 1, because it is impossible to choose more than 1 tuple with weight 1.
However, the LP-relaxation of the problem has value 7, because the feasible
solution in which all ç' tuples with weight 1 are assigned for a fraction ^
gives us value 9 and theorem 5.3 says that we cannot do any better than
this. D
The construction in theorem 5.4 fails when p - 1 is not a prime power,
because in this case no finite field of cardinality p - 1 exists.
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5.2 Assignment games
In a natural way the assignment problem gives rise to a cooperative game.
Again, consider the situation at the beginning of section 5.1, but this time
all amplifiers, loud-speakers and cd-players are in possession of individuals
or players and each player possesses one object. Hence, we may identify
players with objects, so we have a player set Af = A u f l u C . The worth
v//>(5) of a coalition 5 Ç TV is the maximum value that can be achieved by
forming combinations (a, 6, c) within 5. I.e.
subject to £»,«*•»« < ls(a)
£a,e
£„,»
:<0,l>
In this formulation the notation 15(1) stands for
f 1 if 1 G 5
0 otherwise
By t>£p(S) we denote the value of the LP-relaxation of problem ^5. We shall
refer to the game v/p as the 3-dimensional assignment game. Of course a
generalization to p-dimensiona/ assignment games (p > 2) is possible.
For p = 2 we obtain the assignment game which was introduced by
Shapley and Shubik[51], so the p-dimensional assignment game is a straight-
forward generalization of this. In their paper Shapley and Shubik prove that
a 2-dimensional assignment game always has a non-empty core. Unfortu-
nately, for p > 3 the core may be empty.
Example : Let A = {1,2}, B = {3,4} and C = {5,6}. AW weights o/"
the trip/es in A x fl x C are 0 or 1. The tripies with weight 1 are (1,3,5),
(1,4,6), (2,3,6) and (2,4,5). Observe that this example was a/so used to
show that the bound of 2 for the ratio between the LP-re/axation and in-
teger version of a 3-dimensiona/ assignment probiem is sharp. We have
V/P(JV) = 1 and t//p(l,3,5) = t//#>(l,4,6) = v//>(2,3,6) = I / /P(2 ,4 ,5) = 1.
A core e/ement 1 shouid satisfy z(l,3,5) > 1, z(l,4,6) > 1, z(2,3,6) > 1
and i(2,4,5) > 1. Adding these four inequa/ities and dividing by 2 we find
z(JV) > 2. But 1 shouid aiso satisfy i(A^) = u/p(iV) = 1. We conclude that
the core of v//> is empty. However, the game vj,p has a non-empty core,
since (1/6,1/6,1/6,1/6,1/6,1/6) is an element of it. •
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For the reason that the core of a game may be empty, various solu-
tion concepts have been proposed that relax the core constraints somewhat.
Probably the best known relaxation is the e-core, introduced by Shapley and
Shubik[52]. The c-core of a game u is defined by
Core«(v) = {i e 2R" | z(tf) = v(W) and i (5 ) > u(5) - c for all S Ç J V } .
Here we present another core-generalization in which we relax the condi-
tion that each coalition receives at least its own worth to the condition that
each coalition receives at least a certain fraction of its own worth.
For a cooperative game v we define its Jfc-core as
Jk-Core(v) = {z G « " | i(AT) = v(AT) and Jbz(S) > v(5) for all 5 #
For obvious reasons we are interested in the minimal Jb for which the fc-core
is non-empty. We define Armjn(v) as the minimal A: for which fc-Core(t>) is
non-empty. We shall avoid pathological cases and assume throughout that
u(yV) > 0, in which case the minimum exists. Elements of the fcmin-core have
the following interpretation. Let z be an element of the Jt^in-core. Observe
that z is an efficient allocation such that each coalition gets at least l/&min
times its own worth. Furthermore, observe that for any efficient allocation
there will always be a coalition that receives no more than 1/^ mm times its
own value. Thus, in this sense the allocation z is the best one can achieve.
In case the game t; is zero-normalized the definition of the fcn,in-core is
equivalent to that of the /ea«t toz core, introduced by Tijs and Driessen
in [59]. Since assignment games are zero-normalized games, all theorems
concerning the fc^m-core are valid also for the least tax core.
Theorem 5.5 For a p-<ftmen«tona/ aaâtynment yame we Aave tAai
Proo/ : Again we prove the theorem for the case p = 3. Define fc*
)- The dual of the LP-relaxation of J>s is
min £a€vi"
subject tO Ua + V4 4- We >
Ua > 0
V» > 0
U>c > 0
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Let (u*, t/*,u/*) be an optimal solution for fi/yr- Then for any 5
with S^ Ç A, SB Ç B and 5c Ç C we have
and
Hence £(u*,v ' ,u ; ' ) G **-Core(t>/p) and it* > *„;„.
To prove that fcmin > *' suppose that j - * — (u, v, tu) is an element of
Core(v/p). Then we have for each triple (a"£,c) 6 A x B x C that
u« + v» + u>< > v/p({o,6,c}) =
«« > V/P({O}) = 0
v»>v/p({6})=0
{) = 0
Thus (u,u,u;) is a feasible solution for 2jv, yielding that
For any instance of a 2-dimensional assignment game we have
W). Applying theorem 5.5 we find that &„,!„ = 1 and consequently the
core is non-empty. So theorem 5.5 is a direct generalization of Shapley and
Shubik's result. Shapley and Shubik not only proved that any solution of
fijv is a core-element, they also showed that the core of a 2-dimensional
assignment game is precisely the set of solutions of fiw- Completely anal-
ogous we have here that the core of u^p is precisely the set of solutions of
2w- In general however {z/fc* | i 6 core(vj,p)} may be a proper subset of
fcmin-Core(v/p), hence not all solutions of fcmin-Core(u/p) can be found by
solving <2/v-
Another generalization of 2-dimensional assignment games was consid-
ered by Curiel and Tijs[l2]. Here they introduced mu/tt-a««tynment yame«.
Their model is very similar to ours, but not equivalent. In their model of
a p-assignment games there are p - 1 types of objects. The player set in a
p-assignment game is divided into two types of players, buyers and sellers.
Each seller possesses a bundle of p - 1 objects, all of a different type. A
transaction, where buyer i buys an object of type 1 from seller j i , an ob-
ject of type 2 from seller jj> etc. has value *i,y,,...j,_,- Observe that one set
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of weights induces both a p-assignment game v in the sense of Curiel and
Tijs, and a p-dimensional assignment game u;. Let i be an element of the
fcmin(w)-Core(tf). For a buyer i in the game v we define y, = Zj. For a
seller j , possessing the objects J i , • . . , ip- i , we define y, = H ^ i ^ - It is
straightforward to verify that y G Jfcmjn(w)-Core(v). Hence, we have the re-
lationship fcmin(v) < fcmin(tw) for a p-assignment game v and a p-dimensional
assignment game w defined on the same set of weights. This inequality may
be strict.
In section 5.1 we derived some bounds for the ratio VLP(./V)/V/P(./V).
Using these results we conclude with some corollaries concerning the fc-core
of assignment games. These corollaries put bounds on the maximum value
of Jkmin for an arbitrary assignment game.
Corollary 5.6 TAe p-core o/ a p-</imen«tona/ assignment oame is never
empty.
Proo/ : The corollary is a direct consequence of theorems 5.1 and 5.5. •
Corollary 5.7 WAen a// weig/its in a p-dimension a/ assignment game are
0 or 1, tnen tAe (p - l)-core is non-empty.
Proo/ : The corollary is a direct consequence of theorems 5.3 and 5.5. •
Corollary 5.8 WAen p — 1 is a prime power tne iound in coro//ary 5.7 is
Proo/ : A direct consequence of theorems 5.4 and 5.5. •
In analogy to the conjecture in section 5.1 it is conjectured that all p-
dimensional assignment games have non-empty (p - l)-core. Of course, for
p = 2 this conjecture is true.
Chapter 6
Extreme elements of the
core
This chapter is based on Kuipers and Derks[3lj.
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we paid considerable attention to the core (anti-
core) of various classes of games. In most cases we were satisfied when we
were able to construct at least one core element. For MCST games we were
able to do more than that, but despite the nice combinatorial structure of
these games, we were still not able to characterize all extreme elements of
the anti-core. In this chapter we are not so much interested in the charac-
terization of individual core elements, but we shall provide sharp bounds on
the numfier of extreme elements of the core and the B-restricted core.
Recall that for a game v with player set TV and collection of formable
coalitions S the B-restricted core is defined as
Core(B.v) = { i € i ? " | z(TV) = v(7V) and x(S) > v(5) for all S e B } .
We define the S-restricted upper set by
U(B,v) = {z€ ffi" |z(5) > u(5) for all S e S } .
In the following we shall provide bounds on the number of extreme elements
of the upper set. When TV 6 S then the restricted core is just a face of the
restricted upper set. Hence, any bound we obtain for the number of extreme
elements of the upper set is then also an upper bound for the core.
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For any two vectors i , y G 2R" their inner product is defined by £)"=i z^ y,-,
and it is denoted by zy. For any element i G U(B,v), let fl, Ç B denote
the collection of coalitions for which i(5) = v(5). i is an extreme element
of U(B, t/) if and only if the incidence vectors corresponding to the coalitions
in flx contain a set of n linearly independent vectors. Hence, a trivial upper
bound for the number of extreme elements of U(B,v) is I I. This
bound is a gross overestimate. McMullen[35] showed that the polyhedron
f = {i € JR" | Ar > 6} has at most
(
— n / \ m - n
extreme elements, where n is the number of rows of the matrix A and m is the
number of columns. Furthermore, Gale[l9] constructed examples of polyhe-
dra having precisely /(m,n) extreme elements, so that McMullen's bound
cannot be further improved fcr arbitrary matrices A (see also Chvatal[8] for
these results). However, for the specific type of polyhedra we consider, an
improvement of McMullen's bound is possible.
Let us define the polytope Q* as the convex hull of the origin 0 and the
incidence vectors of all coalitions in B. We shall prove that the number of
extreme elements of the upper set is bounded by n! times the n-dimensional
volume of the polytope Q*. Observe that Q* is contained in the unit Ayper-
cu6e, described by the restrictions 0 < *,• < 1 for all i € {1 , . . . ,n}. Hence,
Q* has a volume of at most 1, and it follows that the upper set has at most
n! extreme elements. However, if not every coalition 5 Ç TV is an element
of B we obtain a stronger bound.
Let X Ç jR" and i G X. i is said to be an intenor point of X if there
exists e > 0 such that for all d G ZR" with ||d|| < 1 and all £ with 0 < 6" < £
we have i + W e X. Here ||d|| denotes the Euclidian norm of the vector d.
The set of all interior points of X is called the interior of X.
Let z be an extreme element of U(B,v) and let <Jz Ç <J* denote the
convex hull of 0 and the incidence vectors of the elements of Sx- It is intu-
itively quite clear that Q, •"< Qy has an empty interior for any two distinct
extreme elements i , y G P (see also figure 6.1). We give a proof of this result
in lemma 6.2. We need the following lemma as an intermediate result.
Lemma 6.1 Let i i , . . . , im G -R" and /et X denote tAe convez Au// o/ tAeae
potnt«. // z is on interior point o/ X tncn tAere ezi«t strictiy positive Aj,
(i = 1,...,m) untn £ £ i A, = 1, «ucA tAot z = £ £ j A,z,.
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Since z lies in the interior of X, it is possible to choose e > 0 such
that « + e £ £ i ( * - *i) € -K- Hence, we can find ^ > 0, (i = 1,.. . ,m)
with J X i Mi = 1, such that z + e £,™ ,(z - x.) = £ " , /*.*• It follows that
z = J2Î^I(MI + t)x,/(l + em). The lemma follows immediately by setting
em). D
Lemma 6.2 Let x and y 6e two tfottnct extreme e/emento o/ i/(B,t>). T/ien
Qz n Qy Aas an empty interior.
Proo/ : Let x and y be two distinct extreme elements of U(B,v) and
suppose that Qz n Qy has a non-empty interior. Choose c in the inte-
rior of Qr n Qy. Obviously, c lies also in the interior of Q,. Therefore,
it can be written as a convex combination of its extreme points, with all
coefficients strictly positive, i.e. c = SseS ^5^5 with A$ > 0. We have
that y(5) > v(5) for at least one S e B,. Since A^ > 0 it follows that
cy = SseB, ^5 y(^) > DseB ^Sf(S) = ex. Analogously one proves that
cz > cy, a contradiction. Q
As a consequence of lemma 6.2, the n-dimensional volume of the union
of polytopes Qz is simply the sum of their volumes. In the following we shall
provide a lower bound on the volume of Qz. This gives us then an upper
bound on the number of polytopes Qz that can be contained in Q*, or
equivalently it gives us an upper bound on the number of extreme elements
of U(B,v).
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A set of n + 1 vectors xo,xi, • • • >*n € ^ " is called a^înc/j/ in
if the vectors Xi - xo,... ,!„ - xo are linearly independent. If the vectors
xo,Xi,...,Xn are affinely independent, then the convex hull of their end-
points is called a atmp/ez.
Let Q be a polytope. A collection of simplices 5 is called a atmp/tcia/
suirfttnaton of Q if
= Q and
ii) the interior of 5 D T is empty for all 5,T G S with 5 ^ T.
Let w = (jri,..., *„) be a permutation of { l , . . . , n } . For each A: G
{1, . . . ,n}, let u,r * G 2R" be the vector with ones at coordinates JTJ, ... , xt
and zeros elsewhere. The vectors u,_i,. . . , u*,,, are linearly independent, and
hence the convex hull of the origin 0 and the endpoints of the vectors u^,t
is a simplex. Let us denote this simplex by S*. Furthermore, let us denote
the collection of simplices 5 , over all permutations JT by S.
Lemma 6.3 !TAe co//eclion 5 i« a «tmp/tcia/ su6<fivwi'on o/ £ne untt Ayper-
cufor in # " .
Proo/ : Let ÎT and a be two different permutations of {1 , . . . ,n}. We have
to prove that S* n5j, has an empty interior. Suppose i lies in the interior of
5 , n S j . Obviously, i lies also in the interior of S,. Therefore, we can write
with X)"=i Aj = 1 and Aj > 0 for all i G { 1 , . . . , n}. Observe that
Now, using that A, > 0 for all i G {1 , . . . ,n} we find that
Analogously one proves that
a contradiction.
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We now have to prove that the union of elements in S is the unit hyper-
cube. Since each member of 5 is trivially contained in the unit hypercube,
it follows that also the union is contained in the unit hypercube.
Finally, to prove that the unit hypercube is contained in the union of
elements of 5, let z be an element of the unit hypercube. Take a permutation
IT, such that i», > i», > . . . > z»,,. Then x can be written as a non-
negative combination of the vectors u , , , say z = £"=1 A,u», with A,- > 0
for all t € { l , . . . , n} . Observe that u , i t i , , = 1 for all i € { l , . . . , n } .
Furthermore, u, n = z», < 1, since z is an element of the unit hypercube.
It follows that
Hence, z is a convex combination of 0 and the vectors u»^ and it follows
that i € 5 , . D
The collection S is well-known in literature (see e.g. Mara[32]). There an
even stronger result is proved for 5, namely that the intersection of any two
distinct simplices in 5 is a face of both simplices. A simplicial subdivision
with this property is called a trtanpu/ation.
Let us denote the volume of an n-dimensional body X Ç JÎ" by V(X).
The following theorem is well-known in linear algebra. For a proof we refer
to Birkhoff and MacLane[6].
Theorem 6.4 Let X Ç 5?" and /et /I 6e a «auare maJrt'z o/ a*tmenaton
n. TAen ^({Az | z € X} = |det(A)| V(X), u>Aere det(yl) denote* tAe
o/ tAe matrtz A.
Using this theorem one easily proves the following lemma.
Lemma 6.5 Let 01,02,... ,<in € 52" and /et /I 6e tAe motrtz twttA co/umnj
ai,a2, . . . ,<!„. TAen tAe n-(ftmen«tona/ t/o/ume o/ tAe convex Au// o/ tAe vec-
tor* oi, 02,... ,a^ and 0 eçuais |det(;4)|/n!.
Proo/ : According to lemma 6.3, the simplices S, € S form a simplicial
subdivision of the unit hypercube. For reasons of symmetry all simplices
5» have the same volume, and since there are n! of such simplices, each of
them has volume 1/n!. In particular, the simplex 5, which is associated
with the permutation (1,2,.. . ,n) has volume 1/n!. Let 5 be the matrix
with columns aj,O2 - 01,03 - aj, . . . ,<!„- a,,_i. Now, {Bz | z G 5} is pre-
cisely the simplex spanned by the vectors a i , . . . ,<!„. Applying theorem 6.4
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we find that its volume equals |det(B)| V(5) = |det(B)|/n! = |det(A)|/n!. D
Now we are in a position to provide a lower bound on l*(Qz)- ^ '
Lemma 6.6 Let z 6e an extreme e/ement o/ £/(B,v). TAen V(Qz) > 1/n!.
Proo/ : Since z is an extreme element of U(S,u), the incidence vectors in
{Is | 5 G Sz} contain a set of n independent vectors, say zi, Z2,. . . , z«. Ac-
cording to lemma 6.5 the volume of the convex hull of the points zj,Z2, • • • , in
and 0 equals |det(zi, . . . ,z,,)|/n!, where det(zi , . . . , z,,) denotes the deter-
minant of the matrix with columns i i , . . . , z,,. All entries of this matrix are
integer, so its determinant is also integer. The independency of the columns
in the matrix ensures that the determinant is unequal to 0 and therefore,
|det( i i , . . . ,Zn)| > 1. Consequently, the volume of the convex hull of the
points Zi,Z2,...,Zn and 0 is at least 1/n!. Since this convex hull is con-
tained in Qz> also Qz has a volume of at least 1/n!. D
Theorem 6.7 î/(B,v) Aa« at mo«t n!V(Q*) eztreme e/ement«.
Proo/ : Let £7 denote the set of extreme elements of U(3,v). Clearly,
Q« Ç Q* for all z G £. Hence, UxefiQz Ç Q* and
V(Q") > V ( u ^ g z ) .
According to lemma 6.2, the intersection of any two polytopes Qz and Qy
with i , y e £ ( i / y ) has an empty interior, and therefore
Furthermore, each polytope Q, has a volume of at least 1/n!. Hence,
z€E
Combining these results the theorem follows.
Corollary 6.8 For any collection 3 ana" characteristic /unctton v tAe po/y-
Ae</ron i/(B,v) /»as at most n! extreme pointa.
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J*ro©/: Q* is contained in the unit hypercube, described by the restrictions
0 < x, < 1 for all i € { 1 , . . . . n}. Hence, V(Q*) < 1 and the corollary follows
immediately from theorem 6.7. Q
In section 6.2 we shall prove that the bound mentioned in corollary 6.8
is sharp. Clearly, the maximum of n! extreme elements of U(S,v) can only
be achieved if S = 2*. If B is a proper subset of 2* , then V(Q') is strictly
less than 1, and hence the bound in theorem 6.7 is strictly less than n!. In
section 6.2 we shall investigate structures on 0, such that we can find nice
expressions for the volume of the polytope (J*.
6.2 Graph induced polytopes
Let G be an undirected graph with vertex set Af = { 1 , . . . , n} . We say that
a subset 5 Ç JV is G-connected if the subgraph on the vertices in 5 is a
connected graph. Let Qc denote the convex hull of all incidence vectors
of G-connected sets, including the null vector. Q G i> called the G-tn<fuee<f
polytope. In this section we shall be interested in determining an upper
bound for the number of extreme elements of the polyhedron U(B, v) in case
all elements of B G-connected.
According to theorem 6.7 it suffices to find an expression for the n-
dimensional volume of the graph induced polytope Q G if we want to derive
an upper bound for the number of extreme elements of U(B,t;).
If 5 is a simplicial subdivision of <2G> then the volume of Q G is simply the
sum of the volumes of the simplices in the simplicial subdivision. We have
seen in lemma 6.3 that the volume of a simplex can easily be expressed in
the determinant of a matrix. Hence, if we are able to construct a simplicial
subdivision of the graph induced polytope, then this will enable us to find
its volume.
Let * = ( » i , . . . ,JTn) be a permutation of { l , . . . , n } . For each fc G
{ l , . . . , n } , let u , t again be the vector with ones at coordinates JTJ, . . . , jr*
and zeros elsewhere, and let (/, t = {*i, . . . , * • * } . Furthermore, let VG,*,*
denote the G-component of £/, * which contains JT*. Finally, let fc,ir,i be the
(0, l)-vector with ones at places which correspond to elements in VG.T.I and
zeros elsewhere. If no confusion can arise, we shall omit the subscript G in
our notation, so we write V, * and v»_t.
Example : Consider the graph in figure 6.2, and iet * = (1,3,2,4).
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Then we have
and
/ l A
0
0
V o J
. "ir,2 =
1 * 10
1
I ^ I1
1
1 * 11
1
/ l A
0
0
0 ;
' 0 ^
0
1
0 ;
. " , , 3 =
' 1 ^
1
1
0 ,
/ j \
1
1
In the example the vectors u» i , . . . , v» 4 are linearly independent. This
is true in general and it will be proved in lemma 6.11. Therefore, the con-
vex hull of the points tv. i , . . . , v ,^n and 0 is a simplex. Let us denote this
simplex by 5G , and let us denote the collection of simplices S^^ over all
permutations TT by Sc- The cardinality of SG can be less than n!, because
two simplices 5^ , and SG_<, can be the same, while the permutations * and
a are different.
Example : Consider the graph in figure 6.2 again, iet x = (1,3,2,4)
and a = (3,1,2,4). The reader can easi/y verify that
= conv{
' 0 ^
0
0
0
' 1 ^
0
0
loi
' 0 ^
0
1
V /
/ 1 ^
1
1
0 ,
/ 1 \
1
1
1
The following lemmas give some insight in the structure of the collections
{tfr.i,...,£/»,*} and {V,,i,...,W,n}.
Lemma 6.9 Let G 6e an una't'rectea' prapA untn vertex «et TV, iet 1 it a
permutation 0/ W ana* /et V,_i,... ,V,_n 6e de/inca* aa a6ove. For a// V, IV €
<"»« 0/ *«e /o//ounny tnrce statements w true.
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figure 6.2
V U W M not C-connecterf.
Proo/ : Suppose that neither V Ç IV nor W Ç V. Let i, j be such that
Without loss of generality we assume that i < j .
is a set which is strictly larger than V»^, it is contained in J7,j
= V,,j and
Then
and it contains ary. Then VuW cannot be connected, since by definition V,
is the largest connected set which is contained in £/* , and which contains
' i -
L e m m a 6 .10 Let G 6c an
mutation o/ TV and /et {/«-.l
TAcn
jrap/i wttn vertez act Af, /et JT 6e a per-
ir.i».. . , V»,n 6e rfe/tnea* as a6ove.
i^  eocn component o/£/»jt " an c/ement o/{VV,i,... ,V,,t}, ana*
«^ eacA component o/ VV,jfc\{?r*} »« on e/cment o/ {V, i , . . . , V , , t - i} .
Proo/ : Proof of i). We give a proof by induction on fc. Let S be a G-
component of [/,,*. If A: = 1 then 5 = C/»,i = V,_i and it follows that
the proposition is true in this case. Let Jt > 1 be fixed and suppose that
the proposition is true for A; - 1. If JT* € 5 , then 5 = V,^ by definition
and the proposition is proved for Jfc also. Now assume JT* ^ 5 . Then 5
is also a component of t/,r,i-i and according to the induction hypothesis,
•5 G {^ir,i, • • •, V,_fc-i}- This proves i). To see that ii) holds, it suffices to
observe that each component of V, *\{jr;t} is also a component of £/«•,*_!. •
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Let us now prove that the members of $G are indeed simplices. Moreover,
their volume is exactly 1/n!.
Lemma 6.11 Le* C ie a yrap/i twitA «erfea: «et AT = { 1 , . . . , n}, /et JT 6e a
permutation o/ t/ie e/ements o/ iV, ana* /et 5G,»- frc (/e^nerf as a6ot/e. Tnen
5o,» i« a simp/ez ana" "V(5G,jr) = 1/n!.
Proo/ : As a consequence of lemma 6.10 we can write
with 5,t 6 {0,1} and o~tt = 1. By permuting rows and columns, the matrix
with columns u^, i , . . . ,"»-,„ can be transformed into an upper triangular
matrix with ones on its diagonal. Hence,
|det(u, , i , . . . ,u, ,n) | = 1.
It follows that
1 = |det(u»,i,...,u»,n)| =
The fact that det(v,,i, . . . ,«, ,„) ^ 0 proves that the vectors «,.1, ...,«,_„
are linearly independent, and hence the convex hull of 0 and these vectors
is a simplex. Furthermore, it follows from lemma 6.5 that
Lemma 6.12 Let G 6e an unrftrecterf jrap/» twtn t/ertex «et iV, /et x 6e a
permutation o/ TV ana* /et tAe stmp/tces 5G,«- ai</ -?G,CT ^ a'e i^nea' as usuai.
£xact/y one o/ tAe /o/Zounnj statements w true.
nas an empty interior.
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Pro©/ : Suppose Sc.» # So,* Then at least one of the vectors u,^ dif-
fers from v«,j for all j € { l , . . . , n } . Equivalently, there exists a V €
{V,,i,...,VV,n} such that V ^ V^j for all > 6 { l , . . . , n } . Let X be the union
of elements in {V^i , . . . , V<,,n} that do not contain V as a subset. We shall
prove that V \X # 0 . If X n V = 0, this is trivial and we choose v G V \ X .
If this is not the case, we write X = Xi U . . . U X* with Xj € {V«,,i,..., V^,«}
and such that no two elements of { X j , . . . , Xt} are contained in one another.
Choose A^ such that X , n V ^ 0. Since V is not a subset of X,, there exists
a v 6 V\Xj such that v is adjacent to X,. i.e v is chosen such that X, U {v}
is connected. If v G A, for some j ^ i", then X, U X, would be connected,
contradicting lemma 6.9. Therefore v G V\X.
Observe that at least one element in {V<,j,.. ., V<,,n} contains V as a
subset, since otherwise V Ç AT = X, contradicting the fact that V \X ^ 0.
Let y be the intersection of all elements in {V«,,i,... ,V<»,r»} that contain V
as a subset. According to lemma 6.9 these sets can be ordered inclusionwise.
Therefore, V is just the smallest set in {V, , j , . . . , V,,,,,}, which contains V ai
a subset. Since y ^ V, it follows that V\V ?é 0. Choose w € V\V, such
that tu is adjacent to V.
Now consider the hyperplane described by the restriction !„ = £„,. We
shall prove that the simplex 5c,»• lies on one side of this hyperplane and that
the simplex 5G,<J lies on the other side. Define p G 2R" by
( 0 if i 5É v, u>1 if i = u
- 1 if i = u;
Hence, p is the normal of the hyperplane. Let i G { 1 , . . . , n}. First we shall
prove that p v<,,« < 0. If V Ç V<, j , then V^ contains both v and «/. Therefore
p«u,i = 0. If Vj, does not contain V as a subset, then it does not contain u.
Therefore p t/,,,, < 0.
Now we shall prove that pv,,, > 0. According to lemma 6.9, one of the
following three statements is true, i) V,, Ç V. ii) V Ç V,,,. iii) V U V,> is
not G-connected. If i) is the case then V,,, does not contain u/. Therefore
P"ir,» > 0. In case ii) we have that v G V,, . It follows that p t y , > 0.
Finally, in case iii), V,, cannot contain u> because V U {u/} is G-connected.
Therefore pv,,, = 0.
We conclude that all extreme elements of the simplex 5c,ir He on one
side of the hyperplane and all extreme elements of the simplex 5c,<; lie on
the other side. Hence, £<;_» H 5 G ^ has an empty interior. D
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Lemma 6.12 suggests that SG is a good candidate for a simplicial subdivi-
sion of the graph induced polytope QG- Unfortunately, this is not always the
case. Consider the graph in figure 6.2 again. The vector (1,^,1,^), being a
convex combination of the G-connected vectors (1,1,1,0) and (1,0,1,1), is
an element of Qc • It is laborious, but not difficult to verify that this point
lies in none of the simplices Se,*-. The reason is that the polytope QG does
not necessarily lie on one side of the hyperplane supported by the vectors
v*,i>- • • ,v»,n-
For a graph G = (^ V, £) we denote the number of G-components of a set
5 Ç W by A:G(5) or simply by A:(S) if no confusion can arise. We call the
graph G component tncreaatny if Jfc(5\{u}) < Jfc(T\{v}) for all G-connected
sets 5 and T with 5 Ç T and v € iV.
Lemma 6.13 Let G = (/V, £) 6e o component tncrea«tny jrapA and /et * 6e
a permutation o/7V. TAen tAe po/j/tope QG We* on one «ide o/t/ie Ayperp/anc
6y tAe vector* t/»,i,..., v .^n-
Proo/ : Define p G tf?" by p,, = 1 - *(V,,,-\{jr,-}) for i G { 1 , . . . ,n} . We
shall prove by induction that pv»-_, = 1 for all i G { l , . . . , n } . Geometri-
cally, the vector p is the normal of the hyperplane supported by the vectors
Clearly, pv , i = p , , = 1. Suppose pv,,, = 1 for i G { 1 , . . . ,fc- 1}. Let us
denote the unit vector, which has a one at coordinate JT* and zeros elsewhere,
by e,j . In lemma 6.10 we proved that each component of V^t\{jrt} is
an element of the collection {V»,i,..., V,^_i}. Consequently, we can write
"»,* — «ir» = Z3, = i ^y^irj with 5,- equal to 0 or 1 for all j and ]Cy=î >^ =
fc(VV,*\{**})- Using the induction hypothesis and the definition of p, it
follows that
t-i t-l
Let 5 Ç TV and let s denote its associated (0,l)-vector. We now show
that ps < Ar(S). We shall prove this by induction on the cardinality of 5.
Clearly, p, < 1 for all i € { 1 , . . . ,n} , so if | 5 | = 1, the proposition is true.
Suppose |S| = m and that the proposition is true if the cardinality of 5 is
less than m. First assume that S is G-connected. Let fc be such that ** € 5
and that JTJ Ç! 5 for / > ifc. Then 5 Ç V»-,*. Using the induction hypothesis,
lemma 6.14 and the fact that G is component increasing, we find
ps <
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If 5 has components S i , . . . ,Sj, then the lemma follows from . .
We conclude that p i < 1 for all i € Qc, and hence Qc lies on one side of the
hyperplane pi = 1, the hyperplane supported by the vectors v , , i , . . . , v,,n-
O
Component increasingness of a graph turns out to be equivalent to the
property of cycle completeness.
Lemma 6.14 Let C7 = (Af, E) 6e an tina*trecte<f yrapA. TAen tAe /o//ou*no
«tapements are eçuit/a/ent.
ij G w cyc/e eomp/ete.
«^ TAe co/Zection o/G-connected" «et« M c/o^ erf «naV interjection.
i«7 G M component increasing.
Proo/: i)=> ii): Let 5 and T be G-connected sets and suppose v, u> € S n T .
Let («o,.. . , «„) be a path from ti t o w which uses only vertices in 5 and
let (to,->*m) be a path from v to w which uses only vertices in 7' (so
«o = *o = v and «„ = t*, = u>). Suppose a, = t, for i = l , . . . , / i . If
/i = n or /i = m then clearly we have a path from v t o w which uses only
vertices in S n T . Therefore, suppose /i < min(n,m). Let it be the smallest
index greater than /i, for which one of the t,'s equals a*, say tj = «4. Such
indices exist since «„ = t^ = w. Then («>,, . . . ,«*) and (t/,,... ,tj) are two
vertex-disjoint paths from «^ = t^  to «t = tj. The set of vertices that lie
on these two paths form a cycle. According to i), this set is complete, and
therefore {«>,,«*} is an edge of G. Now, remove all vertices between «/,
and sjt from the path («1, . . . ,«„) and remove all vertices between tj, and t|
from the path ( t i , . . . ,£m)- Then both sequences remain paths from v to u>.
After renumbering the remaining vertices in both paths we have s, = t< for
1 = l , . . . , / i + l. Repeat this process until both paths are identical. The
process ends with a path from t; to to, which uses only vertices in S n T . It
follows that S n T is connected.
ii)=> iii): Let S and T be G-connected sets with S Ç T and v G S.
Suppose T\{t;} has it components. Denote these components by T j , . . . ,T*.
Define Sj = S n Tj for 1 = l,.. . ,)k. According to ii), the sets S, are all
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connected. Furthermore, no union 5, U Sj is connected, since otherwise
TjUT, would also be connected. Hence, the number of components of 5\{u}
is exactly the number of non-empty sets 5,, which is at most fc.
->i)=> ->iii): Choose a cycle vi, . . . ,«„,vi which is not complete, say
{".»";} ^ £• Assume that t < j and that j is the smallest index greater
than i such that {v,-,v,-} ^ E. Let 5 = {t/j, v,-_i,v,-} and T = {wi,... ,«„}.
Both 5 and T are G-connected and S Ç T. However, 5\{vy_i} consists of
two components, while T\{t>j_i} is connected. Therefore, iii) does not hold.
•
As the reader suspects by now, cycle completeness of a graph turns out
to be a sufficient condition to ensure that 5c is a simplicial subdivision of
Qc. We conjecture that the condition is also necessary.
Theorem 6.15 Let G 6e o cyc/e comp/ete yropA. TAen tAe co//ectton 5G W
a simp/tcta/ su6<ftvision
Proo/ : We have already proved that the intersection of any two distinct
elements of 5c has an empty interior. Therefore, it suffices to prove that the
union of elements of 5G equals QG- Suppose i G <2G- Let JT be a permutation
of { 1 , . . . , n} such that i , , > z , , > . . . > ! , „ . We shall prove that i € Se,*-.
Let p denote the normal of the hyperplane supported by the vectors
v*M, • • • >"ir,n- Since G is component increasing, it follows from lemma 6.13
that p i < 1 and that pv , , = 1 for all i G iV.
Observe that x can be written as a non-negative combination of the
vectors u,_i,. . . ,u,,n, and since each u,,, can be written as a non-negative
combination of the vectors u»,i, . . . , «»_„, it follows that i can be written as
a non-negative combination of the vectors v , i , . . . , v , ^ , say i = X)^ «"«-,t
with Ai > 0 for all i. Using that p v ^ = 1 for all i, we find
In other words, i is a convex combination of « , , ! , . . . , tv,n and 0. We con-
clude that i 6 5c,». D
Let us define the permutation num6er of a graph G as the cardinality
of the collection 5G and let us denote this number by pc- Applying the
previous results we obtain the following theorems.
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Theorem 6.16 L«t G ie an «nrftrectea* «rapA. TAe vo<vm( o/ tAe yrapA
tnt/ucea* po/ytope QG W at /cast PG/H!. £aua/tty Ao/d« t/G M a cyc/e comp/ete
jrap/i.
Proo/ : The theorem is a direct consequence of lemma 6.11, lemma 6.12
and theorem 6.15. O
Theorem 6.17 Let (JV, v) 6e a «ame ana* /et B Ç 2" i t « co/Zeetton o/
coa/ition« aucA Mat eacA coa/itton in 5 i« connecté untA rf«pec( to a cyc/e
eomp/ete orap/i G = (7V,£). TAen tAe numtcr o/ extreme e/ement« o/ (Ae
po/yAe</ron t/(S,v) û at most tAe permutation number pc- /n case G i*
connected tÀiâ 6ounrf a/ao /io/</«/or Core(S.v).
f roo/ : This is a direct consequence of theorem 6.7 and theorem 6.16. Q
The bound in theorem 6.17 is sharp, i.e. it is possible to construct ex-
amples for which the number of extreme elements of U(B,v) is exactly pc
in case G is cycle complete. In the following we shall construct such an
example.
A game (iV,v) is called convex if
< v(S u T) + v(5 n 7) (6.1)
for all 5 ,T Ç TV. Let us call a game «trict/y convex if
v(T) < v(S U T) + v(S n T) (6.2)
for all S,T Ç TV with 5 g T and 7 2 5. A strictly convex game (W.v)
satisfies
«(5 U {t}) - t>(S) < v(T U {i}) - v(T) (6.3)
for all i € iV and 5 C T Ç 7V\{i}, where the symbol 'c ' is used to denote a
proper subset. This follows directly from (6.2), by letting the roles of 5 and
T in (6.2) be played by 5 U {ï} and 7\
The extreme elememts of the core of a convex game are precisely the
n! marginal allocation vectors. Some of these marginal allocation vectors
may coincide, so that we cannot conclude yet that the core has n! extreme
elements. Strict convexity of a game ensures that all marginal allocation
vectors are different. To show this, let (TV, v) be a game which is strictly
convex. Let * and o* be two different permutations of JV and let it be the
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smallest index for which x* ^ o^. Furthermore, let / > A: be such that <TJ =
*t. Define 5 = {*i,... ,*fc_i} and T = {ai, . . . ,aj_i}. Then S C T. Let
m* denote the marginal allocation vector associated with the permutation
x and let m" denote the one which is associated with a. Then
m^ = v(S U {**}) - 1,(5) < v(T U {**}) - v(T) = m^ .
It follows that m* 7^  m". Hence, all marginal allocation vectors are differ-
ent and consequently the core has precisely n! extreme elements (see also
Shapley[49]). This shows that the bound in corollary 6.8 is sharp. To prove
that the bound in theorem 6.17 is also sharp we need the following lemma.
Lemma 6.18 Let (W, v) 6e a convex yarne, /et A Ç iV and let 5 Ç T Ç
7V\A. Furthermore, /et (5,)*_j and (Tj)*_j 6e partitions 0/ respective/y 5
and T, sucA tnat 5, Ç 7\ /or o//1 e { 1 , . . . , Jfc}. T/ien
v(5 U A) - ^ v(5.) < v(T U A) -
A/oreover, wnen v ts «trtct/y convex and 5 C T tAen tAe tne^ua/tty is strict.
Proo/: When the partitions of 5 and T contain only one element, i.e. when
Jfc = 1, the lemma follows directly from (6.1). Now, suppose the lemma is
true when the partitions of 5 and T contain less than A; elements. Define
Â = S* U A. Observe that A, the sets 5\5t and T\T* and their partitions
(5,)*J^ and (Tj)*!"^  satisfy the conditions of the lemma. According to the
induction hypothesis we have
_ *~1 _ *~*
v(S\S* U A) - X! "(S.) < w(T\3* U A) - 2 «(7;). (6.4)
From the definition of convexity it follows that
t>(TV7k U Â) + v(7t) < v(T U A) + v(5t). (6.5)
Combining (6.4) and (6.5) we find
«(5 u A) - X) «($) < «(r u A) - £ t>(r,). (6.6)
When t; is strictly convex and 5 C T, we may assume without loss of
generality that S* c T*. It follows that the inequality in (6.5) is strict, and
hence also the inequality in (6.6) is strict. D
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Theorem 6.19 Lei (# ,v ) 6e a «trictly convex jaroe and /et G = (N, E)
ie a cyc/e comp/etc jrapA. /WiAermore, /et £ denote tAe co//ectton o/ G-
conneeted coa/tttonj. TAen Core(B,V£) A as exaet/y pc extreme e/emento,
wAere vg denote* tAe jrapA restrtcterf game as (fe/inea* in 5ui«ection ^.5.£.
Proo/: Since coalitions outside S are not essential in V£, it follows that
= Core(B,Vfi).
According to theorem 4.8 the graph restricted game vg is convex, so it
follows that the extreme elements of Core(S,vg) are precisely the marginal
allocation vectors of V£. We shall prove that V£ has exactly pc different
marginal allocation vectors. Let * be a permutation of TV and consider the
system of equations
«(V».*) = «(VV.*) for all Jk e { 1 , . . . ,n} , (6.7)
where the sets V» t are defined as usual. According to lemma 6.10 the G-
components of (/, t are members of {V,,i , . . . ,V,^}. Let / denote the set of
indices t for which V,, is a G-component of t/»,t. Any x satisfying (6.7) also
satisfies
for all Jk € { 1 , . . . ,n} . It follows that system (6.7) has a unique solution, and
this solution is the marginal vector of V£ corresponding to the permutation
IT. Let us denote this marginal vector by m".
Let the permutations * and a be such that the collections {V»,i,... , V,,n}
and {V<7,i,..., V<7,n} are different. We shall prove that the vectors m* and m"
are different. Let Jk be the smallest index such that V,_t ^ {K*,i> • • • i Va,n}-
Let / be such that JT* = <7j. According to lemma 6.10 all G-components
of V»,t are members of {V,, i , . . . ,V,^_i} , and since A: is chosen such that
{V*M,...,VV,fc-i} Ç {Vp,x,...,V«vJ, >' follows that all G-components of
Vir,jb\{Tfc} are members of {V<,,i,..., V^^}. Now, let V be a G-component
of V,,fc\{**}. Since aj = JT* is adjacent to V, it follows that V j^ U V is G-
connected. Then, according to lemma 6.9, we must have either V Ç K<,_f or
^ Ç 7 . Since JT* € V<,_, and JT* ^ V, it follows that V Ç V^j. This is true for
all components of V,jt\{jrt}, so we conclude that V»_t\{jrt} Ç V<^ , and even
V»,Jb Ç V^, since jrt € V ,^,j. V,,* was chosen such that V,,t ^ {V^,i,..., V^n},
so V,jt # V^ ,j and it follows that V»,* C V<^ .
Let (V,)f_j denote the partition of V,,t\{*i} into G-components, and let
i)'=i denote the partition of V^_j\{ffj} into its G-components. Since K, is
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connected and Vi Ç V<, j , it follows that there must be a unique G-component
of V<7_j\{aj} which contains Vj- as a subset. Assume without loss of generality
that V; Ç VV< for t = 1, . . . ,p. Clearly, p < g. If p < ç, we define V< = 0 for
i = p + 1, . . . ,g. This way we achieve that (K)'=i and (Wi)i=i are partitions
of V, t\{xfc} and V<,_j\{^}, satisfying Vj Ç Wi for all ï G { 1 , . . . , g}. Applying
lemma 6.18 we find
It follows that m* ^ m".
Since there are pc different collections {V»,i,..., V»,n}> it follows that
there are exactly p<? different marginal allocations. •
6.3 Computation of the permutation number
In this section we provide some recursive rules for computing the permuta-
tion number of a graph.
Let G be an undirected graph with vertex set AT, and let G i , . . . ,G* be
the components of this graph. Then
PC = n ^ i p c , . (6.8)
Of course, applying this rule makes only sense when the graph G is not
connected.
Let G be an undirected graph with vertex set AT, and assume that G
is connected. Furthermore, let JT and a be permutations of Af, such that
*„ 5É ffn- Then the collections {v,,i, . . . ,« , ,„_ i} and {v«,,i,... ,v«,,n-i} are
different, because at least one of the vectors v^, has a 1 at place *„, while
the vectors v , , have 0 at place *•„ for all i G { 1 , . . . ,n - 1}. Since G is
connected, we have «„_„ = v,,,, = 1, where 1 denotes the all-one vector. We
conclude that {v, , i , . . . ,t»«-,n} and {va,i. • • • > Vn} are different and hence the
simplices Sc.ir and SG,? are different.
Let G' denote the graph which results from G by deleting the vertex i
from it. The number of different simplices in $G, which result from permu-
tations x with *„ = i is exactly the permutation number of the graph G*.
Consequently,
•etf
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if G is a connected graph.
Applying (6.8) and (6.9) and using that pc = 1 when G has only one ver-
tex, it is possible to compute the permutation number of any graph relatively
easy, although an algorithm based on these rules will not be polynomial in
the number of vertices of the graph.
For some types of graphs it is possible to give closed formulas for their
permutation number. We give two examples.
Example : A complete graph, /n this case we have 5« , ^ S<^ <, if
* ^ a. Therefore, the permutation number of a complete graph with n ver-
tices is n!. •
Example : A path. Let «„ denote the permutation number of a
path with n vertices. Combining ruies (6.5) and ^6.9 ,^ we find that «» =
J^ "Jo* «« «n-i-i if we adopt the convention «o = !• This expression defines
the weii-known Cata/an numbers, /n /7/ a ciosed formuia is given for these
numbers:
n+1 \ n j
Since a path is a cycle complete graph, we conclude that the Catalan numbers
form an upper bound for the number of extreme elements of U(fl,v) and
Core(B,u), when all elements of S are path-connected.
Recall that the essential coalitions of the dual of a routing game are all
path-connected. Hence, the number of extreme elements of the anti-core of
a routing game with n players is bounded by the n-th Catalan number. •
••Si-:H.$f;ti.-V-.-.•;••-.-
Appendix A
Graph theoretic notions
In this appendix we give the definitions of some basic graph theoretic notions.
Other notions are defined when they first appear in the text.
Let V b e a non-empty finite set and let E be a set of pairs of distinct elements
of V. The ordered pair G = (V, E) is called a oraj>A. The graph is called
directet/ if £ consists of ordered pairs. G is called unrftrectea' if £ consists
of unordered pairs. The elements of V are called verttce* or norfea, and the
elements of £ are called area in case of a directed graph and they are called
edyea in case of an undirected graph. Assume from now on that G is an
undirected graph.
The vertices v and w are called the endpotnto of the edge {u,u>}.
Two distinct vertices u, u; G V are called a<f;acent if {v, u>} G £ .
The deoree of a vertex v G V is the number of vertices which are adjacent to
v.
A sequence of vertices (vo, v i , . . . , v*) is called a pa*A if v, and u, + i are
adjacent for i = 0 , 1 , . . . , A - 1. «o is called the t'nttia/ vertez of the path and
Vfc is called its /ma/ vertex.
A path («o, • . . , t^) is called e/ementary if t>, ^ vy when i ^ j .
A path (vo, •.. ,t»t) is called a cyc/e if Jb > 3, vo = "fc and if no two other
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vertices on the path coincide.
Two paths with the same initial vertex v and final vertex w are called vertex-
rfûjotnt if v and w are the only vertices that these paths have in common.
The graph G is called connectée/ if for each pair of vertices v, u; € V there
exists a path with v as initial vertex and tu as final vertex.
A /oreat is a graph without cycles. J \ ï M ï * ^ .' ? " >
A tree is a connected graph without cycles.
A comp/ete yrap/i is a graph for which any two vertices are adjacent.
A graph is called 6i/>arttte if all cycles contain an even number of distinct
vertices.
The auAarapA on [/ Ç V of G is the graph with vertex set £/ and edge set
A component of G is a maximal connected subgraph of G, that is, it is a
connected subgraph, and there is no connected subgraph whose vertex set is
strictly larger. Sometimes we shall say that a subset [/ Ç V is a component
of the graph G, when in fact the subgraph on f/ is a component.
The complement of G is the graph with vertex set V and edge set (V x V)\E,
where V X V denote the Cartesian product of V and V.
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Samenvatting
In dit proefschrift beschouwen we situaties waar ecn groep van individuen
een samenwerkingsverband kan aangaan. Door het sluiten van zo'n on-
derlinge verbintenis zal de groep in het algemeen efficientcr kunncn func-
tioneren, dan wanneer de individuen afzonderlijk werken. Dit maakt samcn-
werking aantrekkelijk. De individuen wordcn «pe/era genocmd. We nenicn
aan dat niet alleen de groep van allé spelers kan samenwcrken, maar dat
ook elke deelgroep van spelers een onderlinge verbintenis kan aangaan. Ken
samenwerkingsverband van een deelgroep wordt een coa/iite genoemd. De
iara&erta/tefce /unctte geeft weer welke kosten of winsten aan icdere mo-
gelijke coalitie gekoppeld zijn. Spelersverzameling en karakteristiekc functio
tesamen noemen we een coopérante/ «pe/.
De cooperatieve speltheorie is de tak van wiskunde die bovenstaande
situaties beschrijft en bestudeert. Twee probleemstcllingcn zijn van belang:
welke coalities zullen zich vormen en hoe moeten de gemaakte winsten of
kosten van een coalitie verdeeld worden over de spelers in zo'n coalitie. Vaak
is het niet onredelijk om te veronderstellen dat allé spelers in een spel zullen
samenwerken in wat we de i/rofe coo/tite zullen noemen. Ook in dit proef-
schrift zullen we telkens deze veronderstelling maken. We concentreren ons
op de vraag hoe de kosten of winsten van de grote coalitie verdeeld moeten
worden over de spelers.
Een méthode die voorschrijft hoe deze verdeling moet plaatsvinden wordt
een op/oasmjsconcepf genoemd. Tal van oplossingsconcepten zijn in de litera-
tuur beschreven, zoals de core, de nucleolus en de Shapley waarde. Bij een
spel met n spelers kunnen zich 2" - 1 coalities vormen. Voor de zojuist
genoemde oplossingsconcepten kan de waarde van iedere coalitie van belang
zijn in hun berekening, zodat deze berekening al snel een praktisch onmo-
gelijke taak wordt.
Om deze reden zijn er oplossingsconcepten bedacht waarvoor de bereke-
ning slechts een deel van de karakteristieke functie vereist. Ook wordt on-
derzoek verricht naar klassen van spelen waarbij de karakteristieke functie
een zodanige structuur heeft dat de gangbare oplossingsconcepten eenvoudig
berekenbaar zijn. Beide onderzoekslijnen raken elkaar als voor een bepaalde
klasse van spelen het vereenvoudigde oplossingsconcept met een gangbaar
oplossingsconcept overeenkomt.
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Dit proefschrift kan men zien in het licht van dit type onderzoek. We
behandelen verschillende klassen van cooperatieve spelen waarbij de karak-
teristieke functie van het spel bepaald wordt door een combinatorisch op-
timaliseringsprobleem. Een voorbeeld hiervan is de klasse van minimaal
opspannende boom spelen, waarbij de waarde van een coalitie bepaald wordt
door een minimaal opspannende boom probleem, een bekend probleem uit
de combinatorische optimalisering. De karakteristieke functie van minimaal
opspannende boom spelen blijkt een structuur te hebben die de analyse van
het spel vereenvoudigt. We onderzoeken de eigenschappen van de core en
de nucleolus voor een aantal klassen van spelen die samenhangen met een
probleem uit de combinatorische optimalisering.
Hoofdstuk 1 van het proefschrift is inleidend. In hoofdstuk 2 beschouwen
we spelen waarbij slechts een deel van de coalities zich werkelijk kan vormen.
We geven condities op deze collectie van formeerbare coalities die het niet
leeg zijn van de core garanderen en die berekening van een core element of
de nucleolus aanmerkelijk vereenvoudigen.
In hoofdstuk 3 beschouwen we spelen die gerelateerd zijn aan het handels-
reizigersprobleem. Bij een bepaalde variant van dit type spelen, de rou-
teringsspelen, blijkt slechts een klein deel van de coalities relevant te zijn
voor berekening van de core en de nucleolus. Hier kunnen de resultaten uit
hoofdstuk 2 gebruikt worden voor een efficiente berekening van deze oplos-
singsconcepten.
Hoofstuk 4 behandelt verschillende varianten van spelen die verband
houden met het minimaal opspannende boom probleem. Ook hier blijkt
wcer dat de resultaten uit hoofdstuk 2 toegepast kunnen worden om bere-
kening van core elementen en de nucleolus te vereenvoudigen.
In hoofdstuk 5 beschouwen we spelen waarbij de coaiitie waarden bepaald
worden door een meer-dimensionaal toekenningsprobleem. Omdat de core
voor dit soort spelen leeg kan zijn, introduceren we een verwant oplossings-
concept, de Jt-core, en we analyseren enkele eigenschappen van de A:-core met
betreking tot meer-dimensionale toekenningsspelen.
Tenslotte, in hoofdstuk 6, stellen we onze interesse in het aantal extreme
punten van de core. We tonen aan dat dit aantal ten hoogste n! is als r» het
aantal spelers in het spel is. We geven ook bovengrenzen voor dit aantal als
slechts een deel van de coalities formeerbaar is. Een van de nevenresultaten
van dit onderzoek laat zien dat de core van een routeringsspel met n spelers
ten hoogste ^ j I I extreme punten heeft.
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